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Abstract
This thesis examines the impact of parental job loss and parental job insecurity on several
academic outcomes of their offspring.
Recent evidence has shown that parental job loss negatively influences the school performance
of their offspring. Chapter 2 uses an original dataset I collected myself (described in Chapter
1) to study the effect of parental job loss on children’s school performance during the Great
Recession in Spain. Conditioning on student fixed effects and observed covariates, the Great
Recession generates variation in job loss that could be considered analogous to that provided by
randomisation. The results show that after father’s job loss, students experience a negative and
significant decrease on average grades of about 13 to 19% of a standard deviation. This effect
remains unaltered once the impact of mother’s job loss on grades is accounted for. Interestingly,
maternal job loss has no significant effect on the school performance of her offspring. Moreover,
school performance prior to father’s job loss is not affected by future job losses, reinforcing the
causal interpretation of the link between father’s job loss and children’s educational outcomes.
Finally, the impact of paternal job loss is not homogeneous across students, but it is rather
largely concentrated among children whose fathers suffer long unemployment spells after job
loss and those students in already disadvantaged families in terms of the level of education of
the father. Therefore, these results are pointing out a mechanism (paternal job loss) through
which further inequalities might develop during and after a deep economic crisis.
Chapter 3 uses exogenous variation in regional labour market policies in Spain to identify the
impact of paternal job insecurity on the students’ probability of graduating from compulsory
education on time. Using data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey, average marginal effects
and local average treatment effects (LATE) are estimated. Results indicate that students whose
fathers hold a permanent contract (as opposed to a temporary, fixed-term contract) the year they
should graduate from compulsory education are, on average, 7 percentage points more likely to
graduate on time. LATE estimates are considerably higher, suggesting that those students whose
fathers obtained a permanent contract as a result of the availability of regional subsidies reaped
bigger benefits from paternal job stability. These results hold when maternal job insecurity is
also accounted for, and they are concentrated on male students. Importantly, these findings seem
to indicate that the pervasive effects of temporary contracts found elsewhere in the literature
go beyond the employees and affect negatively their children’s educational outcomes.
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Preface
Starting in the 1960s, the study of human capital formation has been centre stage of the economic
debate for a wide variety of reasons. One of the most notorious ones can be found in the seminal
paper by Schultz (1961) on investment in human capital: “It has been widely observed that in-
creases in national output have been large compared with the increases of land, man-hours, and
physical reproducible capital. Investment in human capital is probably the major explanation
for this difference.” Besides its macroeconomic relevance, human capital formation has been the
object of many studies at the microeconomic level. In one of the most influential works on the
subject, Becker’s Human Capital, we find a powerful hint describing why that could be the case:
“Probably the most impressive piece of evidence is that more highly educated and skilled persons
almost always tend to earn more than others.” (Becker (2009) - Introduction to the first edition).
Individuals with higher human capital have in general better earning and employment
prospects. Or as Schultz (1961) put it, by investing in themselves, people can enlarge the
range of choice available to them: it is one way free men can enhance their welfare. As a result,
a lot of effort has been devoted to understanding the determinants of human capital levels across
the population, and even if investments in human capital are multidimensional, the study of the
education dimension of human capital has had a predominant relevance.
Several studies have documented the effect of parental background and school inputs on
cognitive achievement, school performance and, more generally, educational attainment. This
thesis examines the impact of parental job loss and parental job insecurity (measured by the
type of contract held by parents) on several academic outcomes of their offspring.
Recent evidence has shown that parental job loss negatively influences the school perfor-
mance of their offspring. The developments taking place in the Spanish labour market since the
onset of the Great Recession provide a good scenario to further explore the impact of parental
job loss on children’s educational outcomes. Since no data was available to fulfill this purpose,
I designed a survey to collect panel data retrospectively on school performance and parental
employment history in a school in the province of Barcelona. Chapter 1 describes the main
features of the survey, the data collection process and the characteristics of the sample. In par-
ticular, Chapter 1 assesses the degree of the sample representativeness using different population
concepts: the school population, the population of Catalan schools, and the Spanish population
as given by the data in the Spanish Labour Force Survey. Finally, it also compares the labour
market impact of the Great Recession on the Spanish population and on the sample.
Chapter 2 uses the data described in Chapter 1 to study the effect of parental job loss on
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children’s school performance during the Great Recession in Spain. Conditioning on student
fixed effects and observed covariates, the Great Recession generates variation in job loss that
could be considered analogous to that provided by randomisation. The results show that after
father’s job loss, students experience a negative and significant decrease on average grades of
about 13 to 19% of a standard deviation. This effect remains unaltered once the impact of
mother’s job loss on grades is accounted for. Interestingly, maternal job loss has no significant
effect on the school performance of her offspring. Moreover, school performance prior to father’s
job loss is not affected by future job losses, reinforcing the causal interpretation of the link be-
tween father’s job loss and children’s educational outcomes. Finally, the impact of paternal job
loss is not homogeneous across students, but it is rather largely concentrated among children
whose fathers suffer long unemployment spells after job loss and those students in already dis-
advantaged families in terms of the level of education of the father. Therefore, these results are
pointing out a mechanism (paternal job loss) through which further inequalities might develop
during and after a deep economic crisis.
Chapter 3 uses exogenous variation in regional labour market policies in Spain to identify
the impact of paternal job insecurity on the students’ probability of graduating from compulsory
education on time. Using data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey, average marginal effects
and local average treatment effects (LATE) are estimated. Results indicate that students whose
fathers hold a permanent contract (as opposed to a temporary, fixed-term contract) the year
they should graduate from compulsory education are, on average, 7 percentage points more likely
to graduate on time. LATE estimates are considerably higher, suggesting that those students
whose fathers obtained a permanent contract as a result of the availability of regional subsidies,
reaped bigger benefits from paternal job stability. These results hold when maternal job inse-
curity is also accounted for, and they are concentrated on male students. Importantly, these
findings seem to indicate that the pervasive effects of temporary contracts found elsewhere in the
literature go beyond the employees and affect negatively their children’s educational outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Job Loss at Home: Children’s Grades during
the Great Recession in Spain. Methods
1.1 Introduction
Starting in the 1960s, the study of human capital formation has been centre stage of the economic
debate for a wide variety of reasons. One of the most notorious ones can be found in the seminal
paper by Schultz (1961) on investment in human capital: “It has been widely observed that in-
creases in national output have been large compared with the increases of land, man-hours, and
physical reproducible capital. Investment in human capital is probably the major explanation
for this difference.” Besides its macroeconomic relevance, human capital formation has been the
object of many studies at the microeconomic level.1 In one of the most influential works on the
subject, Becker’s Human Capital, we find a powerful hint describing why that could be the case.
“Probably the most impressive piece of evidence is that more highly educated and skilled persons
almost always tend to earn more than others.” (Becker (2009) - Introduction to the first edition).
Individuals with higher human capital have in general better earning and employment
prospects. Or as Schultz (1961) put it, by investing in themselves, people can enlarge the
range of choice available to them: it is one way free men can enhance their welfare. As a result,
a lot of effort has been devoted to understanding the determinants of human capital levels across
the population, and even if investments in human capital are multidimensional, the study of the
education dimension of human capital has had a predominant relevance.2
Several studies have documented the effect of parental background and school inputs on cog-
nitive achievement, school performance and, more generally, educational attainment.3 Parental
job insecurity, and more specifically, parental job loss, is one among these parental background
variables that recently has been shown to affect the educational outcomes of their offspring.
Rege et al. (2011) and Stevens and Schaller (2011) are among the most remarkable examples in
the literature.
1See Barro (2001) or Dome´nech and De la Fuente (2006) for more recent evidence on the macroeconomic
relevance of human capital.
2The different dimensions of investments in human capital include health, on-the-job training, formal education,
migration, etc.
3Todd and Wolpin (2003) provide a review of the determinants of the production function for cognitive achieve-
ment. Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) and Woessmann (2004) are some of the many papers relating family back-
ground and educational attainment. Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes (2011) provide a revision of this literature. Finally,
see Hanushek (2006) for a review on the impact of school resources on various educational outcomes.
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The developments taking place in the Spanish labour market since the onset of the Great
Recession provide a good scenario to further explore the impact of parental job loss on children’s
school performance. Without a source of exogenous variation for parental job loss, the identi-
fication of its causal impact becomes extremely difficult. Experiments in this field are nearly
impossible and would be extremely unethical. The Great Recession in Spain, however, provides
a source of variation in job loss that, conditional on worker fixed effects and additional observed
data, could be considered analogous to that given by randomization. With this strategy in mind,
I designed a survey to collect panel data retrospectively on school performance and parental em-
ployment history, in a school in the province of Barcelona. Some of the existing studies on the
subject had used job losses due to plant closures as a way to overcome endogeneity issues, but
they either relied on cross section data (Rege et al., 2011), or on a very aggregate educational
outcome measure like grade repetition (Stevens and Schaller, 2011).4
At the Spanish level, the already existing datasets do not offer the necessary information
to tackle the question. The PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) dataset
contains data on the test performance (mathematics, reading, science, etc.) of 15 years olds, but
the labour characteristics of the parents are scarce and collected only at one point in time. The
same happens with the data collected by the Spanish Ministry of Education, the so called “Eval-
uacio´n General de Diagno´stico”, that tests the knowledge in different subjects of 4th graders
in primary school and 2nd graders in secondary school. On the other hand, the databases that
have a panel dimension, like the different household panels or the Labour Force Survey, have
the advantage of observing the labour characteristics of the father for several quarters (or years
in some cases). However, information on their offspring’s educational outcomes is very limited.
In the majority of cases, there is only information about the education level reached at a certain
age for individuals over 16 years of age.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the main features of the making of the survey,
the data collection process and the characteristics of the sample. The rest of the chapter is
structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the questionnaire design and Section 1.3 presents
the stages of the field work and the data collection process. Section 1.4 assesses the degree of
the sample representativeness using different population concepts: the school population, the
population of Catalan schools, and the Spanish population as given by the data in the Spanish
Labour Force Survey. It also compares the labour market impact of the Great Recession on the
Spanish population and on the sample. Lastly, Section 1.5 presents some final remarks.
4Other studies that have addressed a similar question are Kalil and Ziol-Guest (2008), Coelli (2011), Ananat
et al. (2011) and Gregg et al. (2012).
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1.2 Collecting parental employment history data retrospectively:
The questionnaire design
Parental employment history data, together with personal and household characteristics, has
been collected through a questionnaire whose final design has been done in collaboration with
the school’s Principals and Parents Association, and is the result of different trials. The first
trial questionnaire was designed to collect the entire employment history of the parents ret-
rospectively. This idea was inspired by questionnaires used in developing countries in order
to reconstruct personal employment histories.5 This first type of questionnaire was tried on a
sample of school parents with a low and intermediate level of education reached. The main
problem with this type of design was that it was very complicated for the respondent, without
the help of an interviewer, to correctly answer the questionnaire. But due to time and resource
constraints, the data collection could not be done by using any of the following options: (1)
Personal interviews by employing interviewers, and (2) Computer assisted self interviews (given
that a big percentage of parents in the school never use the computer).
Given the above constraints the questionnaire was simplified. A new version included ques-
tions about the employment situation and job characteristics of the parents only for three
points in time: at the beginning of the crisis, in January 2008; in January 2010, and in Jan-
uary/February 2012 (this last point in time coincides with the period that the data was col-
lected). These points in time were chosen for two reasons. First, fixing the time at the beginning
of the year was thought to be helpful for parents to remember their employment situation at
that particular point in time. Second, according to the data provided by the Spanish National
Institute of Statistics (INE), the unemployment rate in Spain (and Catalonia) by the end of 2007
was the lowest since 1979, both for males and females. Accordingly, I was expecting to observe
the majority of parents of the children enrolled at the school in the academic year 2011-2012
to be employed in January 2008, and a considerable amount of involuntary job changes taking
place as the crisis deepened. Different versions of this shortened questionnaire were tried on the
previous small sample of school parents, and a final trial was done with a new sample of parents
that were not familiar with the questionnaire or its content. This final trial involved twelve
new families, and eight of them answered back. Thanks to their answers I obtained personal
feedback to minimise the level of complexity and time needed to fill the questionnaire.
The final questionnaire given to the families is divided in three parts: the household ques-
tionnaire (to be answered by either the father or the mother) and two individual questionnaires.
5There are examples of such questionnaires in countries like Burkina Faso -Migration Dynamics, Urban Inte-
gration and Environment Survey of Burkina Faso’ (EMIUB)- or Uruguay -Primer conteo y censo de personas en
situacio´n de calle y refugios en Montevideo, Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (MIDES)-.
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Both the household and the individual questionnaires contain a small section with brief instruc-
tions.6 The household questionnaire is divided in three main sections. The first section contains
questions about those children in the household that, at the moment of the interview, were en-
rolled at the school where the survey was taking place. The second section collects information
on the children that were living in the household, but were not enrolled at the school when the
survey was administered. Finally, the third section poses questions related to housing. One of
the more delicate issues about the questionnaire was that it could not be confidential. The name
of the student was asked at the beginning of the household questionnaire in order to be able
to match the household and parental information with the academic outcomes of the student.
Since this fact would most likely raise concern among parents, special emphasis was put on
guaranteeing the confidentiality of their data.
The individual questionnaires were aimed to be answered by each parent (or step parent)
as long as they were living in the same household as the children when the survey took place.
The first section of the questionnaire asks personal data like birth date, nationality, and level
of studies. The second section contains questions on the type of contract of the partner for the
three points in time mentioned above. Notice that this information is asked twice. First, in
the section just mentioned (questions 14 to 16). Second, as part of the questions concerning
the employment situation of the respondents in the individual questionnaire (questions 21, 30
and 46, respectively). This information is asked twice in order to reduce the potential amount
of missing data regarding a variable containing crucial information for this project: the labour
status of the respondents. Finally, the main part of the individual questionnaire focuses on the
employment history of the respondents. The design is such that if the individual had not changed
her employment situation since January 2008, then there was no need for her to respond the
questions referring to 2010 and 2008. But if the individual had experienced changes since 2010
(or 2008), then she was asked to keep on answering the questions concerning her employment
situation in 2010 (and/or 2008). If the respondent had lost her job, she was asked about the
reasons why this happened. This question is important since it allows separating voluntary from
involuntary employment changes.
1.3 Field work and data collection process
This section describes the stages of the field work and the mechanisms used to incentivise
parents to answer the questionnaire. It also summarises survey and item non response. Finally,
it provides information on the type of school outcomes available for the children of responding
parents.
6A copy of the original questionnaire, in Spanish, can be found at the end of this chapter. A translation of the
questions into English can be found in Section 1.6.1 in the Appendix.
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1.3.1 Stages of the questionnaire design
The structure and content of the questionnaires was designed between the months of October
2011 and January 2012. The final trial questionnaire was administered in mid January 2012.
Before that, a meeting was held with the principal of the school, the vice-principal, the coordi-
nator of the kindergarten grades and the president and vice-president of the Parents Association
(AMPA). The goal of this meeting was to inform AMPA representatives about the existence
and overall importance of the research project and have their support. Also, we asked them
to participate in a trial questionnaire to validate the design of the final questionnaire. Follow-
ing this meeting, the president of the AMPA handed in 12 complete sets of questionnaires to
other AMPA representatives. A meeting was held a week later with the AMPA representatives
participating in the trial, in order to have their impressions on the content and clarity of the
questionnaire. As a result, a few changes were introduced to modify some questions that were
perceived to be unclear. The final questionnaire was administered in mid-February 2012.
1.3.2 Mechanisms to reduce survey non-response
The process and the specific dates for the data collection were decided in agreement with the
school. Below there is a list of the elements used to reduce survey non-response.
• Meetings with the students and parents: The vice-principal and myself met the students
enrolled on compulsory secondary education and high-school grades in order to briefly
explain the students the existence of the research project. Given the age of these stu-
dents (12 to 18), these brief meetings were also aimed at motivating them to deliver the
questionnaire at home and convince their parents to participate. For students in primary
grades, the vice-principal and myself held meetings with the parents instead, in order to
inform them personally about the questionnaires that they were soon going to receive and
encourage their participation.
• The motivation letter: Together with the set of questionnaires, we attached a letter that
kindly asked for the collaboration of the families in the research project. The letter was
written in collaboration with the school, and signed exclusively by them. Even though
it was the school asking for the collaboration of the parents, it was explained that only
the researcher in charge of the project would have access to the micro data and that the
principal and teachers would only have access to the conclusions of the research project.
The letter also indicated how to return the questionnaires and the deadline to do so.
• The SMS to the parents: Since the number of students at the school outnumbered by
more than 200 the number of families, it was decided to give the envelope containing the
questionnaires only to the younger sibling at the school (since this is the system the school
5
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normally uses). Unlike most survey research, the questionnaire was not delivered directly
to the respondents, but to their children. Naturally, this particularity carried the addi-
tional problem that surveys may not actually reach the respondent. In order to minimise
this possibility, the school administration sent a text message (SMS) to each family on the
day the children received the questionnaires. In particular, either the father or the mother
of all the children at the school received a text informing them that they were going to
receive a questionnaire at home and that the school would very much appreciate if they
could answer and return it to the reception of the school. An extra SMS was sent to each
family before the deadline in order to remind them that they could still participate. A
considerable number of questionnaires were received a few days after the theoretical dead-
line, since teachers were still encouraging children to motivate their parents to participate.
• The website: Finally, a website was created as a tool to give additional information on
the research project and solve possible doubts about the questionnaires. In particular,
the website contained summary information on the project, a section on potential fre-
quent asked questions on the questionnaires and another section with examples on how
to answer them. Parents were informed about the site on the presentation letter received
together with the questionnaires. Also, they could find the address at the bottom of every
page of the questionnaire (omitted on the questionnaires reproduced here to guarantee
confidentiality of the school), and explicit mention about its availability was made during
the meetings held with both secondary and high school students, and parents with children
on primary school grades.
Finally, among the mechanisms that could not be used to increase the response rate was
the idea of offering an economic incentive. This type of material incentives to the families were
rejected by the school principals.
1.3.3 Survey and item non-response
A total of 313 families handed over the questionnaires. Since there could be more than one
child enrolled at the school for each family, this data corresponded to 436 children distributed
throughout all the grades. There were 931 children in 700 families enrolled at the school for the
academic year 2011-2012. Some children were not present at the school the day the question-
naires were delivered, so we were able to hand over questionnaires to children in 630 families.
The response rate is, therefore, close to 50% of the questionnaires delivered. After receiving,
coding and revising the questionnaires, three typologies of answers emerged. First, a total of 242
families returned the questionnaires completed (some might have had some minor cases of item
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non response, but in general the answers were complete and consistent). Second, some kind of
inconsistency was found for the answers of either the father or the mother in 58 families.7 In
order to correct these inconsistencies, the school allowed me to contact these 58 families again.
21 of those families handed over the questionnaire corrected. Finally, out of the 313 returned
questionnaires, 13 of them presented a substantial number of questions unanswered. These 13
families have been disregarded from the analysis. Additionally, 8 families did not provide the
name of the child in the returned questionnaires, and therefore it was impossible to match the
parental data provided with their offspring’s grades. Taking this into account, the final sample
consists of 408 students in 292 families.
Tables A1, A2 and A3 in Section 1.6.2 in the Appendix show the percent of missing data for
each of the questions in the household and individual questionnaires. Item non-response is very
low for almost all questions in the household and individual questionnaires. Importantly, there
is almost no missing data regarding the labour status of the father or the mother, after following
up with respondents to correct mistakes and manually review by using extra information in
the questionnaires. In every individual questionnaire, the father (mother) is asked to report
the type of contract of the partner. Thus, if the mother (father) did not answer what type of
contract she (he) has, I can use the answer given by the partner in questions F14, F15 and F16
(M14, M15 and M16). Questions related to net income and those pertaining to year 2008 are
the ones with a higher percent of missing data for both fathers and mothers. In the majority
of these cases, 2008 data is missing because the respondent skipped that section by mistake.
Missing values on net labour income can also be reduced by making use of extra information
in the questionnaire. For instance, for the unemployed, I can use the information related to
previous labour income and time in unemployment to reduce slightly the percent of missing
data. Table A4 shows the final missing values on income related variables after using extra
information in the questionnaire. Other than performing the usual follow up with respondents
and manual review of answers, missing data has not been imputed and will be dealt with when
faced with the different research questions that I pretend to answer with this dataset, if necessary.
7I detected two types of inconsistencies, associated with answering wrongly control questions. Control questions
are those in which the next question to be answered depends on the answer given by the respondent to that
particular question. In other words, depending on the answer to control questions respondents could skip a part
of the questionnaire. There are two types of control questions in the questionnaire. First, if the answer to questions
20, 37, and 55 was negative, then the respondent could go directly to questions 33, 51 or finished answering the
questionnaire, respectively. The first type of inconsistency found was when the respondent answered one of the
options one to four in questions 17, 34 and 52, respectively; but then she gave a negative answer in questions 20,
37, or 55. The second type of inconsistency was found when, for instance, the respondent said that she started
working in the current firm in august of 2008, but then replied to the control question 51 that in January 2008
she had the same labour situation or contract than she has nowadays.
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1.3.4 The data on school outcomes
There are different stages in the Spanish education system until a student reaches the degree
that would grant her access to higher education, and these are arranged as follows. Kindergarten
education is composed of two stages, none of them compulsory. The first stage is addressed to
children from ages 0 to 3 and the second stage to children from 3 to 6 years of age. Even if
it is not compulsory, 98% of the children of 3 years of age were enrolled in the second stage
of Kindergarten in the academic year 2008, according to the data provided by the Ministry
of Education.8 Compulsory education in Spain goes from the year the child turns 6 until the
child turns 16, and is divided in two stages: Primary School, with a total of 6 grades (until the
year the child turns 12, absent any repetition) and Secondary School, comprising 4 additional
grades. After completing compulsory education successfully, students can choose to enrol in
High-School (Bachillerato) for 2 additional years or in Vocational Training. The data collected
in this project refers to children aged 3 to 18, that are enrolled in either the second stage of
Kindergarten, Primary School, Secondary (compulsory) School or High-School.
For those students whose parents answered the questionnaire, the school granted me with
access to the grades of their children, for all subjects and in each academic term. The format of
the grades that students receive differs across the stages of education. The grades in Secondary
School and High-School have a number format ranging from 1 to 10, with 10 being the best
possible grade and the passing grade being bigger or equal to 5. In Primary School instead,
grades can take on 5 different values: (1) Fail, (2) Pass, (3) Good, (4) Very Good and (5) Excel-
lent. I translated the Secondary School grades for each subject into this 5-value scale following
the traditional convention in the school. Those with grades 1 to 4 in Secondary School were
assigned a grade of Fail (1). Those with a grade 5 in Secondary School were assigned a grade of
Pass (2). Those with a grade 6 were assigned a grade of Good (3). Those with a grade of 7 or
8 were assigned a grade of Very Good (4) and finally, those with grades 9 or 10 were assigned a
grade of Excellent (5) in the 5-value scale. The student in Primary, Secondary or High school
receives a report with her grades three times during each academic year. In the second stage
of Kindergarten, parents receive a report twice a year where different areas (Maths, Language,
Arts and Musical Education) are evaluated with short sentences. These short sentences can be
clearly positive (ex: the child can count from 1 to 5, the child can write her name, the child
distinguishes the colors, the child can recognise the songs studied, etc.), clearly negative (ex: the
child can not count from 1 to 5, the child can not write her name, etc.), or improving-type of
sentences (the child has improved when counting, writing her name, etc.). In order to translate
these sentences into a numeric grade for each of the areas evaluated, I have constructed two type
of measures. The first type of measure (Measure 1 from now on) assigns a value of 1 to positive
8Source: Datos y Cifras, Curso Escolar 2012-2013, Ministerio de Educacio´n, Cultura y Deporte.
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and improving sentences, and a value of 0 to negative sentences. After doing this, I computed
a simple average of the points obtained in each area in order to obtain a numeric grade ranging
between 0 and 1. Multiplying by 10, this 0 to 1 grade was converted into a 0 to 10 grade, and it
was translated afterwards into the 5-scale values with the same criteria outlined for Secondary
School grades. The second type of measure (Measure 2 from now on), assigns a value of 1 to
positive sentences and a value of 0 to improving and negative sentences. Average grades for
each of the areas is then calculated in the same way.
1.4 Assessing the sample representativeness
This section assesses the ability of the final sample to reproduce the characteristics of the pop-
ulation. Different population definitions will be used to achieve this goal. First, I will use the
population of 6th graders in Primary School in Catalonia in different academic years. Second,
I will use the school population during the academic year 2011-2012 (year of data collection).
Third, I will use the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS) to extract the sample of children aged
0 to 20 in Spain, Catalonia, and the province of Barcelona, in the 1st Quarter of 2012.
The variables analysed in subsections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 below have answers whose options are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. This is needed in order to perform a test of goodness of fit,
namely, the Pearson Chi Square test. This test establishes whether or not an observed frequency
distribution differs from a theoretical distribution. In particular, it tests a null hypothesis
stating that the frequency distribution of certain events observed in a sample is consistent with
a particular theoretical distribution. The value of the test statistic is given by equation 1, where
oj stands for observed frequency in the sample, and ej stands for the frequency in the theoretical
distribution.
χ2 =
k∑
j=1
(oj − ej)2
ej
(1.1)
1.4.1 The school within the Catalan school system
The school where the data has been collected is a concerted school in the province of Barcelona.
A concerted school is a private school, typically owned by the Catholic Church (80% of them
are and it is the case also of this particular school), that signs a long-term concert or agreement
with the government by which it becomes fully subsidised in exchange for implementing a state
school-like admission policy (Arellano and Zamarro, 2007). As these authors point out, nei-
ther the public nor the concerted school, in principle, charge fees because they are both funded
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through the taxpayer. However, in practice, the cost of attending concerted schools may be
three times larger than for state schools, but in either case these are much smaller amounts than
those faced by the small fraction of parents that send their children to non-concerted fee-paying
private schools (Arellano and Zamarro, 2007).9 For this particular school, the amount might
vary according to the level of parental income, but for kindergarten and compulsory schooling
ages, it is below or around 100 euros per month.
Figure 1 provides a description of the position of the school in the Catalan education system
in terms of the achievement of its students. The information comes from a test designed and
organised by the Education Department of the Catalan Government that all 6th graders in
Primary School must take, including all students in public, concerted and private schools. The
first test was administered in the academic year 2008-2009 and evaluated core competencies in
Catalan Language, Spanish Language and Mathematics. From the next academic year it also
tested the knowledge of 6th graders in English Language. The results of these tests are not
publicly available, but the schools receive a document with information regarding how their
students performed compared to the average school in Catalonia, and this is what is shown in
Figure 1 for the academic years 2008-2009, in the left panel, and 2011-2012 in the right panel.
Figure 1: Position of the school in the Catalan Education system
Source: Primary school evaluation, 2008-2009 (left panel) and 2011-2012 (right panel). Education Department,
Generalitat de Catalunya (Catalonian Government).
The results divide the level of core competencies in three categories: low (0 to 70), average
(70 to 90) and high (90 to 100). The results for the academic year 2008-2009 of 6th graders in
the school where the data has been collected are very close to the average results in Catalonia for
the 3 tested subjects. The same can be stated about the academic year 2011-2012 on average,
9According to the data for the academic year 2011-2012 offered by the Ministry of Education, 68.2% of the
students in general (non-vocational) education were enrolled in public schools, 25.4% were enrolled in concerted
schools and 6.4% attended private schools. Source: Datos y Cifras, Curso Escolar 2012-2013, Ministerio de
Educacio´n, Cultura y Deporte.
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although they performed slightly worse in English and slightly better in Maths. The school
does not have the data needed to compute whether the differences between the school results
and the Catalan average results are significantly different from each other. Nevertheless, these
results seem to suggest that, in terms of academic results, the school is very close to the average
Catalan school.
1.4.2 How representative is the sample of the school population?
The school granted me access to the data that they had in electronic format for the population of
all children enrolled at the school during the academic year 2011-2012. In particular, I got data
related to the distribution of students by grades, their birth dates and the postcodes associated
to the household residence for the totality of students enrolled at the school during the academic
year 2011-2012.
Figure 2: Postcode and month of birth of the students. Sample and School population
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. PC stands for postcode. The numbers in the x-axis of
the figure on the right represent the months of the year, where 1 is January and 12 is December
The left part of Figure 2 shows the distribution of the sample and school population across
postcodes. The height of the bars displays the mean (or percent of the sample/population
that lives in that particular postcode) and the vertical thin lines are 95% confidence intervals.
Postcodes 1 to 4 are the 4 different postcodes in the municipality where the school is located,
and students living in other municipalities are grouped in postcode 5. Postcode 3 is the one
where the school is located, and the one where the majority of students live.10 In general, there
are no remarkable differences between the sample and the school population regarding postcode
information and according to Table 1, the results of the Pearson Chi-Square test evidence that
10There is a list of admission criteria that need to be evaluated in order to access Catalan public and concerted
schools. Among them, the most important one is that the student that wants to access a particular school has
siblings already enrolled in that school. The second most important criteria is that the student lives in the so
called area of influence of the school.
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there are no significant differences between the frequency distribution in the sample and the
school population in terms of the postcode data.
Figure 3: Distribution of students across grade levels. Sample and School population
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Grade levels: K: Kindergarden; P: Primary; S:
Secondary (compulsory); HS: High School
The information related to the month of birth of students in the sample and the school
population in the academic year 2011-2012 is plotted on the right part of Figure 2, and the
results of the Pearson’s Chi Square test are shown in Table 1. Again, I can not reject the null
hypothesis that the frequency distribution of the month of birth observed for the students in the
sample is consistent with the distribution observed for the school population. Similarly, students
in the sample are distributed throughout all the academic levels. This can be seen in Figure 3,
and in the results concerning the goodness-of-fit tests shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Frequency distribution in the sample and school population
(1)
Pearson Chi-Square Test and P-value
Postcode 2.7073
(0.608)
Month of birth 8.1924
(0.696)
Distribution across grades 6.684
(0.946)
P-values for Pearson’s Chi Square Test in parentheses.
I also got access to data on school outcomes for the school population. Unfortunately, this
data was not available in electronic format for all the school population, but just for some groups
(e.g. for some subjects, grades and classes). Therefore, the figures and tables below do not use
data of all the students in the final sample, but rather of those students enrolled in grades for
which I also observe the final outcomes of the school population. The data both for the sample
and the school population refers to the 3rd term of the academic year 2011-2012.
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Figure 4: School performance in Mathemathics. Sample and School population
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Data refers to the 3rd term of the academic year
2011-2012
Figure 4 displays the data related to school performance in mathematics in the sample and
the school population. The top panels restrict the data to primary school students (grades can
take on values between 1 and 5, where 1 stands for Fail and 5 for Excellent) whereas the bottom
panels of the figure show the data for students in compulsory secondary schooling (grades take
on values between 1 and 10, where 5 is the passing grade and 10 is the best outcome). The
right part of the figure restricts both the sample and the school population to include only those
students with Spanish-like surnames.11 The reason to exclude those students that are likely to
be children of immigrant parents is that those children tend to perform worse at school and my
sample is very likely not representative of the immigrant population at the school given their
very low response rate. Figure 4 shows that even if both for primary and secondary school stages,
the students in the sample perform better than those in the school population, the differences
are reduced once the data is restricted to take into account only those students with Spanish-like
surnames. Moreover, the results in Table 2 show that there are not significant differences in the
11Unfortunately, I can not restrict the data to include only students of Spanish nationality since I do not have
data on the nationality of children/parents in the school population data. Restricting the data to include only
those students with Spanish-like surnames is just an approximation, since children of Latino origin will still be
included.
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frequency distribution of mathematical scores between the sample and the school population for
both Primary and Secondary school students with Spanish-like surnames. It is reasonable to
think, therefore, that the differences we observe in the graph would further decrease if I could
restrict both the sample and the school population to include only children of Spanish parents.
A very similar pattern emerges in Figure 5, that displays school performance in Catalan Lan-
guage in both the sample and the school population. Students in the sample perform slightly
better than those in the school population even after restricting the data to include only stu-
dents with Spanish-like surnames. However, there are no significant differences in the frequency
distribution between the sample and the school population once the data has been restricted to
students with Spanish-like surnames, as it can be seen in Table 2.
Figure 5: School performance in Catalan Language. Sample and School population
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Data refers to the 3rd term of the academic year
2011-2012
Finally, Figure 6 shows the school performance in Physical education. Compared to the
scores in Mathematics and Catalan language, there are no students failing to pass this subject
in primary school, and almost no students failing in secondary school. Still, students in the
sample perform better than students in the school population, even if the null hypothesis of
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Table 2: Frequency distribution in the sample and school population (2)
Pearson Chi-Square Test and P-value
Primary Primary, Spanish surnames Secondary Secondary, Spanish surnames
Math 10.5946 5.9446 15.0387 13.2132
(0.032) (0.203) (0.090) (0.153)
Catalan language 17.6067 7.615 13.2443 12.2912
(0.001) (0.107) (0.152) (0.197)
Physical education 5.2492 2.9 10.1181 10.2177
(0.154) (0.407) (0.072) (0.069)
P-values for Pearson’s Chi Square Test in parentheses.
consistent frequency distributions in the sample and school population can not be rejected.
Unfortunately, the data I have available for the whole population of students in the school in
2012 does not allow me to discern respondents from non respondents in order to analyse whether
some of the available characteristics (postcode, month of birth, enrolled in which grade and final
grade outcome in 2012 for some subjects) play an important role in the decision to cooperate (i.e.
responding the questionnaire). However, the previous comparison of the available data for the
school population with the sample data seems to suggest that the sample is representative of the
school population as long as students with an immigrant background are excluded from both the
sample and school population. Therefore, given that I don’t have the appropriate information to
construct sample weights, in what follows I will present results for the whole sample and when
students with an immigrant background are excluded. My fundamental working assumption
is that conditional on the immigration status of their parents, students from non-respondent
households are missing at random or f(G|I) = f(G|I,D = 1) (see Little and Rubin (1987)),
where G is the outcome variable of interest (i.e. a measure of school performance), I is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the father has Spanish nationality, and D = 1 indicates participation in
the survey.
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Figure 6: School performance in Physical Education. Sample and School population
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Data refers to the 3rd term of the academic year
2011-2012
1.4.3 The characteristics of the sample compared to those in the population
given by the Spanish Labour Force Survey
In this section I use the data of the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS) to assess how the distri-
bution of some key characteristics of the individuals in my sample compares to the distribution
of these same characteristics in the Spanish, Catalan and (province of) Barcelona population.
Even if with this exercise I do not pretend to claim whether my sample is representative of
these populations or not, it is nonetheless interesting to see if the distribution of some parental
characteristics in my sample resembles the distribution of these same characteristics in the pop-
ulations defined above.
In order to do so, I have used the LFS data produced by the Spanish National Institute of
Statistics (INE) corresponding to the 1st quarter of 2012, and I have extracted the subsample
of individuals aged 0 to 20. Since the age data is given in 5 year interval age groups, and given
that the individuals in my sample have ages ranging from 3 to 18, this is the closest I can get to
the population of my sample using the LFS data. Using the information on family ties, I have
matched these individuals with the information of their parents (this information is available as
16
Chapter 1. Job Loss at Home. Methods
long as they live in the same household). For each of the variables analysed I produce two types
of graphical and goodness-of-fit test comparisons. First, I use all the sample and individuals in
the population for the 3 different regional levels (left part of the graphs and Table 3). Second,
led by the evidence in the previous section, I restrict the sample and the different regional
populations to include only those individuals whose parents have Spanish nationality (right part
of the graphs and Table 3).
Figure 7: Gender of the student
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
Figure 8: Household size
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
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Figure 9: Mother’s civil status
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the gender distribution of individuals aged 0 to 20, the size of their
households, and the civil status of their mothers in the final sample, and in the 3 different
populations, respectively. Figure 7 shows the fraction of observations that correspond to males
and females. Both in the left and the right part of the figure, there is a higher percentage of
females in the sample if compared to the populations in Spain, Catalonia and the province of
Barcelona. The non-significant Pearson Chi-square statistics in Table 3, though, imply that
the null hypothesis of consistent frequency distributions between the sample and the population
can not be rejected in any of the cases (i.e. for the 3 regional levels when considering all the
sample and population, and for the 3 regional levels when considering only those individuals
with Spanish parents). Figure 8 exhibits the distribution of household sizes. More than 60% of
the students in the household live in a 4 person household, and in general, the average household
size is slightly smaller in the sample than in the population(s) -even if the median value is of 4
people both in the sample and the different LFS populations. Figure 9 presents the data on the
civil status of the mother. I consider the data on mothers rather than fathers given that in the
majority of cases, when the student lives with one of the parents, it does so with the mother (in
the sample, all individuals living with just one parent live with the mother). There is a higher
fraction of married mothers and a lower fraction of single mothers in my sample if compared
to any of the 3 regional levels.12 The results in Table 3 confirm that, in all the cases analysed,
the frequency distribution of the mother’s civil status in the sample differs from the frequency
distribution in the population.
12This could be partly related to the fact that the LFS data includes individuals aged 0 to 3, and mothers in
this age group might be more likely to have a single civil status than mothers with older children. In fact, the
fraction of single mothers decreases considerably when I do not consider individuals aged 0 to 5 in the Spanish
population
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The distribution of father’s education, father’s labour status and father’s firm sector of
activity are presented in Figures 10, 11 and 12, respectively, whereas the results for Pearson’s
Chi Square tests are shown in the second panel of Table 3. In general, there is a higher fraction
of fathers in the sample with post-compulsory (non-tertiary) education if compared to any of
the 3 different populations extracted from the LFS, and whether we use all the population or we
restrict the sample to include only children from Spanish individuals. Nonetheless, the results
in Table 3 indicate that the frequency distribution of education levels for fathers in the sample
resembles that of fathers in Catalonia and Barcelona when all the population is considered, and
that of Catalonia when I restrict the sample to Spanish nationals.
Figure 10: Father’s education
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
Figure 11 presents the distribution of father’s labour status, considering those that own a
business, work for a firm or are unemployed. The sample distribution when all the population
is considered is almost identical to the distribution in Spain, Catalonia and the province of
Barcelona. The results in Table 3 (left part of the table), show that there are no significant
differences in the frequency distribution of father’s labour status between the sample and the
population(s). However, once I restrict the sample to include only those individuals with Spanish
parents, the null hypothesis can not be rejected only at the Spanish level. For those fathers that
are working, the distribution regarding the sectors of activity of the firm are plotted in Figure 12.
Both for all the population and for the restricted one, the frequency distribution of the sectors
in the sample resembles that of Catalonia.
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Figure 11: Father’s labour status
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
Figure 12: Father’s sector of the firm
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
The same information is presented for the characteristics related to the mother. The dis-
tributions are plotted in Figures 13, 14 and 15 and the results for the goodness-of-fit tests are
presented in the bottom panel of Table 3. Figure 13 suggests that mothers in the sample have a
lower level of education, even when the data is restricted to include only those individuals with
Spanish parents, especially when compared with the mothers in the Catalan population and
the population in the province of Barcelona. According to the results in Table 3, the frequency
distribution of the education level of mothers in the sample resembles that of the population of
mothers (of children aged 0 to 20) in Spain and Catalonia, but only when the unrestricted data is
used (left part of Table 3). Figure 14 shows that in the first quarter of 2012 more mothers in the
sample were employed both in the self-employed and salaried worker categories, and as a result,
there is a lower fraction of unemployed mothers or homemakers if compared to the mothers of
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children aged 0 to 20 in Spain, Catalonia or the province of Barcelona. The null hypothesis
of consistent frequency distributions between the sample and the LFS populations is rejected
in all cases in Table 3. In Figure 15 the observations are restricted to those individuals whose
mothers are employed in the first quarter of 2012. More than 80% of the mothers have jobs
related to service activities, and there’s a very few percent of them working in the agriculture
or construction sectors. The results in Table 3 suggest that the frequency distributions in the
sample and population are very similar since the null hypothesis of the Pearson’s Chi Square
test can’t be rejected in 5 out of the 6 cases.
The descriptive analysis in this section suggests that the sample, even if restricted in terms
of size and concentrated in only school, is sufficiently diverse to reproduce some of the most
representative characteristics of the population with children aged between 0 and 20 (as given
by the data in the Spanish LFS). Although these results can not be overplayed and I can not
claim that the sample is somehow representative of the Spanish or Catalan population, the
evidence suggests that the sample reproduces fairly well the distribution of father’s education
and father’s main sector of activity in Catalonia as well as the labour status of Spanish fathers.
Figure 13: Mother’s education
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
21
Chapter 1. Job Loss at Home. Methods
Figure 14: Mother’s labour status
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
Figure 15: Mother’s sector of the firm
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of
the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data.
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Table 3: Sample versus Population: Pearson’s Chi Square Test
All population and sample Excluding parents without Spanish nationality
Spain Catalonia Barcelona Obs Spain Catalonia Barcelona Obs
Sex students 0.628 0.628 0.795 408 0.167 0.262 0.377 382
(0.428) (0.428) (0.373) (0.682) (0.609) (0.539)
Household size 38.189 40.425 34.517 408 29.187 18.842 17.36 382
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Civil status mother 39.081 34.985 35.371 408 30.261 29.031 29.236 382
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father’s education 8.147 3.914 3.56 378 11.223 2.506 7.055 352
(0.017) (0.141) (0.169) (0.004) (0.286) (0.029)
Father’s labour situation 0.496 0.204 0.707 371 0.249 12.461 16.658 346
(0.780) (0.903) (0.702) (0.883) (0.002) (0.000)
Father’s firm sector 20.279 3.084 48.017 294 15.842 4.281 49.611 280
(0.000) (0.379) (0.000) (0.001) (0.233) (0.000)
Mother’s education 4.151 5.128 9.816 408 6.221 13.781 24.251 382
(0.125) (0.077) (0.007) (0.045) (0.001) (0.000)
Mother’s labour situation 50.801 33.669 30.302 392 48.168 13.404 13.497 366
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Mother’s firm sector 7.935 2.831 4.047 389 5.771 3.892 6.014 363
(0.047) (0.418) (0.256) (0.123) (0.273) (0.111)
P-values for Pearson’s Chi Square Test in parentheses. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2012 of the Spanish LFS. Weights
have been used for the LFS data. The results for Barcelona refer to the province of Barcelona.
1.4.4 The labour market impact of the Great Recession in the Spanish Pop-
ulation and in the sample
As in the previous section, I compare the sample data with the LFS data for individuals aged
0 to 20 and analyse the distribution of some key labour market characteristics of their parents
before the Great Recession (1st quarter of 2008) and when the data was collected (1st quarter
of 2012). In particular, I look at the labour status and, if working, the sector of the firm, for
fathers (Figures 16 and 17) and mothers (Figures 18 and 19) with Spanish nationality, to see if
the crisis has had a differential effect in the sample and the LFS populations.
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Figure 16: Father’s labour status in 2008 and 2012
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2008 and
2012 of the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data. Excluding individuals without Spanish nationality
Figure 17: Father’s sector of employment in 2008 and 2012
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2008 and
2012 of the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data. Excluding individuals without Spanish nationality
As shown in Figure 16, the crisis has destroyed slightly more employment for fathers in the
sample than in the LFS populations. This might have been related to the fact that there was
a higher percent of fathers working in the construction sector at the beginning of the crisis in
the sample (see Figure 17) and this sector has concentrated the greatest share of employment
destruction since the onset of the crisis in 2008.13 According to the results in Table 4 there
were no significant differences in the frequency distribution of father’s labour situation between
the sample and the LFS populations at the beginning of the crisis, although the frequency
distribution in the sample resembled the frequency distribution in the province of Barcelona the
13According to the LFS data provided by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics, the active population of
men working in the construction sector decreased by over 1200000 people from the first quarter of 2008 to the first
quarter of 2012, from a total of approximately 2775000 men working in the construction sector at the beginning
of the crisis.
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most. At the moment of data collection, and given to a bigger increase in unemployment in the
sample, the frequency distribution of father’s labour status in the sample was not significantly
different from the frequency distribution in the Spanish population instead (see Table 3). The
impact of the Great Recession on the labour status of mothers in the sample differs from that
described for fathers, since it is among mothers in the sample where unemployment increases
the least between 2008 and 2012 (see Figure 18).
Figure 18: Mother’s labour status in 2008 and 2012
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2008 and
2012 of the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data. Excluding individuals without Spanish nationality
Figure 19: Mother’s sector of employment in 2008 and 2012
Mean (given by the height of the bar) and 95% confidence intervals. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of 2008 and
2012 of the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data. Excluding individuals without Spanish nationality
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Table 4: Sample versus Population in 2008: Pearson’s Chi Square Test
Spain Catalonia Barcelona (Prov) Obs
Father’s labour situation 4.3832 1.2904 0.9751 345
(0.112) (0.525) (0.614)
Father’s firm sector 21.0321 4.8471 7.4113 312
(0.000) (0.183) (0.025)
Mother’s labour situation 58.8567 23.8495 31.8322 359
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mother’s firm sector 14.3912 7.4041 8.7274 353
(0.002) (0.060) (0.033)
P-values for Pearson’s Chi Square Test in parentheses. Population data refers to the 1st Quarter of
2008 of the Spanish LFS. Weights have been used for the LFS data. The results for Barcelona refer
to the province of Barcelona.
1.5 Final remarks
Starting in the 1960s, the study of human capital formation has been on the centre stage of
the economic debate. Recent evidence has shown that parental job loss influences the school
performance of their offspring and can therefore impact the human capital or maximum level of
education attained by an individual. The developments taking place in the Spanish labour mar-
ket since the onset of the Great Recession provide a good scenario to further explore the impact
of parental job loss on their children’s school performance. Since no data was available to fulfill
this purpose, I designed a survey to collect (panel) data retrospectively on school performance
and parental employment history in a school in the province of Barcelona. The purpose of this
chapter has been to describe the main features of the making of the survey, the data collection
process and the characteristics of the sample.
Regarding the description of the characteristics of the sample, the results in this chapter show
that in terms of academic results, the school is very close to the average Catalan school. More-
over, compared to the data concerning all the school population, the analysis performed here
seems to suggest that the sample is representative of the school population as long as students
with an immigrant background are excluded from the analysis. Additionally, the descriptive
analysis performed by comparing some characteristics of the sample with those in the Spanish,
Catalan or province of Barcelona population suggests that the sample, even if restricted in terms
of size and concentrated in only one school, is sufficiently diverse to reproduce some of the most
representative characteristics of the Spanish population with children aged between 0 and 20.
Although these results can not be overplayed and I can not claim that the sample is somehow
representative of the Spanish or Catalan population, the evidence suggests that the sample re-
produces fairly well the distribution of father’s education and father’s main sector of activity in
Catalonia as well as the labour status of Spanish fathers. Finally, regarding the impact of the
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Great Recession, the crisis has destroyed slightly more employment for fathers in the sample
than in Spain, Catalonia or the province of Barcelona. This might have been related to the fact
that there was a higher percent of fathers working in the construction sector at the beginning
of the crisis in the sample and this sector has concentrated the greatest share of employment
destruction since the onset of the crisis in 2008.
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Questionnaire in English
The original questionnaire, in Spanish and with the original format, can be found at the end of
this chapter. Below you can find the English translation of the questions contained both in the
household and the individual questionnaire.
Household questionnaire
For each child enrolled at the school where the survey took place, the parent answering the
household questionnaire was asked to provide the following information:
• Name / Surnames
• Date of birth / Sex / Grade
• Is it your: Child / Step child. In the case that the child is your step child: since when do
you live together?
• For your current partner, is it his/her: Child / Step child. In the case that the child is
his/her step child: since when do they live together?
For each child not enrolled at the school where the survey took place, the information asked
was the following:
• Sex / Date of birth / Lives in the current dwelling? / Is it your child or step child? / For
your partner, is it his/her child or step child?
The remaining questions in the household questionnaire are as follows (the numbers corre-
spond to those in the original questionnaire):
1. Who fills the household questionnaire? Father/Mother
2. Number of people living NOWADAYS in the household, including yourself:
3. How many children do you have? (Include also the children of your partner)
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4. Your current dwelling is? Owned, fully paid / Owned, mortgage payments pending /
Rented / Rent free
5. Current neighborhood
6. Since when do you live in your current dwelling? Month/Year
7. Have you and your children always lived in the current dwelling? Yes (End of the household
questionnaire) / No (go to question 8)
8. Your previous dwelling was: Owned / Rented / Rent free
9. Previous neighborhood
Individual questionnaire
The individual questionnaire is divided into the personal information section and the labour mar-
ket situation sections. The numbers of the questions below correspond to those in the original
questionnaire:
Personal information
1. Who fills this questionnaire? Father/Mother
2. Date of birth: Month/Year
3. Nationality: Spanish/Other
4. If other nationality, since when are you in Spain? Month/Year
5. Language spoken at home: Spanish / Catalan / Other
6. Your maximum level of studies attained is:
(a) Without studies, or attended school less than 5 years
(b) Primary (attended school more than 5 years but did not complete compulsory edu-
cation)
(c) Compulsory education
(d) Vocational I (access after compulsory education)
(e) High-School
(f) Vocational II (access after High-School)
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(g) University degree (undergraduate and graduate programs)
(h) Other. Specify:
7. Maximum level of studies attained by your father / mother
8. Current civil status: Single / Living with partner / Married / Widowed / Separated-
Divorced
9. Since when is this your civil status? Month/Year
10. Civil status previous to your current status: Single / Living with partner / Married /
Widowed / Separated-Divorced
11. Did you ever belong to the Association of fathers and mothers of the school? Yes/No
12. (If answer to the previous question is Yes) When was the first time you were part of the
association? Month/Year
13. Once your children finish compulsory education, who will have the last word on the decision
of whether they continue studying or not (mark one option): Parents / Teachers / Children
14. Current type of labour contract of your current partner: Permanent / Fixed term / Does
not correspond
15. Type of labour contract of your current partner two years ago: Permanent / Fixed term
/ Does not correspond
16. Type of labour contract of your current partner four years ago: Permanent / Fixed term
/ Does not correspond
Information regarding your CURRENT labour situation
The second section of the individual questionnaire collects information on the labour situation of
the respondent, and it is divided in three parts. The first part gathers information on the labour
situation of the respondent at the moment when the survey took place (February 2012).
17. What is your current (main) labour market situation? Choose an option:
(a) Own business
(b) Salaried worker (mark this option if you are a salaried worker, even if you don’t have
a contract)
(c) Work for another household (Household worker)
(d) Helps in the family business
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(e) Unemployed
(f) Homemaker
(g) Retired or permanent sickness
(h) Student, not working
18. If answered e to h in the previous question (number 17): since when is this your labour
market situation? Month/Year
19. NET monthly income in euros (includes your salary, unemployment benefits, pension, or
other subsidies): Less than 999 euros / Between 1000 and 1499 euros / Between 1500 and
1999 euros / More than 2000 euros
20. Do you own a business or are you a salaried worker, work for another household or help
in the family business? Yes (go to question 21) / No (go to question 33)
21. Type of contract: Permanent / Fixed term / Does not have a contract / Special Regime
of household workers / Does not correspond (own business)
22. Starting date of your current contract (leave blank if you don’t have a contract): Month/Year
23. Since when do you work for your current firm? Month/Year
24. Your firm belongs to the: Private sector / Public sector
25. Do you work...? Full time / Part time
26. Firm size (number of workers): Only myself / From 2 to 9 / From 10 to 49 / From 50 to
249 / More than 250
27. Firm’s main industry:
(a) Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
(b) Manufacturing, Mining, Utilities
(c) Construction
(d) Accommodation and Food Services
(e) Cleaning
(f) Other service sector activities
(g) Other: Indicate...
28. Motivation at work (mark an option from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for Not motivated and 5
for Very motivated)
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The next section needs to be filled only by those respondents that in February 2012 had a
temporary/fixed-term contract:
29. Duration, in months, of your current contract
30. When does your current contract end? Month/Year
31. Do you know if you will get an extension of your contract when it finishes? Yes / I think
so / I don’t think so / No
32. Do you think it will be easy to find a job when this contract ends? (mark an option from
1 to 5, where 1 stands for “Not easy” and 5 for “Very easy”)
Information regarding your labour situation two years ago (JANUARY 2010)
33. Two years ago (in January 2010) was your labour situation the same as your current one?
(a) Yes, I had the same labour situation or the same contract as I have now (go to
question 51)
(b) No, I had a different labour situation or a different contract than the one I have now
(keep on aswering in question 34)
34. What was your main labour market situation TWO YEARS AGO? Choose an option:
(a) Own business
(b) Salaried worker (mark this option if you are a salaried worker, even if you don’t have
a contract)
(c) Work for another household (Household worker)
(d) Helps in the family business
(e) Unemployed
(f) Homemaker
(g) Retired or permanent sickness
(h) Student, not working
35. If answered e to h in the previous question (number 34): since when was this your labour
market situation? Month/Year
36. NET monthly income in euros two years ago (includes your salary, unemployment benefits,
pension, or other subsidies): Less than 999 euros / Between 1000 and 1499 euros / Between
1500 and 1999 euros / More than 2000 euros
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37. Two years ago, were you owning a business or were you a salaried worker, worked for
another household or helped in the family business? Yes (go to question 38) / No (go to
question 51)
38. Type of contract in January 2010: Permanent / Fixed term / Does not have a contract /
Special Regime of household workers / Does not correspond (own business)
39. Starting date of the contract you had in January 2010 (leave blank if you didn’t have a
contract): Month/Year
40. Since when were you working at the firm you were working for in 2010? Month/Year
41. The firm you were working for in 2010 belonged to the: Private sector / Public sector
42. Did you work...? Full time / Part time
43. Firm size (number of workers): Only myself / From 2 to 9 / From 10 to 49 / From 50 to
249 / More than 250
44. Firm’s main industry:
(a) Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
(b) Manufacturing, Mining, Utilities
(c) Construction
(d) Accommodation and Food Services
(e) Cleaning
(f) Other service sector activities
(g) Other: Indicate...
45. Motivation at work (mark an option from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for Not motivated and 5
for Very motivated)
46. Why isn’t this your current labour situation?
(a) Left work voluntarily
(b) End temporary contract
(c) I was fired
(d) Firm downsize
(e) Firm closure
(f) Other reason
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The next section needs to be filled only by those respondents that in January 2010 had a
temporary/fixed-term contract:
47. Duration, in months, of the contract you had in January 2010
48. When did that contract end? Month/Year
49. Did you get an extension of the contract in the same firm? No/Yes. If yes, for how many
more months?
50. When did you know if you would get an extension or not? Month/Year
Information regarding your labour situation four years ago (JANUARY 2008)
51. Four years ago (in January 2008) was your labour situation the same as your current one?
(a) Yes, I had the same labour situation or the same contract as I have now (End of the
questionnaire)
(b) No, but I had the same situation as in January 2010 (End of the questionnaire)
(c) No, I had a different labour situation or a different contract than the one I had in
January 2010 (keep on aswering in question 52)
52. What was your main labour market situation FOUR YEARS AGO? Choose an option:
(a) Own business
(b) Salaried worker (mark this option if you are a salaried worker, even if you don’t have
a contract)
(c) Work for another household (Household worker)
(d) Helps in the family business
(e) Unemployed
(f) Homemaker
(g) Retired or permanent sickness
(h) Student, not working
53. If answered e to h in the previous question (number 52): since when was this your labour
market situation? Month/Year
54. NET monthly income in euros four years ago (includes your salary, unemployment benefits,
pension, or other subsidies): Less than 999 euros / Between 1000 and 1499 euros / Between
1500 and 1999 euros / More than 2000 euros
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55. Four years ago, were you owning a business or were you a salaried worker, worked for
another household or helped in the family business? Yes (go to question 56) / No (End of
the questionnaire)
56. Type of contract in January 2008: Permanent / Fixed term / Does not have a contract /
Special Regime of household workers / Does not correspond (own business)
57. Starting date of the contract you had in January 2008 (leave blank if you didn’t have a
contract): Month/Year
58. Since when were you working at the firm you were working for in 2008? Month/Year
59. The firm you were working for in 2008 belonged to the: Private sector / Public sector
60. Did you work...? Full time / Part time
61. Firm size (number of workers): Only myself / From 2 to 9 / From 10 to 49 / From 50 to
249 / More than 250
62. Firm’s main industry:
(a) Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
(b) Manufacturing, Mining, Utilities
(c) Construction
(d) Accommodation and Food Services
(e) Cleaning
(f) Other service sector activities
(g) Other: Indicate...
63. Motivation at work (mark an option from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for Not motivated and 5
for Very motivated)
64. Why wasn’t this your labour situation in January 2010?
(a) Left work voluntarily
(b) End temporary contract
(c) I was fired
(d) Firm downsize
(e) Firm closure
(f) Other reason
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The next section needs to be filled only by those respondents that in January 2008 had a
temporary/fixed-term contract:
65. Duration, in months, of the contract you had in January 2008
66. When did that contract end? Month/Year
67. Did you get an extension of the contract at the same firm? No/Yes. If yes, for how many
more months?
68. When did you know if you would get an extension or not? Month/Year
1.6.2 Item non-response
Table A1: Item non response. Household questionnaire
Question number Description Missing % Missing
HH1 who fills 4 1.37
HH2 n. people 0 0
HH3 n. children 0 0
HHSib1.1 sex sib1 4 1.37
HHSib1.2 birthmonth sib1 8 2.74
HHSib1.3 birthyear sib1 7 2.4
HHSib1.4 lives home sib1 1 0.34
HHSib1.5 same mother sib1 3 1.03
HHSib1.6 same father sib1 3 1.03
HHSib2.1 sex sib2 3 1.03
HHSib2.2 birthmonth sib2 5 1.71
HHSib2.3 birthyear sib2 5 1.71
HHSib2.4 lives home sib2 0 0
HHSib2.5 same mother sib2 1 0.34
HHSib2.6 same father sib2 1 0.34
HHSib3.1 sex sib3 1 0.34
HHSib3.2 birthmonth sib3 1 0.34
HHSib3.3 birthyear sib3 1 0.34
HHSib3.4 lives home sib3 1 0.34
HHSib3.5 same mother sib3 1 0.34
HHSib3.6 same father sib3 1 0.34
HH4 Type property 0 0
HH5 Neighborhhod 2 0.68
HH6.1 Month moving 18 6.16
HH6.2 Year moving 6 2.05
HH7 Same house 0 0
HH8 Previous type property 1 0.34
HH9 Previous neighborhood 3 1.03
HH stands for household questionnaire. HHSib refers to questions regarding siblings not enrolled
in the school where the survey took place. The percent is calculated over 292 answers.
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Table A2: Item non response. Father’s questionnaire
Question number Description % Missing Question number Description % Missing
F1 Who fills 0 F36 Net income -2010 8.55
F2.1 Birth month 0 F37 Control working -2010 0
F2.2 Birth year 0 F38 Type contract -2010 0.37
F3 Nationality 0 F39.1 Contract, month since -2010 0
F4.1 Month arrived 0.74 F39.2 Contract, year since -2010 0
F4.2 Year arrived 0.74 F40.1 Tenure, month since -2010 0
F5 Language home 0 F40.2 Tenure, year since -2010 0
F6 Education 0 F41 Sector firm -2010 4.46
F7.1 Education father 6.32 F42 Time at work -2010 6.69
F7.1 Education mother 8.18 F43 Size firm -2010 6.69
F8 Civil status 0 F44 Sector firm detailed -2010 5.95
F9.1 Month civil status 1.86 F45 Motivation at work -2010 7.81
F9.2 Year civil status 1.12 F46 Reason end -2010 1.86
F10 Previous civil status 0.74 F47 Duration temp contract -2010 2.6
F11 Belong to AMPA 2.97 F48.1 Month end temp contract -2010 2.6
F12.1 Ampa since month 2.97 F48.2 Year end temp contract -2010 2.6
F12.2 Ampa since year 3.72 F49.1 Got renewed -2010 1.49
F13 Decision 4.46 F49.2 Months more -2010 1.86
F14 Contract partner 12 4.46 F50.1 Knew extension, month -2010 2.6
F15 Contract partner 10 14.87 F50.2 Knew extension, year -2010 2.6
F16 Contract partner 08 14.87 F51 Control 2008 0.37
F17 Labour situation 0 F52 Labour situation -2008 0.37
F18.1 Not working, month 0 F53.1 Not working, month -2008 0.74
F18.2 Not working, year 0 F53.2 Not working, year -2008 0.37
F19 Net income 7.43 F54 Net income -2008 11.52
F20 Control working 0 F55 Control working -2008 0.37
F21 Type contract 0 F56 Type contract -2008 0.37
F22.1 Contract, month since 0.37 F57.1 Contract, month since -2008 0.37
F22.2 Contract, year since 0 F57.2 Contract, year since -2008 0.37
F23.1 Tenure, month since 0.37 F58.1 Tenure, month since -2008 0.37
F23.2 Tenure, year since 0 F58.2 Tenure, year since -2008 0.37
F24 Sector firm 2.97 F59 Sector firm -2008 4.83
F25 Time at work 4.83 F60 Time at work -2008 7.81
F26 Size firm 4.83 F61 Size firm -2008 6.69
F27 Sector firm detailed 4.09 F62 Sector firm detailed -2008 6.32
F28 Motivation at work 6.32 F63 Motivation at work -2008 8.55
F29 Duration temp contract 0.37 F64 Reason end -2008 2.23
F30.1 Month end temp contract 0.37 F65 Duration temp contract -2008 2.97
F30.2 Year end temp contract 0.37 F66.1 Month end temp contract -2008 2.97
F31 Expectation renovation 0.37 F66.2 Year end temp contract -2008 2.97
F32 Easy find a job 0.37 F67.1 Got renewed -2008 1.86
F33 Control 2010 0 F67.2 Months more -2008 2.6
F34 Labour situation -2010 0 F68.1 Knew extension, month -2008 4.46
F35.1 Not working, month -2010 0.37 F68.2 Knew extension, year -2008 4.46
F35.2 Not working, year -2010 0
F stands for father’s questionnaire. The percent missing is calculated over 269 answers. The difference between the number of answers in the household
questionnaire and the father questionnaire is due to fathers not living in the same household as their offspring.
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Table A3: Item non response. Mother’s questionnaire
Question number Description % Missing Question number Description % Missing
M1 Who fills 0 M36 Net income -2010 7.53
M2.1 Birth month 0 M37 Control working -2010 0
M2.2 Birth year 0 M38 Type contract -2010 0.34
M3 Nationality 0 M39.1 Contract, month since -2010 0.68
M4.1 Month arrived 0.68 M39.2 Contract, year since -2010 0.68
M4.2 Year arrived 0 M40.1 Tenure, month since -2010 1.03
M5 Language home 0 M40.2 Tenure, year since -2010 1.03
M6 Education 0.34 M41 Sector firm -2010 2.74
M7.1 Education father 8.56 M42 Time at work -2010 4.45
M7.1 Education mother 6.85 M43 Size firm -2010 3.42
M8 Civil status 0 M44 Sector firm detailed -2010 3.42
M9.1 Month civil status 1.71 M45 Motivation at work -2010 3.77
M9.2 Year civil status 1.03 M46 Reason end -2010 1.37
M10 Previous civil status 1.71 M47 Duration temp contract -2010 3.08
M11 Belong to AMPA 1.37 M48.1 Month end temp contract -2010 2.74
M12.1 Ampa since month 1.37 M48.2 Year end temp contract -2010 2.74
M12.2 Ampa since year 2.4 M49.1 Got renewed -2010 1.71
M13 Decision 5.14 M49.2 Months more -2010 2.74
M14 Contract partner 12 3.77 M50.1 Knew extension, month -2010 3.08
M15 Contract partner 10 14.38 M50.2 Knew extension, year -2010 3.08
M16 Contract partner 08 14.38 M51 Control 2008 1.03
M17 Labour situation 1.03 M52 Labour situation -2008 1.37
M18.1 Not working, month 2.4 M53.1 Not working, month -2008 2.05
M18.2 Not working, year 1.03 M53.2 Not working, year -2008 1.37
M19 Net income 8.9 M54 Net income -2008 11.64
M20 Control working 1.03 M55 Control working -2008 1.37
M21 Type contract 1.37 M56 Type contract -2008 1.71
M22.1 Contract, month since 0.68 M57.1 Contract, month since -2008 1.03
M22.2 Contract, year since 0.68 M57.2 Contract, year since -2008 1.03
M23.1 Tenure, month since 0.68 M58.1 Tenure, month since -2008 1.03
M23.2 Tenure, year since 0.68 M58.2 Tenure, year since -2008 1.03
M24 Sector firm 3.77 M59 Sector firm -2008 6.16
M25 Time at work 6.16 M60 Time at work -2008 8.56
M26 Size firm 4.79 M61 Size firm -2008 6.85
M27 Sector firm detailed 4.79 M62 Sector firm detailed -2008 6.85
M28 Motivation at work 5.48 M63 Motivation at work -2008 7.53
M29 Duration temp contract 2.74 M64 Reason end -2008 4.79
M30.1 Month end temp contract 2.4 M65 Duration temp contract -2008 5.48
M30.2 Year end temp contract 2.4 M66.1 Month end temp contract -2008 5.48
M31 Expectation renovation 2.74 M66.2 Year end temp contract -2008 5.48
M32 Easy find a job 2.4 M67.1 Got renewed -2008 3.08
M33 Control 2010 0 M67.2 Months more -2008 4.45
M34 Labour situation -2010 0 M68.1 Knew extension, month -2008 6.85
M35.1 Not working, month -2010 1.03 M68.2 Knew extension, year -2008 6.85
M35.2 Not working, year -2010 0
M stands for mother’s questionnaire. The percent missing is calculated over 292 answers.
Table A4: Item non response. Final missings on net income variables
Question number Description % Missing Question number Description % Missing
F19 Net income 4.46 M19 Net income 3.42
F36 Net income -2010 7.06 M36 Net income -2010 2.74
F54 Net income -2008 10.04 M54 Net income -2008 5.48
F stands for father’s questionnaire and M stands for mother’s questionnaire. The percent missing is calculated over 269 answers
for fathers and 292 answers for mothers.
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CUESTIONARIO DE HOGAR 
 
Instrucciones:  1. Cuando le pregunte por mes y año, si no lo recuerda bien, por favor dígame la fecha aproximada.  
                          2. En las preguntas sobre sus hijos, incluya también a los hijos/as de su pareja.  
            3. Cuando las respuestas a una pregunta muestren varias opciones, marque con una cruz la opción que corresponda:  x 
¡Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración! 
 
1. ¿Quién rellena el cuestionario de hogar?  Padre   Madre  
2. Número de personas que VIVEN ACTUALMENTE en la vivienda familiar, incluyéndose usted: _______ 
3. ¿Cuántos hijos/as tiene? (incluya también los hijos/as de su pareja): _______    
 
HIJOS ACTUALMENTE MATRICULADOS en el colegio (rellene un CUADRO por cada niño/a)  
 
HIJO-1: Nombre: ____________________ __________          Apellidos: ____________________________________________ 
Fecha de nacimiento: Día: _____ Mes: ____  Año: ____   Sexo: Niño   Niña   Curso: ____________________ 
Se trata de su: (marque)      Hijo/a          Hijo/a de su pareja      En ese caso, ¿desde cuándo viven juntos? Mes: ____  Año: ____ 
Para su pareja actual es su: Hijo/a         Hijo/a de su pareja   En ese caso, ¿desde cuándo viven juntos? Mes: ____  Año: ____                                                                            
HIJO-2: Nombre: ____________________ __________          Apellidos: ____________________________________________ 
Fecha de nacimiento: Día: _____ Mes: ____  Año: ____   Sexo: Niño   Niña   Curso: ____________________ 
Se trata de su: (marque)      Hijo/a          Hijo/a de su pareja      En ese caso, ¿desde cuándo viven juntos? Mes: ____  Año: ____ 
Para su pareja actual es su: Hijo/a         Hijo/a de su pareja   En ese caso, ¿desde cuándo viven juntos? Mes: ____  Año: ____                                                                            
HIJO-3: Nombre: ____________________ __________          Apellidos: ____________________________________________ 
Fecha de nacimiento: Día: _____ Mes: ____  Año: ____   Sexo: Niño   Niña   Curso: ____________________ 
Se trata de su: (marque)      Hijo/a          Hijo/a de su pareja      En ese caso, ¿desde cuándo viven juntos? Mes: ____  Año: ____ 
Para su pareja actual es su: Hijo/a         Hijo/a de su pareja   En ese caso, ¿desde cuándo viven juntos? Mes: ____  Año: ____                                                                            
HIJO-4: Nombre: ____________________ __________          Apellidos: ____________________________________________ 
Fecha de nacimiento: Día: _____ Mes: ____  Año: ____   Sexo: Niño   Niña   Curso: ____________________ 
Se trata de su: (marque)      Hijo/a          Hijo/a de su pareja      En ese caso, ¿desde cuándo viven juntos? Mes: ____  Año: ____ 
Para su pareja actual es su: Hijo/a         Hijo/a de su pareja   En ese caso, ¿desde cuándo viven juntos? Mes: ____  Año: ____                                                                            
 
 
HIJOS NO MATRICULADOS ACTUALMENTE en el colegio (rellene una FILA por cada niño/a)  
 
 Sexo Fecha nacimiento ¿Vive en el hogar? Para usted, se trata de su: Para su PAREJA actual, es su: 
1 Niño       Niña  Mes:___ Año:___ Sí           No  Hijo/a          Hijo/a pareja        Hijo/a          Hijo/a pareja    
2 Niño       Niña  Mes:___ Año:___ Sí           No  Hijo/a          Hijo/a pareja        Hijo/a          Hijo/a pareja   
3 Niño       Niña  Mes:___ Año:___ Sí           No  Hijo/a          Hijo/a pareja        Hijo/a          Hijo/a pareja   
4 Niño       Niña  Mes:___ Año:___ Sí           No  Hijo/a          Hijo/a pareja        Hijo/a          Hijo/a pareja   
 
 
Información sobre su vivienda 
4. ¿Su vivienda es? De propiedad, totalmente pagada            De propiedad, con hipoteca            Alquilada          Cesión gratuita   
5. ¿En qué barrio vive? __________________________ 6. ¿Desde cuándo viven en esa vivienda? Mes: ____  Año: ____ 
7. Usted y sus hijos, ¿han vivido SIEMPRE en la vivienda actual?    Sí       (Fin cuestionario hogar)     No       (siga contestando) 
8. ¿Su vivienda ANTERIOR a la actual era?     De propiedad          Alquiler           Cesión gratuita     
9. Barrio de la vivienda ANTERIOR a la actual: ________________________ 
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CUESTIONARIO INDIVIDUAL 1 
 
Instrucciones: 1. Hay dos cuestionarios individuales. Uno debe ser rellenado por el padre o padrastro y el otro por la madre o  
  madrastra de los hijos matriculados en el colegio, siempre que vivan en el mismo hogar.  
            2. Cuando le pregunte por mes y año, si no lo recuerda bien, por favor dígame la fecha aproximada.  
            3. Cuando las respuestas a una pregunta muestren varias opciones, marque con una cruz la opción que corresponda: x  
            4. Por razones técnicas, debo preguntarle sobre el tipo de contrato de su pareja, aunque su pareja conteste a esto  
  en su cuestionario individual. Disculpe las molestias que esto le pueda ocasionar.    
¡Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración! 
 
1.  ¿Quién rellena este cuestionario? Padre  Madre 
 
Información personal 
2. Fecha de nacimiento:  Mes: ________   Año: ________    
3. Nacionalidad:  Española  Extranjera          4. Si es extranjera, ¿cuándo llegó a España?  Mes: ____  Año: ____  
5. ¿Qué idioma se habla normalmente en casa?   Español  Catalán   Otro  
6. ¿Cuál es su máximo nivel de estudios alcanzado? Marque la opción que contenga su máximo nivel de estudios alcanzado: 
1. Sin estudios, o fue a la escuela menos de 5 años 
2. Primaria (fue a la escuela 5 años o más, pero no llegó al último curso del Bachillerato elemental, EGB o ESO) 
3. Llegó al último curso del Bachillerato Elemental, EGB o ESO, o tiene el Certificado de Escolaridad o Estudios Primarios 
4. FP-I, FP grado medio, oficialía industrial o equivalente, grado medio de música y danza 
5. Bachillerato superior, BUP, COU, Bachillerato (LOGSE, LOE) 
6.  FP-II, FP grado superior, maestría industrial o equivalente 
7. Estudios superiores (Diplomatura universitaria, Licenciatura, Ingeniería técnica o superior, Máster, Doctorado)  
8. Otro     Especifique: _____________________________________________________________________________ 
7. ¿Cuál fue el máximo nivel de estudios alcanzado por su padre y por su madre? (elija una de las opciones de la lista anterior)  
 Padre: ________________________ Madre: ________________________ 
8. ¿Cuál es su estado civil actual?  Soltero         Pareja de hecho           Casado    Viudo           Separado/divorciado  
9. ¿Desde cuándo es ese su estado civil?  Mes: ____  Año: ____   
10. ¿Cuál era su estado civil anterior al actual?  Soltero Pareja de hecho         Casado         Viudo      Separado/divorciado  
11. ¿Ha pertenecido alguna vez a la AMPA (asociación de madres y padres)? Sí       (siga contestando)  No         (pase a preg 13) 
12. ¿Me podría decir cuándo fue la primera vez que perteneció  a la AMPA?  Mes: ________   Año: ________   
13. Una vez finalizada la educación obligatoria (4-ESO) de sus hijos: ¿quién tendrá la última palabra en la decisión de si siguen 
estudiando o no?  Marque UNA opción:     Decidiremos los padres   Decidirán los profesores       Decidirán los propios hijos  
 
Información sobre el tipo de contrato de su pareja ACTUAL (rellene sólo si vive en el hogar con usted):  
14. Tipo de contrato de su pareja actual AHORA:                      Indefinido (fijo)         Temporal          No corresponde   
15. Tipo de contrato de su pareja actual hace 2 años:                  Indefinido (fijo)         Temporal          No corresponde      
16. Tipo de contrato de su pareja actual hace 4 años:                  Indefinido (fijo)         Temporal          No corresponde      
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Instrucciones: A continuación, le preguntaré por SU situación con respecto al mercado laboral en la actualidad, después por su 
situación laboral hace dos años, y finalmente por su situación laboral hace 4 años. Siga las preguntas (y flechas) y verá que si su 
situación laboral ha sido la misma durante los últimos 4 años, sólo contestará a las preguntas relativas a su situación laboral actual. 
 
Información sobre SU situación laboral ACTUAL:  
 
17. ¿Cuál es su situación laboral actual?  (Si trabaja, y tiene dos empleos, marque la opción que corresponda a su empleo principal) 
1. Empresario/a, autónomo/a, trabajador/a por cuenta propia                          5. Desempleado/a o en paro, y buscando trabajo 
2. Trabajador/a asalariado/a (también si no tiene contrato)         6. Tareas del hogar (amo/a de casa) 
3. Trabajador/a del hogar (trabaja en un hogar diferente al suyo)        7. Jubilado/a, prejubilado, pensionista o con la invalidez 
4. Ayuda en la empresa o negocio familiar           8. Estudiante, sin trabajo 
 
         18. ¿Desde cuándo? Mes:_____ Año: _____  
 
19. ¿Cuál es su nivel de ingresos NETOS mensuales en € (ya sea por su salario, subsidio de desempleo, pensión u otra ayuda)? 
Menos de 999 €   Entre 1000 y 1499 €          Entre 1500 y 1999 €      Más de 2000 €              No corresponde 
20. ¿Es usted: empresario/a, autónomo/a, trabajador/a asalariado, trabajador/a del hogar, o ayuda en la empresa familiar? 
Sí   (siga contestando en la pregunta 21)   
No   (vaya a la pregunta 33 en la página siguiente)  
 
 
21. Tipo de contrato:     De duración indefinida (fijo)           De duración temporal o eventual  Sin contrato      
   Régimen Especial trabajadores del hogar           No corresponde (por ejemplo, para empresarios, autónomos, etc)   
22.  Fecha de inicio del contrato actual (deje en blanco si no tiene contrato):  Mes: ________  Año: ________  
23. ¿Cuándo empezó a trabajar en la empresa actual?   Mes: ________   Año: ________   
24. Sector al que pertenece la empresa: Sector privado          Sector o administración pública  
25. Jornada de trabajo:  A tiempo completo   A tiempo parcial  
26. Tamaño de la empresa (número de trabajadores):    Sólo yo            De 2 a 9          De 10 a 49         De 50 a 249        Más de 250     
27. Sector de actividad de la empresa (marque una sola opción) 
Agricultura, ganadería,  pesca      Industria manufacturera, extractiva y suministros      Construcción (incluye fontaneros, carpinteros, etc)             
Comercio           Hostelería            Limpieza            Resto de actividades del sector servicios  Otro     Indique: _____________ 
28. Grado de motivación en el trabajo (marque una opción del 1 al 5, dónde 1 significa NADA motivado y 5 MUY motivado):   
    1     2     3     4    5     
 
               Conteste si USTED tiene un CONTRATO de duración TEMPORAL: 
               29. Duración en meses de su contrato actual: _____  
30. ¿Cuándo finaliza su contrato actual? Mes: ________   Año: ________   
31. ¿Sabe si van a renovarle al final de su contrato? Sabe que sí     Cree que sí     Cree que no     Sabe que No     
32. ¿Cree que será fácil encontrar un trabajo cuando se le acabe este contrato? (1 significa NADA fácil y 5 MUY fácil) 
1     2     3     4    5     
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Información sobre su SITUACIÓN LABORAL hace 2 años (ENERO 2010) 
 
33.  Hace 2 años (en enero de 2010), ¿se encontraba en la MISMA situación laboral que EN LA ACTUALIDAD?  
Sí, MISMA situación laboral o MISMO contrato que el que tengo ahora          (vaya a la pregunta 51, página siguiente)  
No, DIFERENTE situación laboral o contrato DIFERENTE al que tengo ahora       (siga contestando en la pregunta 34)   
  
34. ¿Cuál era su situación laboral hace 2 años?  (Si trabajaba, y tenía dos empleos, responda con los datos de su empleo principal) 
1. Empresario/a, autónomo/a, trabajador/a por cuenta propia                          5. Desempleado/a o en paro, y buscando trabajo 
2. Trabajador/a asalariado/a (también si no tiene contrato)         6. Tareas del hogar (amo/a de casa) 
3. Trabajador/a del hogar (trabaja en un hogar diferente al suyo)        7. Jubilado/a, prejubilado, pensionista o con la invalidez 
4. Ayuda en la empresa o negocio familiar           8. Estudiante, sin trabajo 
           35. ¿Desde cuándo? Mes:_____ Año: _____ 
 
36. Nivel de ingresos NETOS mensuales en € hace 2 años (ya sea por su salario, subsidio de desempleo, pensión u otra ayuda): 
Menos de 999 €   Entre 1000 y 1499 €          Entre 1500 y 1999 €      Más de 2000 €              No corresponde 
37. Hace 2 años, ¿era usted empresario/a, autónomo, trabajador asalariado, trabajador/a del hogar, o ayudaba en la empresa familiar? 
Sí   (siga contestando en la pregunta 38 con la información del trabajo de ENERO de 2010)   
No   (vaya a la pregunta 51 en la siguiente página)  
 
Todas las preguntas se refieren a ENERO de 2010 (hace 2 años) 
38. Tipo de contrato:     De duración indefinida (fijo)           De duración temporal o eventual  Sin contrato      
   Régimen Especial trabajadores del hogar          No corresponde (por ejemplo, para empresarios, autónomos, etc)   
39. Fecha de inicio del contrato que tenía en enero de 2010 (deje en blanco si no tenía contrato): Mes: ________   Año: ________   
40. ¿Cuándo empezó a trabajar en la empresa en la que trabajaba en enero de 2010?  Mes: ________   Año: ________   
41. Sector al que pertenecía la empresa: Sector privado          Sector o administración pública  
42. Jornada de trabajo:  A tiempo completo   A tiempo parcial  
43. Tamaño de la empresa (número de trabajadores):    Sólo yo            De 2 a 9          De 10 a 49         De 50 a 249        Más de 250     
44. Sector de actividad de la empresa (marque una sola opción) 
Agricultura, ganadería,  pesca      Industria manufacturera, extractiva y suministros      Construcción (incluye fontaneros, carpinteros, etc)             
Comercio           Hostelería            Limpieza            Resto de actividades del sector servicios  Otro     Indique: _____________ 
45.  Grado de motivación en el trabajo (marque una opción del 1 al 5, dónde 1 significa NADA motivado y 5 MUY motivado):   
    1     2     3     4    5     
46. ¿Cuáles fueron los motivos de que ésta no sea su situación laboral actual? 
Dejó el trabajo voluntariamente     Fin del contrato temporal       Fue despedido       
Reducción de plantilla        La empresa cerró       Otra razón              
 
Conteste si USTED tenía un CONTRATO de duración TEMPORAL en ENERO DE 2010 
47. Duración en meses del contrato que tenía en enero de 2010: _____ 
48. ¿Cuándo finalizaba el contrato que tenía en enero de 2010? Mes: ________   Año: ________   
49. ¿Le renovaron el contrato en la misma empresa?    No       Sí      ¿Durante cuántos meses más? ___   
50. ¿Cuándo supo si le renovaban o no el contrato?   Mes: ________   Año: ________   
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Información sobre su SITUACIÓN LABORAL hace 4 años (ENERO 2008) 
 
51.  Hace 4 años (enero 2008), ¿se encontraba en la MISMA situación laboral que EN LA ACTUALIDAD?  
Sí, MISMA situación laboral o MISMO contrato que el que tengo ahora          (FIN DEL CUESTIONARIO)    
No, pero MISMA situación laboral o MISMO contrato que tenía en ENERO de 2010   (FIN DEL CUESTIONARIO)    
No, DIFERENTE situación laboral o DIFERENTE contrato al que tenía en ENERO de 2010  (siga contestando en pregunta 52)      
    
52. Cuál era su situación laboral hace 4 años?  (Si trabajaba, y tenía dos empleos, responda con los datos de su empleo principal) 
1. Empresario/a, autónomo/a, trabajador/a por cuenta propia                          5. Desempleado/a o en paro, y buscando trabajo 
2. Trabajador/a asalariado/a (también si no tiene contrato)         6. Tareas del hogar (amo/a de casa) 
3. Trabajador/a del hogar (trabaja en un hogar diferente al suyo)        7. Jubilado/a, prejubilado, pensionista o con la invalidez 
4. Ayuda en la empresa o negocio familiar           8. Estudiante, sin trabajo 
           53. ¿Desde cuándo? Mes:_____ Año: _____ 
 
54. Nivel de ingresos NETOS mensuales en € hace 4 años (ya sea por su salario, subsidio de desempleo, pensión u otra ayuda): 
Menos de 999 €   Entre 1000 y 1499 €          Entre 1500 y 1999 €      Más de 2000 €              No corresponde 
55. Hace 4 años, ¿era usted empresario/a, autónomo, trabajador asalariado, trabajadora del hogar, o ayudaba en la empresa familiar?  
Sí   (siga contestando en la pregunta 56 con la información del trabajo de ENERO de 2008)   
No   (FIN DEL CUESTIONARIO)    
 
Todas las preguntas se refieren a ENERO de 2008 (hace 4 años) 
56. Tipo de contrato:     De duración indefinida (fijo)           De duración temporal o eventual  Sin contrato      
   Régimen Especial trabajadores del hogar          No corresponde (por ejemplo, para empresarios, autónomos, etc) 
57. Fecha de inicio del contrato que tenía en enero de 2008 (deje en blanco si no tenía contrato): Mes: ________   Año: ________   
58. ¿Cuándo empezó a trabajar en la empresa en la que trabajaba en enero de 2008?  Mes: ________   Año: ________   
59. Sector al que pertenecía la empresa: Sector privado          Sector o administración pública  
60. Jornada de trabajo:  A tiempo completo   A tiempo parcial  
61. Tamaño de la empresa (número de trabajadores):    Sólo yo            De 2 a 9          De 10 a 49         De 50 a 249        Más de 250     
62. Sector de actividad de la empresa (marque una sola opción) 
Agricultura, ganadería,  pesca      Industria manufacturera, extractiva y suministros      Construcción (incluye fontaneros, carpinteros, etc)             
Comercio           Hostelería            Limpieza            Resto de actividades del sector servicios  Otro     Indique: _____________ 
63. Grado de motivación en el trabajo (marque una opción del 1 al 5, dónde 1 significa NADA motivado y 5 MUY motivado):   
    1     2     3     4    5     
64. ¿Cuáles fueron los motivos de que ésta no fuese su situación laboral 2 años después (en enero de 2010)? 
Dejó el trabajo voluntariamente     Fin del contrato temporal       Fue despedido       
Reducción de plantilla        La empresa cerró       Otra razón              
Conteste si USTED tenía un CONTRATO de duración TEMPORAL en ENERO DE 2008 
65. Duración en meses del contrato que tenía en enero de 2008: _____ 
66. ¿Cuándo finalizaba el contrato que tenía en enero de 2008?   Mes: ________ Año: ________   
67. ¿Le renovaron el contrato en la misma empresa?   No       Sí      ¿Durante cuántos meses más? ___   
68. ¿Cuándo supo si le renovaban o no el contrato?  Mes: ________ Año: ________  (FIN DEL CUESTIONARIO) 
    
Chapter 2
Job Loss at Home: Children’s Grades during
the Great Recession in Spain
2.1 Introduction
The available evidence on the effects of job loss indicates that job loss has negative effects
for the affected worker. According to the literature, among these negative consequences we
can find short-run earning losses that persist in the long-rung (Jacobson et al., 1993), lower
re-employment probabilities (Kletzer, 1998; Huttunen et al., 2011), prevalent feelings of job in-
security (Barling et al., 1999b), worse physical and mental health (Eliason and Storrie, 2009b,a),
an excess risk of divorce (Eliason, 2012; Charles and Stephens, 2004) and, upon re-employment,
a moderate increase in workplace injuries (Leombruni et al., 2013). A recent and rapidly growing
literature has addressed the question of whether parental job loss has detrimental effects on their
offspring. The majority of these papers show a negative effect of parental job loss on different
educational outcomes. This chapter studies the impact of father’s job loss on children’s school
performance during the Great Recession in Spain.
According to the evidence mentioned above, parents experiencing job loss suffer from income
reduction, job uncertainty and a worse family environment, among other negative consequences.
All these variables are usually seen as inputs affecting the grade production function of their
children and could, therefore, be suggested as mechanisms through which parental job loss would
translate into a worse school performance for those affected students.1 On the other hand, stu-
dents whose parents face an episode of job loss might change their beliefs on the relationship
between effort and success. And this, in turn, might change their tastes for effort exerted while
at school. In this case, though, empirical evidence on the direction of the distortion introduced
by parental job loss does not seem to be as clear. Evidence coming from the social psychology
field suggests that children whose parents suffer job loss develop negative work beliefs (Barling
et al., 1998). Moreover, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) find that those individuals that ex-
perienced an economic recession during their teenager years are more inclined to believe that
luck, rather than effort, is the fundamental driver of success. However, there is also evidence
that would suggest a positive impact on the tastes for effort. For instance, Betts and McFarland
(1995) show that children choose more education when the labour market is weak.
1See Todd and Wolpin (2003) for a review on the specification and estimation of the production function for
cognitive achievement.
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In a simple one period static model in which children decide the level of effort they exert at
school each academic year, and effort positively influences school performance, parental job loss
is assumed to affect both the marginal returns and marginal costs of effort, by making children
more or less productive while studying, and altering their incentives to study. This simple model
shows that from a theoretical point of view, the direction of the impact of parental job loss on
grades is ambiguous. The data collected and the estimation strategy followed in this chapter
will allow me to estimate the total effect of an arguably exogenous change in parental job loss
on the school performance of their offspring. That is, not holding other inputs constant.
Estimating a causal relationship between parental job loss and child outcomes faces two main
challenges: finding a source of exogenous variation for parental job loss and the scarcity of appro-
priate data. This chapter addresses both of them by exploiting the developments in the Spanish
labour market during the Great Recession and by using a dataset specifically designed to address
this question. In particular, this article uses an original dataset I gathered myself on the school
performance of over 400 children aged 3 to 18 for the academic years 2007-2008 to 2011-2012
in a school in the province of Barcelona. On the parental side, I designed a survey to collect
data retrospectively, with a special focus on the labour situation and job characteristics at the
beginning of the crisis, i.e. in January 2008, and then later on in January 2010 and January 2012.
Starting from 2008, millions of jobs have been destroyed in Spain.2 Figure 1 shows the
unemployment rates in the EU-27, euro area, Spain and the province of Barcelona for the eco-
nomically active population. Both the Spanish unemployment rate and the unemployment rate
in the province of Barcelona reached its minimum in 2007, and started increasing dramatically
thereafter (unemployment rates in Spain and the province of Barcelona were 25% and 22.6%,
respectively, in 2012). The same pattern is found if I would restrict the data to males aged 25
to 74. Under the assumption that the vast majority of employment destruction observed in this
period is due to the Great Recession (i.e., workers would not have lost their jobs otherwise),
job losses could be considered as exogenous to the worker. Or as Gregg et al. (2012) put it, the
recession provides an exogenous shock to employment analogous to exploring job displacement
for known plant closures. However, it could be that those losing their jobs during the Great
Recession in Spain have some unobserved characteristics that affect both their labour status and
the school performance of their children. In order to address this last challenge, the panel na-
ture of the data collected allows to condition for unobserved characteristics of both the student
and the father by using student (worker) fixed effects. Thus, the empirical strategy followed
in this article relies on the assumption that, conditioning on student fixed effects and observed
covariates, the Great Recession in Spain generates exogenous variation in job loss analogous to
2According to the Labour Force Survey data provided by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE)
almost 4 million jobs were destroyed between 2007 and 2012.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rates
that provided by randomisation.
Fixed effect estimates of the effect of father’s job loss on the average grade and the percentile
rank (in the cohort of the student) are negative and statistically significant. In particular, the
results suggest that after father’s job loss, the school performance of affected students is signifi-
cantly worse. Paternal job loss entails a (yearly) average decrease in children’s grades of around
13.2 to 16% of the population standard deviation, and a reduction of around 15.7 to 19.6%
of the population standard deviation in the percentile rank measure, and these results remain
unaltered once maternal job loss is accounted for in the empirical model. Importantly, in terms
of being able to give a causal interpretation to the estimates, placebo tests show that both the
percentile rank and the average grade prior to father’s job loss are not affected by future job
losses experienced by the father. Additionally, the negative effect of FJL does not seem to be
driven by those students whose fathers had lower tenure at the firm prior to job loss, but rather,
by those fathers that had a more stable situation prior to losing the job. This evidence would
suggest that treated students were not on a different (negative) trend prior to father’s job loss.
Moreover, the results suggest that the negative impact of father’s job loss in school performance
is mainly driven by those fathers that suffer longer unemployment spells. Importantly, these
results are pointing out a mechanism through which further inequalities might develop during
and after a deep economic crisis. In this respect, the effect of father’s job loss appears to be
largely concentrated among children of already disadvantaged families in terms of the level of
education of the father. This result doesn’t seem to be fully explained by different income losses,
and it can partly be explained by a higher probability of finding a job after job loss, for those
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fathers with a high level of education. Also, even though imprecise, the results seem to be larger
for those children whose fathers closed their own business after 2008, and more concentrated
on boys rather than on girls. Even if in the whole sample father’s job loss is associated with
a significant decrease in income, these differential effects do not seem to be driven by changes
in income. Thus, I find no clear evidence supporting the hypothesis that income could be the
main mechanism behind the effect of father’s job loss on school performance. I also find that
residential relocation or changes in civil status are not the main drivers of the effect of father’s
job loss on school performance of their offspring.
This chapter is closely related to a recent emerging literature trying to assess the effects of
parental job loss on several children outcomes. The first published articles focused on the effects
of parental job displacements on their children’s earnings later in life. Oreopoulos et al. (2008)
use Canadian administrative data to find that children whose fathers were displaced had annual
earnings about 9% lower than similar children whose fathers did not experience an employment
shock, and that these estimates are driven by those children at the bottom of the income distri-
bution. On the contrary, using data from Norway, Bratberg et al. (2008) find that displacement
has negative effects on earnings of affected workers, but find no statistically significant effect
of father’s displacement on the earnings of their children. Additionally, parental job loss has
also been related to worse infant health. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
Lindo (2011) compares the birth weight of children born after and before a displacement, and
finds that husband’s job losses have significant negative effects on birth weights, that are con-
centrated on the lower half of the birth weight distribution.
More evidence is found on the recent literature analysing the impact of parental job loss on
different educational outcomes. Using administrative Norwegian data, Rege et al. (2011) esti-
mate the effect of parental job loss due to plant closure on a summary measure of ten subjects
for a pooled cross-section of graduating secondary school children.3 Their estimates suggest that
paternal job loss has a negative impact of a 6% of the standard deviation on children’s GPA
at age sixteen, whereas they find a non-significant increase in GPA associated with maternal
job loss. Stevens and Schaller (2011) use SIPP data to study the relationship between parental
job loss (they focus on the father unless the child lives in a single-mother household) and grade
retention between ages 5 to 19. Their findings indicate that the probability of children’s grade
retention increases by 15% after conditioning on child fixed effects. Their measure of job loss
considers those that are classified as being fired, employer sold or went bankrupt, and due to
slack work or business conditions. This contribution improves upon Kalil and Ziol-Guest (2008),
which use the same data to explain grade retention, but concerns were raised on the exogeneity
3It is common to assume in the literature that job losses due to plant closures are exogenous to the affected
workers.
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of the measure used to capture parental job losses. Coelli (2011) finds that parental job loss
from layoffs and business failures that occur when youth complete high school are found to be
negatively related with enrollment at university and community college in Canada. A related
study in this literature by Ananat et al. (2011), uses state-level US data on mass layoffs to show
that job losses decrease test scores for math and reading assessments, and these effects are larger
for eighth than fourth graders. Gregg et al. (2012) do not have information on job displacement
for the worker itself and instead, the authors try to identify those parents being displaced by the
contractions in employment suffered by the industry in which the father was working during the
recession of the 1980’s in the UK. They find that a child with a likely displaced father obtained
lower grades, equivalent to about 2% lower wages as an adult, had a lower early labour market
attachment, and no direct impact on earnings at age 30/34. Finally, instead of focusing on
job losses, Pinger (2013) investigates how paternal unemployment affects children’s educational
attainment. She finds that paternal unemployment decreases the probability of upper secondary
schooling choice by around 18 percentage points.
The contributions of this chapter to this literature are threefold. First, I use an original
dataset specifically designed to address the research question. Second, the combination of job
losses due to the Great Recession in Spain, together with the use of fixed effects given the panel
nature of the data, make my measure of job loss more likely to fulfill the exogeneity assumption
than most of the papers in the literature. Most of the cited papers use plant closures to identify
the causal impact of father’s job loss on their offspring’s school outcomes, but can’t control for
student fixed effects as this chapter does. Finally, a variety of heterogeneous effects and mech-
anisms not explored before are identified. Additionally, analysing the Spanish case during the
Great Recession is interesting given that the results might be pointing out a mechanism (pa-
ternal job loss) through which further inequalities might be developing during and after a deep
economic crisis. Similar results could potentially be found in other economies that have been
highly affected by the Great Recession in terms of employment losses, like Greece or Portugal.4
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes a simple theoretical frame-
work describing the effects of parental job loss on children’s optimal effort while at school.
Section 2.3 describes the original dataset used in the chapter, and Section 2.4 presents the
estimation strategy. Finally, Section 2.5 shows the main results and Section 2.6 concludes.
4These countries also have similar unemployment insurance gross replacement rates (although net replacement
rates are higher in Portugal and Greece than in Spain). In terms of unemployment duration, the Spanish benefits
last longer than those in place in these other two countries. For more data on this and comparisons with the rest
of EU member states, see Esser et al. (2013).
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2.2 The impact of parental job loss on grades. A simple
theoretical framework
Consider a student in general education that every year has to choose how much effort to devote
to study, e, and assume that her utility while she is in school depends directly and positively
on the grades she obtains, G. In general, it’s not unreasonable to think that better grades can
entail a greater reward than bad grades either in the family environment (parents offering extra
consumption for better grades) or later on in life by granting access to higher education, a wider
choice of studies or a better job. The grade production function is determined by the level of
effort supplied by the student: G = g(e) and is supposed to be strictly increasing and concave
in the level of effort. The effort that students devote to study entails a disutility, d(e), which is
supposed to be strictly increasing and convex. Thus, under this framework, the problem of the
student is very similar to a static labour supply model, but here the student chooses the level
of effort to maximise her utility:
max
e
U(G, e) = G− d(e) (2.1)
Subject to the grade production function:
G = g(e) (2.2)
The first order condition for an interior solution is given by (3) and states that students will
choose the level of effort that equates the marginal rate of return to effort with its marginal cost:
g′(e) = d′(e) (2.3)
Under this formulation there is only one level of effort that is optimal. A simple way of
introducing heterogeneity in this setting is to follow Card (1999). Card introduces heterogeneity
in the Becker (1967)’s optimal schooling choice model by introducing differences in the costs
of (or tastes for) schooling, and in the economic benefits of schooling. Likewise, I will assume
that the marginal rate of return to effort, g′(e), and the marginal cost of effort, d′(e), are linear
functions with person-specific intercepts and homogeneous slopes:
g′(e) = βi(e) = bi − k1e (2.4)
d′(e) = δi = ri + k2e (2.5)
k1 ≥ 0, k2 ≥ 0 (2.6)
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As Card (1999) states, variation in bi can be seen as differences in ability (for the same level
of effort, more able people obtain higher grades). But he also points out that changes in school
quality could be parameterised in this model by shifts in bi. At the same time, variations in bi
could also reflect differences in family background, or, in general, those inputs traditionally seen
as affecting the production function for cognitive achievement (see Todd and Wolpin (2003)).
Variation in ri can be seen as different tastes for effort.
Parental job loss could potentially affect both the marginal benefits and costs of effort. As
stated in the introduction, people experiencing job loss suffer from income reduction, worse
family environment, deteriorated physical and mental health, etc. That is, empirical evidence
has until now shown a negative impact on the inputs that generally are seen as affecting the
production function for cognitive achievement. But it could also be that children benefit from
parents being more at home after job loss. Todd and Wolpin (2003) point out the lack of con-
sensus of maternal employment on school achievement, for instance.
Parental job loss could also distort the tastes for effort of the affected student. However, the
direction of the distortion could go, a priori, in any direction. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009)
find that a recession during impressionable years (between 18 and 25 years of age) makes an
individual more inclined to believe that luck, rather than effort, is the fundamental driver of
success. Moreover, research in social psychology suggests that from as young as 5 years of age,
children understand such concepts as pay, labour disputes, unemployment and welfare. (Bar-
ling et al., 1999b). Barling et al. (1999a) find that children’s perceptions of their parent’s job
insecurity indirectly affect their grade performance through the effects of beliefs in an unjust
world and negative mood. Similarly, Barling et al. (1998) postulate a model by which children
who watch their parents experiencing layoffs and insecurity, develop negative work beliefs that
then predict their work-related attitudes. According to these studies, parental job loss would
introduce a negative distortion in the tastes for effort. On the contrary, it might be that stu-
dents whose parents face job loss are more aware of the importance of education later in life,
and thus receive an additional incentive to exert a higher level of effort that would lead to a
better performance while at school. In this sense, the empirical evidence shows that, in general,
children choose more education when the labour market is weak (see, for instance, Betts and
McFarland (1995)). In this case, parental job loss would introduce a positive distortion in the
tastes for effort.5
Therefore, both bi and ri could potentially be affected by parental job loss, and I will ex-
press this by writing both of them as a function of parental job loss (JL): b(JL)i and r(JL)i,
5It seems reasonable to think that if this positive distortion exists, it would be bigger the older the student is.
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respectively. Optimal level efforts are then determined according to:6
e∗i =
b(JL)i − r(JL)i
k1 + k2
(2.7)
Thus, the direction of the impact of parental job loss on effort (and therefore on grades)
depends on the impacts of parental job loss on both the marginal returns and costs of effort and
these are, as mentioned above, theoretically ambiguous.7 This chapter will therefore assess the
impact of parental job loss on grades from an empirical point of view. Given that the estimation
strategy relies on the use of something close to a natural experiment, I will not be able to identify
any of the parameters of the grade production function or the disutility of effort. Instead, what I
will uncover is a policy effect, i.e. the total effect of an exogenous change in parental job loss on
grades (that is, not holding other inputs constant). I will come back to this point in Section 2.4,
after describing the dataset in the next section.
2.3 Data
The data used in this chapter come from an original dataset I collected myself, gathering data
on the parental labour market situation and grades of 408 students with ages ranging from 3 to
18 in a school in the province of Barcelona.8 In particular, for each of these students, I observe
their grades in the different subjects from the academic year 2007-2008 to the academic year
2011-2012 (as long as they have been enrolled in the school since the academic year 2008).9 On
the parental side, I designed a survey to collect personal information as well as current and past
information of their labour market situation and, if parents were employed, the characteristics
of the job. The survey was supposed to be answered by both parents if they were living in the
same household as the children. If only one parent was living at home at the time the survey
was administered, then the survey was answered only by that parent. Regarding the informa-
tion on the labour market characteristics of the parents, I collected information on their labour
market situation (and if employed, on the job characteristics) in January 2012, January 2010
and January 2008. With the information of these 3 points in time, and the dates regarding
labour status changes, I have reconstructed their labour market situation for the 5 periods in
which I also observe the grades of their offspring.10
6Where a necessary condition for the equilibrium to exist with non-negative levels of effort is that bi ≥ ri.
7Even if not included here, it might as well be that parental job loss affects the slopes (k1, k2) of the marginal
return and marginal costs of effort. In any case, the effect would still be theoretically ambiguous.
8For a more detailed description of the questionnaire design, data collection, survey and item non response,
and representativeness of the data, see Chapter 1.
9The academic year in Spain starts in September and finishes by the end of June, with summer holidays in
the months of July and August. From now on, when I refer to, for instance, the academic year 2008, I will be
referring to the academic year going from September 2007 to June 2008.
10Due to missing data for some individuals, I had to make some reasonable assumptions regarding the dates
of job loss. Even if I am able to use the 5 years of information by making these assumptions, they could be
50
Chapter 2. Job Loss at Home: Children’s Grades during the Great Recession in Spain
Following the related literature, a number of exclusion criteria are applied to create the final
sample. First, those kids that are not living in 2012 in a two-parent household are dropped
from the analysis (30 observations dropped). In all these cases the student is living only with
the mother, and therefore, I have no information on the labour characteristics of the father.
Second, given that the sample does not seem to be representative of students with an immigrant
background (see Chapter 1), students whose fathers are immigrants are excluded (22 additional
observations dropped). Third, given that students in the High-School stage (“Bachillerato”)
have already made the transition from compulsory to post-compulsory education and, as a re-
sult, I can only observe those that decided on continuing their studies, I am not considering
them in the analysis (45 additional observations dropped). The final two exclusion criteria are
important for the identification strategy and internal validity. I restrict the sample to those
students that I can observe for each of the 5 periods. In practical terms, these means that I keep
the observations for which I can observe the grades at the beginning of the crisis (academic year
2008), and for every year after that. A total of 128 students are excluded after applying this
restriction. Out of them, 82 students are excluded because they were too young to be in school
in the academic year 2007-2008 (children that in the academic year 2012 were in the second stage
of kindergarten and those in the first grade of primary school).11 The remaining 46 students
that are not observed for 5 years are those that entered the school during secondary education.
That is, they graduated from Primary school in another school, and enrolled in the school where
the data was collected once they moved to secondary education. If data was available at the
school where I collected the data also for grades in previous schools, then this information was
incorporated in the dataset. Finally, the last and very important exclusion restriction has to do
with the employment status of fathers in the first period of observation. I restrict the sample to
those students whose fathers were employed in January 2008. After applying this restriction, 5
additional observations are dropped. Thus, the final sample consists of 178 students in compul-
sory education whose grades were observed for all the 5 academic years from 2008 to 2012 and
whose fathers were employed at the beginning of the crisis in 2008, were present at home during
all the period and had Spanish nationality. Robustness checks will be conducted by showing the
results for the whole sample and results when removing some of this exclusion criteria.
Information on the grades obtained each academic year was made available by the school
introducing some measurement error in the dates regarding labour status changes. Thus, even if the main results
shown both in this and the results section use this 5 period reconstructed dataset, I perform robustness checks
using only the 3 years (2008, 2010 and 2012), for which information regarding the labour status is certain and
there is no need to make any assumptions.
11See Chapter 1 for a description of the Spanish education system. Kindergarten in this chapter is based on
the British/Australian definition (rather than the definition used in North America) and it refers to the stage of
education where children below the age of compulsory education play and learn; a nursery school.
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Figure 2: Average grade and mean percentile rank in the year-grade
for those students whose parents answered the questionnaire. The format of the grades for
each stage of education is described in the section on data on school outcomes in Chapter 1.
After some transformations to homogenise grades between stages of education, all the students
in the sample have grades ranging from 1 to 5 (where 1 means that the student has failed to
pass the subject, and 5 is the best possible grade). For each student I computed her average
grade in each academic year by averaging her grades for all the subjects taken in each of the 3
terms in the academic year. For those students that in the period under study were enrolled in
some of the Kindergarten grades, two possible average grades were available depending on the
way I calculated their numeric kindergarten grade (see Chapter 1 for details. Throughout this
chapter I use Measure 1, although I also conduct robustness checks using Measure 2). In order
to have a measure that is less sensitive to the type of measure used and given that these grades
are the result of non-standardised tests, I compute the percentile rank in the grade and year
corresponding to each student. Both the average grade and the percentile rank will be used as
dependent variables throughout the analysis.
I use the 5 period dataset to construct the treatment group. The treatment group consists
of children whose fathers experienced an involuntary job loss (this includes those fathers closing
their own business) at some point after the first academic year. In total, 54 out of the 178
children have been affected by father’s job loss after academic year 2008.
Figure 2 shows the average grade and percentile rank for treated and control students in the
academic years 2008 and 2012. In the academic year 2008, when all fathers in the sample were
employed, there were no significant differences between treated and control students for none of
the educational measures shown in the graph. In 2012 though, after some students have been
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exposed to father’s job loss, relevant differences emerge. For the average grade measure, stan-
dard errors are too big to reject the null hypothesis of a t-test of equality of means (not shown)
between treated and control students in 2012. For the percentile rank measure, though, I do
reject the null of equality of means between treated and control students in 2012. Tables A1, A2
and A3 show descriptive statistics for the sample of 178 students analysed. In each table, the first
three columns report means of different variables. The last column reports the difference in the
mean for control and treated individuals (first row), whereas the second row shows the value of
a t-test that has as a null hypothesis the equality of means between control and treated students.
No significant differences emerge for the variables shown in Table A1, except for the third
quarter of birth dummy. Compared to control students, there were more treated students born
in the third quarter of the year. There are no significant differences in the means for those
variables containing information on the sex, age, if ever repeated a grade, and if the grades
referred to periods in school (as opposed to grades from previous schools). Descriptive statistics
of household characteristics in 2008, previous to job loss, are shown in Table A2. Families of
treated students were living more in rented apartments (as opposed to owing, with or without
mortgage, an apartment), and there were no treated students living in the first postcode area.12
More significant differences emerge in Table A3, where several personal and 2008 labour market
descriptive statistics of fathers in the sample are shown. In this table, some of the variables
have some missing information, so the number of observations available is shown in an addi-
tional (third) row.13 The fathers of treated students had a lower level of income already in 2008,
and a higher fraction was working in the industry and construction sectors.14 Treated fathers
had less years of tenure at the firm (defined for those owning her own business as the number
of years since they opened the business), and a lower share of permanent contracts. None of
the fathers of treated students worked in the public sector and, on average, they were employed
on, or owned, smaller firms. Contrary to what it could be expected, there are no significant
differences in the level of education of the fathers of treated and control students. It is also
interesting to note that there were no significant differences in their level of motivation at work
in 2008.
12This postcode area corresponds to the city center. Unfortunately, I do not have data on the level of income
by postcodes, but according to census data, it is the area with the highest share of population born in Catalonia.
13In most of the cases, it was easy to detect that the information was missing because the father did not reply,
by mistake, to one of the parts of the questionnaire. As a way to partially asses if these missing observations are
related to father’s job loss, I include a dummy in the table that is equal to 1 if income is missing. As it appears,
there are no significant differences in the level of missing income between both treated and control students.
14High income is a variable derived from the following survey question: NET monthly income in euros (includes
your salary, unemployment benefits, pension, or other subsidies). Possible answers are (1) less than 999 euros,
(2) Between 1000 and 1499 euros, (3) Between 1500 and 1999 euros, and (4) More than 2000 euros. The father is
classified as having a high income in 2008 if he marked options (3) or (4). See Chapter 1 for additional information
on survey questions.
53
Chapter 2. Job Loss at Home: Children’s Grades during the Great Recession in Spain
The information in Tables A1 to A3 suggests that, without controlling for worker fixed
effects, job loss during the Great Recession in Spain can not be considered as good as randomly
assigned.
2.4 Estimation strategy
Let Yit equal the educational outcome under study for child i at time t.
15 This education indi-
cator could either be her average grade in academic year t or the percentile rank of the student
in her grade-year combination based on her average grade. Let Dit denote a dummy variable
that equals 1 from the year the father loses involuntarily his job.16 By the sample restrictions
outlined in Section 2.3, this indicator equals 0 in the academic year 2008 for all students, since
all fathers in the final sample are employed at the beginning of the Great Recession. For control
students, this dummy will take a value of 0 in every period. For treated students, it will be
1 from the year the father loses the job. That is, the treatment is an absorbing state. The
main reason to define the job loss variable in such a way is that, under certain assumptions,
father’s job loss in my sample can be considered exogenous to the worker whereas finding a job
afterwards can not. The main assumption in the chapter, i.e. that conditioning on worker fixed
effects the Great Recession generates random employment shocks, can not be used to analyse
the effect of getting back to employment after job loss. The combination of fixed effects and the
Great Recession can only explain random entry into job loss. After job loss I can not account,
among other things, for the level of job search effort devoted by each worker in each period after
job loss.17
The observed educational outcome, Yit, is either Y0it or Y1it, depending on the father’s
job loss status. The main assumption behind the estimation strategy in this chapter is that
conditioning on student fixed effects and observed covariates, the Great Recession in Spain
generates employment shocks that are random in their timing. This assumption hides one
potential risk for the consistency of my estimates, since I can not rule out the fact that unobserved
time variant variables might be affecting at the same time the probability of job loss of parents
and the grades of their offspring. In this sense, a major concern for my estimation strategy is
given by the fact that fathers who lost the job during the period under analysis could have been
on a different trajectory on the labour market prior to 2008. Unfortunately, pre-2008 labour
15This section follows the notation used by Angrist and Pischke (2008).
16Stevens and Schaller (2011) also define like this the measure of parental job loss. But given that their outcome
of study is grade repetition, the year of parental job loss is separated from the dummies of job loss in prior years.
In their case, job loss in the academic year, if exogenous, should not have an effect on whether the child is
repeating that grade.
17I will explore in Section 2.5.1, though, the results using alternative treatment definitions (i.e., allowing the
treatment variable to switch back to 0 once the worker finds a job after job loss).
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market and school performance data to test for differential trends between treated and control
students is not available.18 A way to partially address this issue is to check whether the effects of
FJL are mainly driven by those students whose fathers had been working for a short time in the
firm previous to job loss, indicating that these fathers could have been on a different (negative)
trajectory prior to losing the job during the Great Recession. As I will show in Section 2.5.1,
this does not seem to be the case in my sample.19 If the main assumption holds, then omitted
time variant variables would not be a cause of concern in this chapter. As a result, father’s
job loss in this sample could be considered as good as randomly assigned after conditioning on
student fixed effects and observed covariates:
E[Y0it|Ai, Xit, Xi, t,Dit] = E[Y0it|Ai, Xit, Xi, t] (2.8)
where Xit is a vector of observed time varying covariates not affected by the job loss itself
(like the stage of education the student is enrolled in); Xi is a vector of observed time invariant
covariates (like sex, level of education of the father, permanent wealth, etc.), and Ai is a vector
of unobserved but fixed confounders capturing, among others, the unobserved ability of the
student. As Angrist and Pischke (2008) point out and I discussed above, the key to fixed effects
estimation is therefore the assumption that the unobserved Ai appears without a time subscript
in a linear model for E[Y0it|Ai, Xit, Xi, t]:
E[Y0it|Ai, Xit, Xi, t] = α+ λt +A′iγ +X ′iφ+X ′itβ (2.9)
Assuming that the causal effect of father’s job loss is additive and constant, then:
E[Y1it|Ai, Xit, Xi, t] = E[Y0it|Ai, Xit, Xi, t] + ρ (2.10)
which together with equation 9 implies:
E[Yit|Ai, Xit, Xi, t] = Dit ∗ (E[Y0it|Ai, Xit, Xi, t] + ρ) + (1−Dit) ∗ E[Y0it|Ai, Xit, Xi, t]
= α+ λt + ρDit +A
′
iγ +X
′
iφ+X
′
itβ
(2.11)
where ρ captures the after job loss average causal effect on children’s school performance as
long as the assumption of absence of time invariant omitted variables holds. Using the panel
18However, it is important to note that the fixed effect controls for static pre-2008 labour market experience
(i.e., number of years in unemployment prior to the Great Recession).
19Additionally, the main characteristics of workers that lost their jobs in the first period of the crisis (2009-
2010), and those that lost their jobs in the second period (2011-2012) are not significantly different from each
other. That is, it seems that the Great Recession was not affecting a particular type of workers at the beginning
of the employment destruction process as compared to workers losing the job a couple years after the start of the
Great Recession (see Table A4).
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nature of the data available, I can therefore estimate the following fixed effects model:
Yit = αi + λt + ρDit +X
′
itβ + it (2.12)
αi = α+A
′
iγ +X
′
iφ (2.13)
where the individual fixed effect, αi would capture any time invariant characteristic affecting
the educational outcomes of the child, both at the child, household and father/mother level;
and λt represents a vector of year dummies. Since those factors that may change as a result of
job loss are omitted from the specification (changes in income, civil status, etc.), ρ captures the
(average) full effect of father’s job loss on school performance every year after job loss. That
is, it captures the total effect of an exogenous negative change in the labour status (father’s job
loss) on the educational outcomes of their offspring, not holding other inputs constant. As Todd
and Wolpin (2003) would put it, in this chapter there is no attempt to incorporate in the model
all the determinants of cognitive achievement. Instead, this chapter makes use of an event that
arguably provides a source of exogenous variation (the Great Recession), once worker’s fixed
effects are accounted for. Additionally, as Imbens and Angrist (1994) put it, in models with
panel data and fixed effects, the data are only informative about the impact of binary regressors
on individuals for whom the value of the regressor changes over the period of observation. In this
sense, the estimates in this chapter, rather than identifying average population effects, could be
seen as measuring a local average treatment effect (LATE), i.e., the effect of father’s job loss for
those students whose fathers lost the job due to the Great Recession. As seen in the descriptive
statistics tables in Section 2.3, fathers who lost the job were all employed in the private sector,
and proportionately more in the industry and construction sector. As other studies identifying
local average treatment effects, this study could be subject to the critique of whether the effect
of job loss for those students whose fathers lost the job during the Great Recession in Spain is an
effect of interest.20 Given the dimensions of the Great Recession in terms of job loss, the answer
to this question doesn’t seem unimportant. On the contrary, the results in this chapter will shed
some light on how a deep economic recession severely affecting some sectors in the economy
impacts the educational outcomes of students whose fathers are hit hard by the recession.
As seen in the graphs in the previous section, future father job losses do not seem to be
associated with lower educational outcomes in 2008 for the treatment group. However, estimates
of ρ would be biased if students affected by father’s job loss had changed/left school by the
academic year 2012.21 This does not seem to be a cause for concern since the drop-out rate
20See, for instance, the contribution by Heckman and Urzua (2010) and the critique to the questions that LATE
can answer.
21Since I only could distribute the survey to those parents of students that in the academic year 2012 were
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for the school in both kindergarten and primary school grades is quite stable during the period
of observation and around 0.6% per year. In compulsory secondary school, the average annual
drop-out rate is a bit larger and around 3.3%. However, it doesn’t seem to be a reason for concern
either, since it decreased (rather than increased) from academic year 2008 to academic year 2011
(last year for which I have data on school drop-out rates available). Also, the principals argued
that the main reason for compulsory secondary school drop-out is related to the fact that some
students turning 16 in the academic year are allowed to quit school by law once they turn 16,
and some of them therefore abandon the school system. Moreover, the reader could think that
estimates would be biased if students that otherwise would have enrolled in this particular school,
did not do it as a result of father’s job loss. However, given the sample restrictions applied, all
the students in the restricted sample had to be enrolled in the school before the beginning of
the Great Recession in order to be able to observe them both in 2008 and 2012. Additionally,
estimates could be biased if parents would compensate their children by helping them more with
homework after job loss. Unfortunately, this data was not collected in the survey. Finally, I am
implicitly assuming here that school inputs are not altered by parental job loss. That is, that
the school does not adapt the level of inputs administered to help those students suffering from
parental job loss. Estimates of father’s job loss would be (downward) biased if this assumption
does not hold. All in all, given the characteristics of the sample outlined in Chapter 1 (concerted
school, slightly better students handing in the parental questionnaires, etc.), the results shown
in the next section are probably a downward biased estimate of the effect of father’s job loss on
school performance for the Spanish population of students in compulsory education during the
Great Recession in Spain.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Average effects of father’s job loss on children’s school performance
Table 1 presents the results on the average effect of father’s job loss using the two different
measures of school performance described in the previous sections. The first 4 columns of the
table focus on the results using the average grade as the dependent variable. Standard errors
are clustered at the student level. All models include year dummies, and dummies controlling
for the stage of education the student is in year t. The results of an OLS regression are shown
in column 1. Omitting fixed effects, father’s job loss (FJL from now onwards) does not have
a significant effect on the average grade. However, including fixed effects (see model 2) the
coefficient of the FJL variable becomes negative and significant. After father’s job loss, from a
mean of 3.69 points (in a 1 to 5 scale), students suffer a yearly average decrease in the average
enrolled at school, it could be that previous to 2012, students affected by parental job loss had dropped out from
this school and enrolled into a public one.
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grade of 0.113 points.22 In column 3, a dummy variable is added to control for repetition of
grades (this variable equals 1 if the student is retaking that particular grade) and a dummy
variable that captures whether the grades correspond to years in the school where the survey
was administered. The point estimate barely changes after the inclusion of these additional
explanatory variables.23 In model 4, estimates of the fixed effects model are presented for a
sample restricted to exclude those students whose fathers have experienced 2 job losses in the
period. Stevens (1997) studies the effects of multiple job losses on earnings, and finds that much
of the persistence in the earnings losses can be explained by additional job losses in the years
following an initial displacement. Initial displacements predict future displacements and thus,
subsequent displacements might not be exogenous (in the sense that they might no longer be
attributed to the combination of Great Recession and fixed effects). Multiple job losses could
be due to unobserved time varying heterogeneity that could bias the estimates. By excluding
from the sample those students whose fathers lost the job more than once in the period under
analysis, the estimate remains negative, significant and slightly bigger in magnitude. From now
on, I will show the results both for the initial restricted sample as well as for the sample that
excludes those students whose fathers suffer more than a job loss in the period.
22This difference between the OLS and fixed effect estimators is worth commenting on. Without taking into
account the panel nature of the data in the estimation, FJL does not have a significant impact on grades. As
shown in Figure 2, both control and treated students suffer a decrease in school performance during the period
that is captured by the year dummies in the model and the dummies for the stage of education. The fixed effects
estimator exploits the variation within the individual instead, and captures the additional decrease in grades
experienced by treated individuals (once the effect of year dummies and the stage of education has been taken
into account). Also, as pointed out in Section 2.4, in models with fixed effects the data are only informative
about the impact of binary regressors on individuals for whom the value of the regressor changes over the period
of observation. In this sense, fixed effect estimates are analogous to local average treatment effects coming from
an instrumental variable setting (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). This would imply that the fixed effects results are
not directly comparable to OLS estimates.
23Note that it is not clear that these two variables should be included as a control since they could be considered
outcome variables. Nonetheless, in both cases less than 1% of the observations are classified as repeating a grade
or not in the school where the survey was administered, and the results barely change.
58
Chapter 2. Job Loss at Home: Children’s Grades during the Great Recession in Spain
Table 1: Average effect of FJL on the average grade and percentile rank
Dep variable: average grade Dep variable: percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
FJL 0.012 -0.113** -0.118** -0.142** -0.003 -0.044** -0.044** -0.055**
(0.111) (0.057) (0.057) (0.066) (0.041) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
Mean 3.706 3.706 3.706 3.678 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.519
SD 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.855 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.296
N 890 890 890 830 890 890 890 830
Students 178 178 178 166 178 178 178 166
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Dep variable (first 4 columns): Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education), has a mean of 3.69 and
SD of 0.89. Dep variable (last 4 columns): Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education)
has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1
from the year the father loses the job. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies,
and dummies for stage of education. Extra controls are indicators for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the
average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
The last 4 columns of Table 1 present the same structure as the first 4 columns, but using
the percentile rank of the student in her cohort as the dependent variable. The same pattern
described for the average grade emerges. The percentile rank in the class decreases on average
around 4.4 percentage points after father’s job loss in the restricted sample and 5.5 percentage
points when students with fathers experiencing two job losses are excluded.24
In terms of standard deviations, FJL entails a (yearly) average decrease in children’s aver-
age grades of about 13.2 to 16% of the population standard deviation. For the percentile rank
measure, it implies a decrease of about 15.7 to 19.6% of the population standard deviation.
Compared to Rege et al. (2011), that find an effect of father plant closure on the grade point
average of 16 year old students of about 6.3% of the population standard deviation, the results
here show that the effects of father’s job loss on the school performance of their offspring during
a deep economic crisis are bigger in magnitude. However, the results in this chapter are an
average of the effects of FJL across different ages, since students included had ages ranging
between 8 and 17 in the academic year 2012, and are the result of estimations including fixed
24Even if convenient for its simplicity, the results using the linear fixed effects model do not take into account
the special nature of the percentile rank variable, that takes values between 0 and 1. Using a linear functional
form for the conditional mean might miss important non-linearities, as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (2008)
and the estimated expected values might not lie between 0 and 1. Papke and Wooldridge (2008) propose using
fractional probit models for panel data in these cases, using a probit link function. The average partial effects
obtained after estimating fractional probit models using the generalised estimating equation approach with an
exchangeable working correlation matrix are, however, very similar to those obtained in Table 1: -0.039 (s.e:
0.021) and -0.052 (s.e: 0.0237), are the average partial effects that would compare to the point estimates in
columns 7 and 8 of Table 1, respectively.
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effects (Rege et al. (2011) work with a cross section of 10th graders in Norway).25
The previous results are based on the restricted sample, i.e., the one resulting after applying
the sample restriction criteria outlined in Section 2.3. Table 2 presents results using the whole
sample and different subsamples, using again the average grade (first 5 columns) and the per-
centile rank (last 5 columns) as dependent variables. Father’s job loss does not have a significant
impact on average grades when using all the sample.26 By excluding those students that are
in post-compulsory education (High-School) in column 2, FJL becomes significant at the 10%
level. The evidence in column 3, that considers exclusively students that in 2012 are already
on post-compulsory education, suggests that the school performance of these older students is
not negatively affected by FJL. If anything, the evidence suggests rather the contrary. This
suggestive evidence is in line with the intuition in Section 2.2, whereby father’s job loss could
be introducing a positive distortion in the tastes for effort for older students. Starting with the
number of observations in column 2, column 4 makes additional restrictions. First, I don’t in-
clude those students whose father was already retired at the beginning of the period. Moreover,
given that the estimation strategy relies on within individual differences, I only include those
students for which I can observe their school performance for 2 periods or more.27 Finally, given
that I want to compare within individual pre-father’s job loss outcomes with post-father’s job
loss outcomes, I exclude those students whose fathers were already unemployed in 2008. Column
5 applies the additional restriction of excluding those students whose fathers have experienced
more than a job loss in the period. By applying these restrictions, compared to column 3, the
point estimates change slightly but the variability increases and makes the estimates not signifi-
cant (p-values are 0.106 and 0.121, respectively). The right part of the table presents the results
using the percentile rank measure instead. The same pattern emerges, although this time the
impact of FJL is significant in all columns except in column 6, because High-School students are
included. In general, for the models excluding HS students, a decrease in the absolute magnitude
of the point estimate of FJL was expected a priori since these bigger samples include students
whose school performance is not observed during all the 5 years. In particular, the years missing
for these additional observations are observations at the beginning of the period: before father’s
job loss occurs or right after that.
25Table A5 reproduces the results of models 3 and 4 using the two measures of school performance computed
under the assumptions of measure 2 instead (see Section 2.3). The results obtained are almost identical. Thus,
from now on I will only reproduce the results using the measures of school performance computed under the
assumptions of measure 1.
26The number of observations in the sample is 408. I lose 30 observations in both columns 1 and 6 because
the father does not live in the house at the moment the survey was distributed, and therefore, I do not have
information on the labour situation of fathers in these cases.
27When talking about the unrestricted sample in the next section, this is the sample that I will be referring to.
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Table 2: Average effect of FJL on the average grade and percentile rank - Unrestricted samples
Dep variable: average grade Dep variable: percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8 M.9 M.10
FJL -0.048 -0.086* 0.238 -0.082 -0.089 -0.017 -0.034* 0.082* -0.033* -0.038*
(0.046) (0.049) (0.156) (0.050) (0.057) (0.017) (0.018) (0.045) (0.019) (0.021)
Mean 3.673 3.733 3.298 3.715 3.687 0.511 0.510 0.511 0.508 0.502
SD 0.905 0.893 0.891 0.887 0.897 0.288 0.289 0.281 0.289 0.292
N 1580 1360 220 1279 1201 1580 1360 220 1279 1201
Students 378 332 46 292 274 378 332 46 292 274
Subsample All Excl HS Only HS Unrest Unrest All Excl HS Only HS Unrest Unrest
students students Exclude 2JL students students Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. Dep variable (first 5 columns): Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education), has a mean
of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Dep variable (last 5 columns): Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory
education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy
equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year
dummies, dummies for stage of education, indicators for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade and whether the average grades
belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
Going back to the restricted sample, Table A6 shows the results of the estimations of random
effects models of the average grade (first 4 columns) and the percentile rank (last 4 columns),
for the restricted sample, and excluding from the restricted sample those students with fathers
that experienced 2 job losses in the period under analysis. This table is interesting for at least
2 reasons. First, by using the random effects model I can estimate the impact of time invariant
variables and assess whether the results obtained are in line with those traditionally found in the
economics of education literature. In general, the main regularities established in the empirical
literature also hold for this sample (and also for the unrestricted one, even if results are not
shown). Thus, females tend to perform better at school, those born in the first quarters of the
year do better with respect to those born in the last quarter, and father’s education (here de-
fined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the father has an education degree beyond high-school)
has a positive and sizable impact both in the average grade and percentile rank of his offspring.
These results are also interesting because they allow me to compare the results of random versus
fixed effects models. The fact that the point estimates between the 2 estimators do not differ
by a significant amount (Hausman tests can not reject the null of non systematic differences
between FE and RE coefficients) suggests that the shocks to employment could be exogenous to
the worker, even without conditioning on his (time invariant) characteristics. Moreover, placebo
tests for the effect of future father job losses on school performance prior to job loss provide ad-
ditional support to the interpretation of the effects as being of a causal nature. Table 3, panel A,
shows the results of the impact of future job losses on average grades in 2008 (the first academic
year in the sample, where by construction all students have employed fathers). In all cases the
estimates are highly imprecise and not significantly different from zero. This finding provides
evidence against the possibility that changes in household’s unobservables simultaneously drive
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FJL and school performance of their offspring, since otherwise we would probably expect to see
significantly worse school performance prior to father’s job loss. Moreover, Panel B suggests
that the lack of significance of future FJL on school performance is not driven by the fact that I
use a cross section instead of a panel to run the placebo test. Using the 2012 cross-section, the
results in Panel B show that students that by 2012 have been affected by FJL suffer a significant
decrease in school performance.
Table 3: Placebo test: Impact of future job loss on the average grade and percentile rank of 2008
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4
Panel A: Placebo - Impact of future father job losses using cross-section of 2008
Future FJL 0.015 -0.067 -0.011 -0.029
(0.104) (0.123) (0.041) (0.048)
Mean 3.955 3.921 0.518 0.511
SD 0.801 0.815 0.286 0.288
Panel B: Impact of FJL using only cross-section of 2012
FJL 2012 -0.199* -0.272** -0.090** -0.115**
(0.117) (0.134) (0.041) (0.047)
Mean 3.619 3.596 0.539 0.536
SD 0.863 0.886 0.298 0.306
Students 178 166 178 166
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
Future FJL: dummy equal to 1 if the father will experience job loss in the future (at some point in subsequent observed academic years).
FJL 2012: dummy equal to 1 if the father has experienced job loss after 2008. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include dummies for sex, father’s education, quarter of birth, stage of education and
whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in
the text.
Even if according to the former placebo tests, future job losses do not significantly affect
grades prior to father’s job loss, this evidence does not guarantee that grades of treated and
control students have parallel trends. That is, fathers who lost the job during the period under
analysis could have been on a different trajectory on the labour market prior to 2008. Unfor-
tunately, pre-2008 labour market and school performance data that could be used to test for
differential trends between treated and control students is not available.28 A way to partially
address this issue is to check whether the effects of FJL are mainly driven by those students
whose fathers had been working for a short time in the firm previous to job loss, indicating
that these fathers could have been on a different (negative) trajectory prior to losing the job
during the Great Recession. In order to verify this I restrict the sample to those students whose
fathers, in 2008, had started working in the firm at least in 2007, 2006 and 2005 respectively.
28However, it is important to note that the fixed effect controls for static pre-2008 labour market experience
(i.e., number of years in unemployment prior to the Great Recession).
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The estimates in Table 4 show that the impact of FJL remains negative and significant in all
cases. It is interesting to note that, the more years of tenure prior to FJL, the larger in absolute
value the point estimates are. That is, the negative effect of FJL does not seem to be driven
by those students whose fathers had lower tenure at the firm prior to job loss, but rather, by
those fathers that had a more stable situation prior to losing the job. This evidence suggests
that treated students were not on a different (negative) trend prior to father’s job loss.
Table 4: Robustness check: father’s tenure before job loss
All restricted sample All restricted sample-excl 2JL
Father started working in 2008’s firm during: 2007 2006 2005 2007 2006 2005
Panel A. Dep variable: Average grade
FJL -0.126** -0.138** -0.159** -0.148** -0.163** -0.191**
(0.059) (0.061) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.078)
Mean 3.696 3.707 3.693 3.673 3.683 3.672
SD 0.844 0.841 0.855 0.856 0.854 0.870
Panel B. Dep variable: Percentile rank
FJL -0.050** -0.052** -0.056** -0.058** -0.061** -0.070**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028)
Mean 0.523 0.526 0.522 0.518 0.520 0.518
SD 0.293 0.295 0.297 0.297 0.299 0.303
N 865 820 760 820 775 720
Students 173 164 152 164 155 144
FE estimates. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample
(excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample
(excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage
of education, indicators for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades belong to classes taken
in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
This chapter differs from almost all other papers in the related literature in the sense that
job losses happen during a deep economic crisis rather than being the result of firm downsizes
or plant closures for reasons other than an economic recession. In this regard, it might be
that the Great Recession is also provoking job losses for mothers, and if mother and father
job losses are somehow correlated (which is indeed the case in this sample, as it will be shown
in Table 14,columns 4 and 8), then the effect of FJL could be capturing also the impact of
mother’s job loss (MJL from now onwards) on the average grades of their offspring. The results
in Table 5 suggest that this is not the case, since the coefficient of the FJL variable retains
its sign and magnitude after including the MJL variable.29 Moreover, the coefficient on MJL,
that is considerably smaller in absolute size, is not significantly different from zero in any of
the specifications. These results hold both for the restricted sample and the restricted sample
excluding those students whose fathers have suffered 2 job losses in the period analysed, and for
29The MJL variable is defined in the same way: it is equal to 1 from the (academic) year that the mother loses
the job.
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the two school performance measures (these results also hold for the unrestricted sample, even
if results are not shown in the table). Additionally, doing the same exercise as for fathers, and
applying the same exclusion criteria so that only students whose mothers were employed in 2008
are considered, I find no significant effect of MJL in any of the specifications (see Table A8).
These findings are consistent with recent papers in health economics that have found that men
suffer more negative health related consequences after job loss than women. For instance, Kuhn
et al. (2009) find that job loss significantly increases expenditures for antidepressants and related
drugs, as well as hospitalizations due to mental health problems for men, but not for women.
Additionally, results from the social psychology field suggest that there are detrimental effects
of job insecurity on money anxiety for men but not for women (Lim and Sng, 2006).
Table 5: Average effect of FJL and MJL on the average grade and percentile rank
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4
FJL -0.117** -0.142** -0.043* -0.053**
(0.057) (0.066) (0.022) (0.025)
MJL -0.012 -0.006 -0.010 -0.017
(0.085) (0.094) (0.030) (0.033)
Mean 3.706 3.678 0.526 0.519
SD 0.839 0.855 0.291 0.296
N 890 830 890 830
Students 178 166 178 166
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. FJL/MJL (father’s/mother’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father/mother loses the job. Average grade
for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for
the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies,
and dummies for stage of education, indicators for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades
belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
A series of additional robustness checks are presented in Tables A9, A10 and A11. First, Ta-
ble A9 uses only the information corresponding to the academic years 2008, 2010 and 2012. As
described in the Section 2.3, by restricting the sample to these periods I don’t need to make any
assumptions with regards to the exact date of job loss for some of the observations. Estimates
from the fixed effect models show that the coefficients of the FJL variable are also negative and
significant, and slightly bigger in magnitude (given that now the distance between observations
is 2 years and therefore ρ captures that), both for the percentile rank and the average grade
measure. Second, given the small sample size, it is also important to verify that outliers are not
the main drivers of the results. In order to address this concern, Table A10 shows estimates
when I drop observations at the extremes of the grade distribution.30 For the two school per-
30I calculate the average change in the average grade and percentile rank between the academic years 2008 and
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formance measures, applying these restrictions has almost no effect on the estimates. Finally,
I calculate the percent of students suffering job loss in the same grade and year, and also in
the same grade, year and class, as a way to control for peer group effects. Again, introducing
these variables in the main specification (see Table A11) barely changes the point estimates of
FJL. Moreover, the peer group effects coefficients are always not significantly different from zero.
Alternative treatment definitions
So far, the treatment variable has been defined as an absorbing state (i.e. it equals 1 from
the moment the father loses the job, no matter his employment situation afterwards). This is
because conditioning on worker’s fixed effects, the Great Recession can be seen as providing an
exogenous source of variation for losing the job. It is not as clear that finding a job afterwards,
conditioning on fixed effects, fulfills equally the exogeneity assumption. Nonetheless, it is inter-
esting to see what happens if I vary the treatment definition to allow those fathers finding a job
to switch the treatment status. Table A7 shows the results of experimenting with two different
treatment definitions. FJL (1) is a dummy variable that equals 1 the year the father loses the
job and the years after job loss as long as the father remains unemployed, and it equals 0 when
the father is employed. FJL (2) is a dummy variable that equals 1 the year the father loses the
job (as long as he does not find a job the same year), and the years after job loss as long as the
father remains unemployed. As for FJL (1), it equals 0 when the father is employed. That is,
the only difference between FJL (1) and FJL (2) is that FJL (1) considers fathers during the
year of job loss as treated, whereas FJL (2) only considers them as treated if they do not find
a job during the same year. In this sense, FJL (2) would be capturing the effect of long term
unemployment spells, whereas FJL (1) would be capturing the impact of father’s job loss and
long term unemployment. The results in column 1 and 2 of Table A7, suggest that the negative
impact of father’s job loss in the average grade is mainly driven by those fathers that stay unem-
ployed at least for one academic year. The same holds for the percentile rank measure, columns
5 and 6, and when I exclude from the sample those fathers who suffer two job losses in the period.
Related to the previous evidence, it would be interesting to see whether the negative effects
of job loss are offset once the father goes back to being employed. Unfortunately, the dataset
is too small and short to provide a rigorous answer. A small exercise, though, is provided in
Table A12. Considering those students whose fathers lost the job either in 2009 or 2010, I study
the effects on school performance when the father gets back to work. I construct a variable
that starts with a value of 0 for all these students in the first year (that would be 2009 or 2010,
2012 and I run the main specification excluding observations for which the average change falls in the 1st and
99th percentile, and the 5th and 95th percentile, respectively.
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depending on the year of father’s job loss), and it switches to a value of 1 for the periods when
the father goes back to work. In general, there doesn’t seem to be an impact of the father’s
getting back to work on the average grade, although the evidence suggests that once the father
is back to being employed, students start improving their ranking in their cohort again. In any
case, this is just a preliminary exercise and further data would needed to examine whether the
effects of job loss and finding a job are symmetric.
2.5.2 Heterogeneous effects and possible mechanisms
Following the related literature, I analyse whether the impact of father’s job loss is heterogeneous
across different subgroups in the sample, and the possible mechanisms by which father’s job loss
has a negative effect on the school performance of their offspring. The results need to be taken
with caution given the limitation posed by the sample size (standard errors tend to be large),
but nevertheless they add new and interesting suggestive evidence of the likely mechanisms
operating behind the detrimental effect of father’s job loss on the school performance of their
offspring that merit consideration for future research.
Father’s education and the probability to find a job
In this section I study whether the effect of FJL differs with the level of education of the father.
I group fathers in two groups according to their level of education. Those with a high level of
education are those with a degree beyond a high-school diploma, and those with a low level of
education are those that have a high-school diploma or less. The results in Table 6 show that
the effect of father’s job loss is negative and significant for those students whose fathers have a
low level of education, and that this effect is significantly different from the effect on the sub-
sample of treated students whose fathers have a high level of education. This holds for almost
all the specifications in the table, in particular when using the average grade of the student
as the dependent variable. Thus, these results would indicate that on the one side, the effect
of job loss is concentrated on disadvantaged families, as measured by the level of education of
the father. On the other, that there is no effect, or a slightly positive effect, if FJL occurs in
families where the father has a high level of education. The direction of the results is in line
with the ones found by Rege et al. (2011) and Stevens and Schaller (2011), although in their
case, the confidence intervals around the estimates were too large to draw any strong conclusions.
The differential impact of father’s job loss on children’s school performance between these
two subgroups could be explained by distinct income changes after job loss. Displaced workers
suffer short-run earning losses that persist in the long run (Jacobson et al., 1993). Even if chil-
dren in the restricted sample are always facing a very similar level of school inputs (i.e., they
are always observed in the same school), less income after job loss could mean that families
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effects of FJL by the level of education of the father
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
FJL -0.168** -0.210*** -0.141** -0.169*** -0.059** -0.077*** -0.048** -0.061***
(0.071) (0.075) (0.062) (0.064) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022)
FJL*Father 0.167* 0.315*** 0.203** 0.347*** 0.048 0.102* 0.051 0.099**
high educ (0.093) (0.117) (0.086) (0.101) (0.041) (0.057) (0.038) (0.048)
Mean 3.706 3.678 3.715 3.687 0.526 0.519 0.508 0.502
SD 0.839 0.855 0.887 0.897 0.291 0.296 0.289 0.292
N 890 830 1279 1201 890 830 1279 1201
Students 178 166 292 274 178 166 292 274
Subsample Rest Rest Unrest Unrest Rest Rest Unrest Unrest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. FJL: dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. Father high educ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the father has
a level of education beyond high-school. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of
3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and
SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses.
All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education, indicators for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade,
and whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained
in the text. From the treated students, 17 of them have a father with a high level of education whereas 37 of them have a father with a low
level of education.
could adjust downwards the level of spending in, for instance, external support with homework.
Table 7 shows a large decrease in net income following job loss for both the restricted (Panel A,
model 1) and the unrestricted sample (Panel B, model 1).31 Results excluding students whose
fathers suffered two job losses in the period are shown for both samples in the right part of the
table. Dividing the sample in two different subsamples according to the level of education of
the father, in both of them significantly less fathers are observed in the high income category
after job loss. And even though the estimates corresponding to the subsample of children whose
fathers have a high education education level are not significant in 3 out of the 4 models, the con-
fidence intervals for the estimates in the two subsamples overlap. This evidence seems to suggest
that income reductions are not one of the main channels driving the differential impact of FJL
between the two subgroups, although results have to be taken with care given missing responses
in the income question. Moreover, if families with better educated fathers had more savings to
start with, they could use these to adjust for the reduced income after job loss. Unfortunately,
the dataset does not contain information on savings to test this hypothesis. Information on help
received with homework, to account for potential changes between the two subsamples, is not
available either.32 Finally, income reductions could be explaining this dissimilar effect if men
31Net monthly income information comes from the following survey question: NET monthly income in euros
(includes your salary, unemployment benefits, pension, or other subsidies). Possible answers are (1) less than 999
euros, (2) Between 1000 and 1499 euros, (3) Between 1500 and 1999 euros, and (4) More than 2000 euros. The
father is classified as having a high income in 2008 if he marked options (3) or (4), that is, if the father has a net
income above 1500 euros. This threshold is very close to the average wage in Catalonia, according to the Annual
Wage Structure Survey for 2008-2009.
32However, hiring people to help children with homework does not seem an option widely used in Spain.
According to the data in the Evaluacio´n General de Diagno´stico, a Spanish representative survey that evaluates
the level of achievement in basic skills for 4th-year primary school graders in 2009, only 10% of students were
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Table 7: Are the heterogeneous effects of father education driven by income? Effects of FJL on income by father’s
education
Dependent variable: Dummy equal to 1 if father has high income
All Excluding fathers with 2 job losses
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6
Panel A: Restricted sample
FJL -0.318*** -0.361*** -0.229 -0.339*** -0.339** -0.346
(0.099) (0.118) (0.174) (0.124) (0.132) (0.308)
Mean 0.647 0.577 0.755 0.668 0.598 0.785
SD 0.478 0.495 0.431 0.471 0.491 0.412
N 829 506 323 770 482 288
Students 169 104 65 157 99 58
Panel B: Unrestricted sample
FJL -0.352*** -0.406*** -0.227 -0.414*** -0.404*** -0.441**
(0.084) (0.094) (0.172) (0.097) (0.106) (0.218)
Mean 0.650 0.557 0.796 0.666 0.572 0.817
SD 0.477 0.497 0.404 0.472 0.495 0.387
N 1333 814 519 1250 774 476
Students 279 171 108 261 162 99
Subsample All Father low Father high All Father low Father high
observed education education observed education education
FE estimates. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the household level in parentheses. Extra controls are year dummies. Dependent variable:
Dummy equal to 1 if father has high income (i.e., above 1500 euros).
with different levels of education would face distinctly the money anxiety attached to income
reductions, and this, in turn, could affect somehow the school performance of their offspring.
Again, data is not available to further explore this option. If data becomes available in the
future, all these hypothesis could be the object of future research.
One of the potential explanations of the differential effects of FJL by the level of education
of the father could be the distinct probabilities of finding a job during the Great Recession.
Using the data from the first quarter of 2012 of the Spanish Labour Force Survey, I estimate
the probability of finding a job in Catalonia for those male individuals that have children aged
0 to 20. Table A13 shows the results of logistic regressions for the probability of finding a
job under different specifications. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual has
started working in the firm in the last 12 months or has already found a job, and 0 if the
individual is unemployed. The results show that immigrants, those aged more than 45 and
those working in the construction sector before becoming unemployed, are more likely to remain
in unemployment. In contrast, those with a level of education beyond high school are between
2 and 3 times more likely to have found a job. The level of education of the father is, therefore,
one of the main determinants of the probability of finding a job in Catalonia. Using Model 3 in
that table, I have constructed out-of-sample predictions of the probability of finding a job for
the fathers in my sample.33 Table 8 explores the effect on school performance of the interaction
receiving external help, i.e. not coming from the family, in order to complete their homework.
33The other models lose a considerable amount of observations because the sector of activity variables are only
defined if the individual has been unemployed for less than a year.
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between the FJL variable and the out-of-sample predictions of the probability of finding a job
that the father has according to the data in the Spanish Labour Force Survey.34 The results
in Table 8 for the average grade show that the detrimental effects of FJL decrease when the
probability of finding a job increases, although the same does not happen for the percentile rank
variable. Given that father’s education is one of the main determinants of this probability, the
more detrimental effects of FJL for students whose fathers have a low level of education could
be explained by their father’s lower probability of finding a job. These results are in line with
those found in Section 2.5.1, that suggested that the negative impact of father’s job loss in the
average grade is mainly driven by those fathers that stay unemployed at least for one academic
year.
Table 8: Heterogeneous effects of FJL: Probability of finding a job
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
FJL -0.117** -0.141** -0.082* -0.092 -0.044** -0.054** -0.033* -0.038*
(0.056) (0.065) (0.050) (0.056) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021)
FJL*PFJ 0.004 0.008* 0.005* 0.007** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean 3.706 3.678 3.715 3.687 0.526 0.519 0.508 0.502
SD 0.839 0.855 0.887 0.897 0.291 0.296 0.289 0.292
N 890 830 1279 1201 890 830 1279 1201
Students 178 166 292 274 178 166 292 274
Subsample Rest Rest Unrest Unrest Rest Rest Unrest Unrest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. FJL: dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. PFJ: Probability of finding a job calculated from out-of-
sample predictions using Model 3 in Table A13, and centered at the mean value for those suffering job loss in each sample. Average grade
for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for
the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies,
and dummies for stage of education, indicators for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades
belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
Income, motivation at work and type of job loss
This section explores whether there are heterogeneous effects of FJL according to the level of
net income and motivation at work prior to job loss. Given that both the income and motiva-
tion at work variables have some missing values (see Table A3), and given the small size of the
sample, results have to be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, they can offer some suggestive
evidence regarding the potential mechanisms behind the effect of FJL on school performance.
Additionally, I also analyse the existence of heterogeneous effects with regards to the type of
job loss suffered by the father (i.e whether the father had his own business or was working for
34The probability of finding a job variable is centered at the mean value for those suffering job loss in each
sample.
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a firm in 2008).
Table 9: Heterogeneous effects according to father’s net income in 2008
Restricted sample Rest sample, excluding fathers with 2 job losses
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6
Panel 1. Dep variable: Average grade
FJL -0.083 0.036 -0.120* -0.113 0.002 -0.144**
(0.063) (0.125) (0.064) (0.070) (0.147) (0.069)
FJL * low 0.005 0.032
income 2008 (0.115) (0.147)
Mean 3.729 3.733 3.727 3.699 3.682 3.705
SD 0.831 0.838 0.829 0.849 0.868 0.842
Panel 2. Dep variable: Percentile rank in the year-grade combination
FJL -0.041 0.022 -0.053** -0.062** 0.011 -0.072**
(0.026) (0.043) (0.027) (0.028) (0.049) (0.028)
FJL * low 0.020 0.043
income 2008 (0.047) (0.056)
Mean 0.532 0.527 0.534 0.525 0.515 0.529
SD 0.287 0.295 0.284 0.292 0.301 0.289
N 815 240 575 755 210 545
Subsample All -income 2008 Low 2008 High All -income 2008 Low 2008 High
observed income income observed income income
FE estimates. Measure 1 of both percentile rank and average grade used. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father
loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89.
Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **,
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level. Extra controls for all models are:
year dummies, dummies for stage of education, a dummy for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the grades
belong to years in this school.
Table 9 analyses whether there are heterogeneous effects of FJL according to the level of
income prior to job loss (i.e, in 2008). The table shows the results for the restricted sample
of 178 students in the first three columns, whereas columns 4 to 6 present the results for the
sample that further excludes those students whose fathers have suffered more than a job loss
in the period. In the first panel of the table, the variable under study is the average grade.
The second panel reproduces the same models but with the percentile rank in the cohort of the
student as the dependent variable. Placing the focus on the left part of the table first, the esti-
mates in both panels (columns 2 and 3) suggest sizable differences for the effect of FJL on school
performance in both subsamples. However, the estimates for the low income category are very
imprecise, and its confidence interval overlaps with the one for the estimate in the high income
subsample. Accordingly, the interaction term in model 1, even if positive, is never significantly
different from zero. Together with showing the results for the two subsamples, Rege et al. (2011)
analyse the impact of plant closure on subsequent earnings and full-time employment on the
two subsamples, to argue whether the differential effects of plant closure on school performance
could be explained by a distinct impact on father’s income and employment probabilities. As
70
Chapter 2. Job Loss at Home: Children’s Grades during the Great Recession in Spain
seen in Table 7 (model 1, panels A and B), there’s a substantial decrease of those fathers that
after job loss are in the high income category (net income above 1500 euros). Even if the results
are not shown, fathers with a low level of income prior to job loss are 17 percentage point less
likely to have a level of net income above 1000 euros (category 2 or higher) after job loss. In
the same vein, fathers with a high level of income prior to job loss are 26 percentage points
less likely to be observed in the highest income category (net income above 2000 euros). In
both cases, the results obtained from fixed effect regressions that control for year dummies,
using the restricted sample, are significantly different from zero. Thus, even in the absence of
continuous data on income, the results suggest that both groups suffer important income losses
after job loss. In terms of employment, by year 2012, both groups had a similar proportion of
treated individuals that had gotten back to work. In general, excluding those children whose fa-
thers suffered two job losses in the period, the results are very similar to those already described.
Given the nature of my data, the indicator of father’s job loss includes fathers displaced while
working for a firm and fathers that owned his own business in 2008, but closed it down after
the Great Recession hit the Spanish economy. An additional interesting question that can be
analysed with this data concerns the differential effects of FJL on school performance according
to the type of ownership relation that the father had with the firm previous to job loss. If
job loss carries negatives consequences for the displaced worker, even more negative costs could
be expected for those fathers who lost their jobs because their own business failed. Ucbasaran
et al. (2013) review the literature on the consequences of business failure for entrepreneurs,
and classify the costs of business failure into financial, social and psychological. In my sample
though, even if possibly present, social and psychological effects could be expected to be lower
than under normal circumstances, because failure could be easily associated with the economic
crisis, and not with personal failure. Financially, there are important differences between the
level of unemployment protection for those workers losing the job and those workers closing
their own business. Those fathers displaced while working for a firm were entitled to receive
unemployment benefits as long as they had worked more than 360 days during the last 6 years.
The duration of the unemployment benefits depends on tenure prior to job loss (from 120 days
for those with less than 539 days of tenure, to 2 years for those with more than 2160 days of
tenure prior to job loss). The amount received also varies with the wage prior to job loss.35 On
the contrary, the unemployment protection for those workers owning their own business (traba-
jadores auto´nomos, in Spanish) was almost non-existent during the period under analysis.36
35During the period under analysis, workers received 70% of the so-called regulatory base during the first 6
months, and 60% of wages after seven months in unemployment, as long as they were still entitled to receive
unemployment benefits.
36On November 6th, 2010, a new law became effective. Under this law, auto´nomos workers would be entitled to
receive some sort of unemployment insurance after justifying, among other things, that they had to close their busi-
ness for economic reasons. However, by 2012, the 87% of claims had been denied given the difficulty to justify losses
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Table 10: Heterogeneous effects: Closing own business versus losing the job
Restricted sample Rest sample, excluding fathers with 2 job losses
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6
Panel 1. Dep variable: Average grade
FJL -0.212** -0.063 -0.217** -0.208* -0.094 -0.200*
(0.093) (0.068) (0.103) (0.108) (0.081) (0.112)
FJL * Worker 0.137 0.101
in a firm in 2008 (0.110) (0.132)
Mean 3.706 3.777 3.509 3.678 3.752 3.479
SD 0.839 0.825 0.849 0.855 0.846 0.851
N 890 655 235 830 605 225
Panel 2. Dep variable: Percentile rank in the year-grade combination
FJL -0.075** -0.028 -0.076** -0.067* -0.046 -0.063*
(0.031) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036)
FJL * Worker 0.044 0.019
in a firm in 2008 (0.039) (0.046)
Mean 0.526 0.547 0.466 0.519 0.542 0.458
SD 0.291 0.286 0.299 0.296 0.291 0.302
N 890 655 235 830 605 225
Panel 3. Dep variable: Dummy equal to 1 if father has high income
FJL -0.318*** -0.310*** -0.316 -0.339*** -0.340** -0.333
(0.099) (0.115) (0.186) (0.124) (0.148) (0.218)
Mean 0.647 0.645 0.652 0.668 0.675 0.645
SD 0.478 0.479 0.477 0.471 0.469 0.480
N 829 622 207 770 573 197
Subsample All 2008 Father 2008 Father All 2008 Father 2008 Father
observed worker firm own business observed worker firm own business
FE estimates. Measure 1 of both percentile rank and average grade used. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father
loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average
percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level (Panel 1 and 2) and at the household level
(Panel 3) in parentheses. Panel 1 and 2 extra controls for all models are: year dummies, dummies for stage of education, a dummy for whether
the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the grades belong to years in this school. Panel 3 extra controls are year dummies.
Difference in N between panel 1 and 2, on the one hand, and 3, due to missing observations in father’s income.
Table 10 presents the results that analyse whether there are heterogeneous effects between
students whose fathers, previous to job loss, had their own business or, instead, were working
for a firm. The interaction term summarising the effects of FJL on school performance for those
children whose fathers worked for a firm is positive, but insignificant in all cases. Splitting the
sample, the loss in income is very similar in magnitude for both subsamples, although the esti-
mate is not significant for the subsample of those children whose fathers owned a firm in 2008.
In general, even though insignificant, the estimates signal a larger decrease in the average grade
for those children whose fathers closed their own business after 2008 that does not seem to be
related to distinct income losses.
during the previous 3 years. See data on: http : //www.20minutos.es/noticia/1723441/0/autonomos/cobran−
paro/cese− actividad/ (accessed on 10/11/2014).
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A strand of literature in the social psychology field suggests that workers affected by massive
layoffs have prevalent feelings of job insecurity and job loss leaves them anxious, angry and
demoralised (Barling et al., 1999b). At the same time, Barling et al. (1999b) state that from as
young as 5 years of age, children understand such concepts as pay, labour disputes, unemploy-
ment, and, in general, the working conditions of their parents. According to this evidence there
could be differential effects of FJL on school performance according to the level of work moti-
vation of fathers prior to job loss. In particular, are there differential effects of FJL on school
performance, between those children whose fathers were highly motivated at work previous to
losing their jobs and those children whose fathers were not as motivated? Does motivation at
work change after job loss, and if so, could it be a driving mechanism for the effect of FJL on
school performance?
Results are presented in Table 11. As stated at the beginning of the section, though, the
motivation at work variable has some missing values (see Table A3) and is not available for those
fathers that remain unemployed. This, together with the small small sample size, advises to
interpret the results with caution. Separating the sample in two different subsamples, the effect
of FJL on motivation at work for fathers is significantly different and goes in opposite directions
(panel 3).37 The results in Panel 3 suggest that conditional on finding employment, fathers
who were highly motivated in their jobs in 2008 suffer a significant reduction in their level of
motivation in their new jobs, once job loss occurs and they go back to work. On the contrary,
fathers who were less motivated at work in 2008 increase significantly their level of motivation
at work after job loss. However, model 1 in both panels 1 and 2 suggest that there are no
significant differences on school performance between children whose parents were high versus
low motivated at their jobs in 2008. However, albeit imprecise, the estimates seem to suggest
that those children whose fathers had already a low motivation at work suffered a lower negative
impact on school performance. Results when excluding those children whose fathers suffer two
job losses in the period seem to be more supportive of the social psychologists hypothesis. Even
though the interaction is not significant in either panel 1 or 2, the estimates for the interaction
are more precise than the ones shown in the left part of the table. Therefore, even if the results
are far from being conclusive and they should be taken with care, they could be indicating a
potential mechanism behind the detrimental impact of FJL on school performance: the effects
that job loss could entail via a deterioration of father’s mood and motivation in general.
37This data, however, is only available for those that found a new job after job loss.
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Table 11: Heterogeneous effects according to father’s motivation at work in 2008
Restricted sample Rest sample, excluding fathers with 2 job losses
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6
Panel 1. Dep variable: Average grade
FJL -0.131* 0.053 -0.156** -0.172** 0.066 -0.201**
(0.071) (0.152) (0.071) (0.082) (0.161) (0.081)
FJL * low 0.137 0.195
motiv 2008 (0.129) (0.148)
Mean 3.709 3.646 3.729 3.683 3.612 3.706
SD 0.850 0.870 0.843 0.865 0.878 0.860
N 785 190 595 735 180 555
Panel 2. Dep variable: Percentile rank in the year-grade combination
FJL -0.050* -0.020 -0.051* -0.069** -0.014 -0.069**
(0.029) (0.061) (0.029) (0.032) (0.064) (0.032)
FJL * low 0.039 0.069
motiv 2008 (0.052) (0.059)
Mean 0.530 0.515 0.535 0.525 0.503 0.532
SD 0.292 0.286 0.294 0.297 0.288 0.299
N 785 190 595 735 180 555
Panel 3. Dep variable: Dummy equal to 1 if father is highly motivated at work
FJL -0.034 0.578** -0.383*** -0.040 0.673*** -0.506***
(0.172) (0.217) (0.139) (0.159) (0.213) (0.158)
Mean 0.771 0.152 0.964 0.770 0.159 0.962
SD 0.420 0.360 0.186 0.421 0.367 0.191
N 748 178 558 710 170 528
Subsample All -motiv 2008 Low 2008 High All -motiv 2008 Low 2008 High
observed motivation motivation observed motivation motivation
FE estimates. Measure 1 of both percentile rank and average grade used. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father
loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89.
Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level (Panel 1 and 2) and at the household
level (Panel 3) in parentheses. Panel 1 and 2 extra controls for all models are: year dummies, dummies for stage of education, a dummy for
whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the grades belong to years in this school. Panel 3 extra controls are year
dummies. Difference in N between panel 1 and 2, on the one hand, and 3, due to missing observations in father’s motivation at work.
Age and sex of the student
The early childhood development literature emphasises the importance of parental characteris-
tics and early home environment in producing cognitive skills. Following this literature, Cunha
et al. (2006) propose a model of skill accumulation in which childhood has more than one stage
and by which early investments in skills are both self-productive (skills produced at one stage
augment skills attained at later stages), and complementary (skills produced at one stage raise
the productivity of investment at subsequent stages). Thus, everything else equal, the negative
shock to parental inputs that parental job loss produces should have bigger effects on school
performance the younger the children are. However, parental job loss could also distort the
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Table 12: Other heterogenous effects of FJL on the average grade: Age of the student
Restricted sample Rest sample, excluding fathers with 2 job losses
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6
FJL -0.178** -0.169*** -0.151*** -0.225** -0.192*** -0.156**
(0.072) (0.051) (0.053) (0.087) (0.060) (0.070)
FJL * Student in 0.070 0.120
secondary in 2012 (0.104) (0.123)
FJL * Kinder 0.200 0.151
(0.223) (0.293)
FJL * Secondary 0.032 0.052
(0.104) (0.116)
FJL * FJL happened 0.118 0.023
in kinder (0.198) (0.222)
FJL * FJL happened -0.057 -0.054
in secondary (0.151) (0.158)
Mean 3.706 3.706 3.706 3.678 3.678 3.678
SD 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.855 0.855 0.855
N 890 890 890 830 830 830
FE estimates. Dependent variable: average grade (measure 1). FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job.
Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. Extra controls for all models
are: year dummies, dummies for stage of education, a dummy for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the grades
belong to years in this school.
incentives to study of children suffering from parental job loss. A priori, one would expect that
these distortions in incentives are bigger the older the children are when parental job loss occurs,
given that older children are more aware of the value of education. As seen before, though, the
direction of the effect of FJL on student’s incentives is not clear. On the one hand, it could be
that children of those fathers suffering job loss have an additional incentive to perform better
at school to avoid experiencing job loss themselves in the future. In this case, parental job loss
would have a more negative effect for younger children. But on the other hand, parental job
loss could demotivate those children affected, and in this case, it is not clear whether younger
or older children would be more affected. All in all, the expected sign of the effect of father’s
job loss across children of different ages is ambiguous.
The results in Table 2 suggest that the effect of FJL on students that in 2012 were already in
post-compulsory education could be positive. Table 12 studies whether there are heterogeneous
impacts of FJL on average grades according to the age of the students that in 2012 are still in
compulsory education. The results for the restricted sample are presented in the left part of the
table (models 1 to 3), whereas the right part of the table shows the results for the restricted sam-
ple when those students whose fathers have suffered two job losses in the period are excluded.
In each of these models, different definitions are used to capture the potential distinct effects of
FJL across different ages. In model 1, the FJL variable is interacted with a dummy equal to 1
for those students that in the last observed academic year, 2012, where in secondary school.38
38That is, if the student is in Secondary School in 2012 the dummy variable takes on a value of 1 in all five
periods.
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Although the interaction is not significant, its positive sign could be suggesting that the effect
of parental job loss on the average grade is lower for those children that in 2012 were already
in secondary school. That is, in line with the results in Table 2, it suggests a lower negative
effect of FJL for older students. In the second model, the FJL variable is interacted with the
dummy variables for the stage of education the children are enrolled in a particular year. The
baseline category is the stage of primary. Again, even though the interaction for both FJL -
enrolled in kindergarten and FJL - enrolled in secondary, are statistically insignificant, their
sizes suggest that the negative effect of FJL is more detrimental in primary grades. Finally,
model 3 interacts the FJL variable with dummies that capture the moment in which FJL hap-
pened.39 In this case, the baseline category captures that father’s job loss happened while the
student was in primary school. Again though, the interactions are insignificant and would indi-
cate that the timing of parental job loss does not matter. The results excluding those children
whose fathers experience more than a job loss in the period are shown in the right part of the
table, and are very similar to the ones already described. Also, results using the percentile rank
as the dependent variable or for the unrestricted sample are not shown, but the same picture
emerges. Even if the evidence in this section does not offer a clear picture, it seems to point
towards a more detrimental effect of FJL to be expected, in general, the younger the children are.
In their test for differential effects of FJL on school performance across boys and girls, Rege
et al. (2011) find no significant differences among these two groups. However, the difference
in the magnitude of estimates suggested a larger negative effect for girls. Even though the
interaction is not significant in any of the four cases but one (Table 13, panel 1, model 4), the
difference in magnitude in my case suggests rather the contrary. The negative effect of FJL
seems to be larger for boys than for girls. The evidence in panel 3 suggests that this differential
effect can not be attributed to distinct income changes after job loss for the subsample of boys,
since both estimates are negative, statistically significant, and the confidence intervals for the
FJL across both subsamples largely overlap.
39For instance, if job loss happened while in Secondary School, then FJL happened in Secondary is equal to 1
in all five periods.
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Table 13: Other heterogeneous effects: Sex of the student
All sample Excluding fathers with 2 job losses
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6
Panel 1. Dep variable: Average grade
FJL -0.184** -0.251*** -0.033 -0.265*** -0.325*** -0.013
(0.091) (0.091) (0.070) (0.096) (0.097) (0.084)
FJL * Female 0.113 0.217*
(0.109) (0.124)
Mean 3.706 3.522 3.860 3.678 3.496 3.835
SD 0.839 0.906 0.746 0.855 0.918 0.764
Panel 2. Dep variable: Percentile rank in the year-grade combination
FJL -0.055 -0.089** -0.013 -0.085** -0.114*** -0.009
(0.034) (0.036) (0.027) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033)
FJL * Female 0.018 0.053
(0.041) (0.046)
Mean 0.526 0.458 0.582 0.519 0.456 0.574
SD 0.291 0.292 0.279 0.296 0.296 0.285
N 890 405 485 830 385 445
Panel 3. Dep variable: Dummy equal to 1 if father has high income
FJL -0.318*** -0.422*** -0.234* -0.339*** -0.442*** -0.254
(0.099) (0.137) (0.125) (0.124) (0.163) (0.164)
Mean 0.647 0.660 0.635 0.668 0.666 0.669
SD 0.478 0.474 0.482 0.471 0.472 0.471
N 829 385 444 770 365 405
Subsample All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
observed observed
FE estimates. Measure 1 of both percentile rank and average grade used. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the
father loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD
of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of
0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level (Panel 1 and 2)
and at the household level (Panel 3) in parentheses. Panel 1 and 2 extra controls for all models are: year dummies, dummies for stage
of education, a dummy for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the grades belong to years in this school.
Panel 3 extra controls are year dummies. Difference in N between panel 1 and 2, on the one hand, and 3, due to missing observations in
father’s income.
Other possible mechanisms: occupation status, relocation, civil status changes and
mother’s changes in the labour market
Following the recent empirical literature on the impact of FJL on school performance, I explore
other likely mechanisms by which FJL could be affecting the school performance of their off-
spring.40 First, Table 14 shows the effect of FJL on several potential mechanisms. Table 15
shows then the results after re-estimating the original model under different sample restrictions.
As Rege et al. (2011) point out, though, the results in Table 15 should be interpreted cautiously
because the sample restrictions are likely endogenous to job loss. As in the precedent sections,
results in both tables are presented for the whole sample (models 1 to 4), and excluding those
children whose fathers experience more than a job loss in the period (models 5 to 8).
40I follow closely in this section the empirical strategy used by Rege et al. (2011).
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The dependent variable in model 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the father is working
in that particular year. There is a consensus among the extensive literature on job displace-
ment on the negative short-run impact of job loss on the re-employment probabilities of the
displaced worker (see Table 3 in Kletzer (1998) or the more recent work by Rege et al. (2009)
on the impact of job displacement on the disability entry rate in Norway). Given that job loss
in my sample is produced in a context of a deep economic recession, the effects of job loss on
subsequent employment status are expected to be even more pronounced than those found in
the literature. Indeed, the probability that the father is working after job loss decreases by
almost 25 percentage points. In model 1 (and 5) in Table 15, I exclude from the analysis those
children whose fathers are not back to work in 2012. This sample restriction excludes basically
fathers that have suffered from job loss, so a priori, a modest attenuation of the effects on school
performance are expected. Applying this restriction barely changes the estimates of FJL on the
percentile rank, and decreases modestly the estimates of FJL on the average grade (and makes
them more imprecise). This latter finding for the average grade would in line with the analysis
in Section 2.5.1, that finds that the effect of the negative effect of the FJL variable is mainly
driven by those students whose fathers suffer long unemployment spells after job loss.
Table 14: Other possible mechanisms: effects of FJL on other variables
Restricted sample Rest sample, excluding fathers with 2 job losses
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
Dep variable: Father Moved Stable Mother Father Moved Stable Mother
working in the year civil status working working in the year civil status working
FJL -0.249*** -0.040 -0.009 -0.111* -0.284*** -0.049 -0.009 -0.143*
(0.066) (0.033) (0.006) (0.061) (0.064) (0.042) (0.006) (0.074)
Mean 0.946 0.019 0.956 0.789 0.951 0.021 0.953 0.779
SD 0.226 0.138 0.205 0.409 0.217 0.143 0.212 0.415
N 890 880 890 889 830 820 830 829
FE estimates. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the household level in parentheses. All models include year dummies. Dependent
variables are, respectively, dummy variables equal to 1 if the father is working, the family has changed residence in the year, the civil
status of the parents is classified as stable (married or living together), and the mother is working.
The recent literature on the effects of parental job loss on the educational outcomes of their
offspring often analyses whether those parents suffering job loss have a higher likelihood of res-
idential mobility or marriage dissolution, since both events might be associated with poorer
educational outcomes. I find no significant effects of FJL on a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the family has changed its residence during that particular year (Table 14, model 2 and 6).41
Excluding from the main model those observations of children that suffered residential reloca-
41Results hold if a dummy variable that equals 1 from the year the household moves, is used as a dependent
variable instead.
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tion in the period under observation (Table 15, models 2 and 6), the estimates of FJL on school
performance decrease modestly and become slightly more imprecise, but the main conclusions
hold. Eliason (2012) and Charles and Stephens (2004) document an excess risk of divorce among
couples in which the husband was displaced in Sweden, and the spousal in the US, respectively.
I find no significant effect on the civil status of parents after FJL in my sample. Accordingly,
after restricting the sample to those children whose parents do not experience any civil status
change during the period of observation, the estimates of FJL on school performance barely
change. However, as Piketty (2003) results suggest, it is parental conflicts (rather than separa-
tion/divorce per se) that are bad for children and, in particular, for their school performance.
Unfortunately, there is no variable in my sample to measure the level of conflict between the
parents in order to assess its role as a potential mechanism behind the effect of FJL on school
performance.
Lastly, I analyse whether there is an effect on the employment status of the mother after
FJL. My results contrast with those obtained by Rege et al. (2011). Instead of increasing their
participation in the labour market, during the Great Recession in Spain mothers experience a
significant decrease in the probability of being employed of 11 percentage points after the father
loses the job. In fact, a measure of mother’s job loss constructed in the same fashion as the FJL
measure, displays a correlation in 2012 of 0.2 in the sample of 178 students considered. However,
restricting the sample to those children whose mothers did not suffer any labour situation change,
the estimates of FJL on school performance decrease only modestly and the results earlier in
the chapter showed that when both father’s and mother’s job loss are introduced in the model,
the father’s job loss coefficient retains its sign and magnitude, whereas the mother’s job loss one
is not statistically different from zero in any of the subsamples. Thus, the evidence does not
suggest that maternal labour status changes could be one of the main drivers of the effect of
FJL on school performance.
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Table 15: Other possible mechanisms: Effects of FJL on percentile rank and average grades. Sample restrictions
Restricted sample Rest sample, excluding fathers with 2 job losses
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
Panel 1. Dep variable: Average grade
FJL -0.088 -0.093 -0.118** -0.094 -0.094 -0.110 -0.142** -0.124
(0.063) (0.060) (0.057) (0.089) (0.073) (0.072) (0.066) (0.093)
Mean 3.726 3.751 3.701 3.752 3.716 3.721 3.671 3.736
SD 0.832 0.810 0.842 0.814 0.842 0.829 0.858 0.821
N 790 765 880 595 760 705 820 575
Panel 2. Dep variable: Percentile rank in the year-grade combination
FJL -0.044* -0.036 -0.043** -0.034 -0.055* -0.044 -0.054** -0.043
(0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.035) (0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.036)
Mean 0.541 0.541 0.523 0.549 0.539 0.535 0.517 0.546
SD 0.290 0.284 0.292 0.290 0.292 0.290 0.297 0.293
N 790 765 880 595 760 705 820 575
Sample Father working Not moving Stable civil Mother: no labour Father working Not moving Stable civil Mother: no labour
restriction in 2012 in the period status status change in 2012 in the period status status change
FE estimates. Measure 1 of both percentile rank and average grade used. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father
loses the job. Grade percentile rank for the entire population of 408 students available has mean 0.5 and SD of 0.28. Average grade for the entire
population of 408 students available has mean 3.69 and SD of 0.89. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust
standard errors at the student level in parentheses. Extra controls for all models are: year dummies, dummies for stage of education, a dummy for
whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the grades belong to years in this school.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies whether the detrimental effects of job loss go beyond the affected worker.
In particular, this article assesses the impact of father’s job loss on the school performance of
their offspring during the Great Recession in Spain. In a simple one period static model in which
children decide the level of effort they exert at school each academic year, and effort positively in-
fluences school performance, parental job loss is assumed to affect both the marginal returns and
marginal costs of effort, by making children more or less productive while studying, and altering
their incentives to study. Therefore, the impact of parental job loss on school performance is not
clear from a theoretical perspective. The data collected and the estimation strategy followed in
this chapter have allowed me to estimate the total effect of an exogenous change in parental job
loss on the educational performance of their offspring. That is, not holding other inputs constant.
As Rege et al. (2011) point out, estimating a causal relationship between parental job loss
and child outcomes faces two main challenges: concerns of omitted variable data and the scarcity
of appropriate data. This chapter has addressed both of them by exploiting the recent devel-
opments in the Spanish labour market and by using a panel dataset specifically designed to
address this question. Thus, the empirical strategy followed in this article has relied on the fact
that, conditioning on student fixed effects and observed covariates, the Great Recession in Spain
generates variation in job loss analogous to that provided by randomisation.
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The results in this chapter imply that father’s job loss entails a yearly average decrease
in children’s average grades of about 13.2 to 16% of the population standard deviation after
job loss, and a reduction of about 15.7 to 19.6% of the population standard deviation in the
percentile rank measure. Compared to Rege et al. (2011), that find an effect of father’s plant
closure on average GPA of 16 year olds of about 6.3% of the population standard deviation, the
results in my case show that the effects of father’s job loss on the average grade of their offspring
during a deep economic crisis (for children aged 8 to 17) are bigger in magnitude. Moreover,
given the panel nature of my data, I can show that school performance prior to father’s job loss
is not affected by future job losses. Additionally, the negative effect of FJL does not seem to
be driven by those students whose fathers had lower tenure at the firm prior to job loss, but
rather, by those fathers that had a more stable situation prior to losing the job. This evidence
would suggest that treated students were not on a different (negative) trend prior to father’s job
loss. This evidence would be suggesting a causal link between father’s job loss and children’s
educational outcomes. Rege et al. (2011) compare their estimates with the results summarised
by Hanushek (2006) about the STAR experiment. Hanushek (2006) notes that large class size
reductions of around 8 students are necessary in order to increase students’ achievement by 20%
of the standard deviation. Thus, the effects of father’s job loss on the school performance of
their offspring during the economic recession in Spain are not negligible. Moreover, the results
suggest that the negative impact of father’s job loss in school performance is mainly driven by
those fathers that suffer longer unemployment spells. Importantly, these results are pointing
out a mechanism through which further inequalities in the Spanish society might develop during
and after a deep economic crisis.
In this respect, the effect of father’s job loss appears to be largely concentrated among chil-
dren of already disadvantaged families in terms of the level of education of the father. This
result doesn’t seem to be fully explained by different income losses, and it can partly be ex-
plained by a higher probability of finding a job after job loss, for those fathers with a high level
of education. Also, even though imprecise, the results seem to be larger for those children whose
father closed his own business after 2008, and more concentrated on boys rather than on girls.
Even if in the whole sample father’s job loss is associated with a significant decrease in income,
these differential effects do not seem to be driven by changes in income. Thus, I find no clear
evidence supporting the hypothesis that income could be the main mechanism behind the effect
of father’s job loss on school performance.
Like Rege et al. (2011) and Stevens and Schaller (2011), I also find that residential reloca-
tion or changes in civil status are not the main drivers of the effect of father’s job loss on the
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school performance of their offspring. Interestingly, I find that mothers experience a significant
decrease in the probability of being employed after the father loses the job. However, restricting
the sample to those children whose mothers did not suffer any labour situation change, the
estimates of father’s job loss on school performance decrease only modestly. Additionally, the
effect of father’s job loss retain its sign and magnitude after controlling for mother’s job loss
whereas the effect of mother’s job loss on school performance is not significant. Thus, mother
labour status changes do not seem to be behind the effect of father’s job loss either. These
results are in line with those found by Rege et al. (2011) that argue that a disparate effect of job
loss across fathers and mothers is consistent with recent empirical studies documenting that the
mental distress experienced by displaced workers is generally more severe for men than women.
One of the mechanisms that had not been addressed so far in the literature are the changes
in motivation at the workplace after job loss (for those fathers who were able to find a job after
job loss). I find that fathers who were highly motivated in their jobs in 2008, suffer a significant
reduction in their level of motivation in their new jobs, once job loss occurs. On the contrary,
fathers who were less motivated at work in 2008 increase significantly their level of motivation
at work after job loss. And even though the estimates are imprecise, the effect of father’s job
loss seems to be larger for those children whose fathers were highly motivated previous to job
loss. These results would be in line with the theories of the social psychologists, that argue that
after job loss, workers have prevalent feelings of job insecurity, and job loss leaves them anxious,
angry and demoralised (Barling et al., 1999b), and these negative feelings and mood could, in
turn, affect the school performance of their offspring. Moreover, given the negative effects on
mood that job loss carries for the worker, it is likely that parental conflict increases after job
loss. As Piketty (2003) results suggest, it is parental conflicts (rather than separation/divorce
per se) that are bad for children and, in particular, for their school performance. Unfortunately,
there is no variable in my sample to measure the level of conflict between the parents, but future
research should assess this channel.
One of the advantages of working with this particular sample is that students are enrolled in
the same school during the period of observation. This means that, under the assumption that
the school does not react to parental job loss, there is no differential change in the level of school
inputs between treated and control students during the whole period. The driving mechanisms
behind the negative effect of father’s job loss have to be found, therefore, at the family level. In
light of the simple theoretical model described above, and even if more data is needed in order to
disentangle the mechanisms behind the negative effect of father’s job loss, the results here and in
the related literature seem to suggest that, in general, there could be a decrease in the return to
effort after parental job loss that is not compensated by a decrease in the marginal costs of effort.
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Given the current massive employment destruction that has been taking place in several
advanced economies after the Great Recession, the present study wants to contribute to un-
derline the importance of understanding the mechanisms behind the negative and sizable effect
of father’s job loss on children’s school performance. Besides the importance of the question
in terms of granting equality of opportunity to individuals in society, there are also important
implications for the economy as a whole, given the paramount importance of human capital for
economic growth.
2.7 Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics. Children characteristics in 2008
Control Treated Total Diff and t-test
Born Q1 0.242 0.185 0.225 0.0568
(0.430) (0.392) (0.419) (0.83)
Born Q2 0.298 0.241 0.281 0.0576
(0.459) (0.432) (0.451) (0.78)
Born Q3 0.274 0.407 0.315 -0.133*
(0.448) (0.496) (0.466) (-1.77)
Born Q4 0.185 0.167 0.180 0.0188
(0.390) (0.376) (0.385) (0.30)
Female 0.524 0.593 0.545 -0.0684
(0.501) (0.496) (0.499) (-0.84)
Ever repeated 0.0403 0.0556 0.0449 -0.0152
a grade (0.198) (0.231) (0.208) (-0.45)
Age 8.306 8 8.213 0.306
(2.697) (2.503) (2.636) (0.71)
Periods in 4.976 4.944 4.966 0.0314
school (0.154) (0.231) (0.181) (0.91)
N 124 54 178
First line for each variable corresponds to its mean. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels. The 4th column shows the difference in means for treated and control individuals, and in parentheses, the value of the t-stat
for the test of equality of means.
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics. Household characteristics in 2008
Control Treated Total Diff and t-test
Number of children 1.976 2.111 2.017 -0.135
(0.517) (0.744) (0.596) (-1.21)
Household size 3.927 4.056 3.966 -0.128
(0.528) (0.787) (0.619) (-1.09)
Stable civil status 0.960 0.926 0.949 0.0338
(0.198) (0.264) (0.220) (0.84)
House: Owned 0.395 0.389 0.393 0.00627
(0.491) (0.492) (0.490) (0.08)
House: Paying mortgage 0.573 0.481 0.545 0.0911
(0.497) (0.504) (0.499) (1.12)
House: Rented 0.0161 0.0926 0.0393 -0.0765*
(0.126) (0.293) (0.195) (-1.85)
Moved in 2008-2012 0.137 0.115 0.131 0.0217
(0.345) (0.323) (0.338) (0.39)
Postcode 1 0.0484 0 0.0337 0.0484**
(0.215) (0) (0.181) (2.50)
Postcode 2 0.105 0.0741 0.0955 0.0308
(0.308) (0.264) (0.295) (0.64)
Postcode 3 0.637 0.648 0.640 -0.0111
(0.483) (0.482) (0.481) (-0.14)
Postcode 4 0.121 0.167 0.135 -0.0457
(0.327) (0.376) (0.343) (-0.77)
Postcode 5 0.0887 0.111 0.0955 -0.0224
(0.285) (0.317) (0.295) (-0.45)
N 124 54 178
First line for each variable corresponds to its mean. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
The 4th column shows the difference in means for treated and control individuals, and in parentheses, the value of the t-stat for the test of equality
of means.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics. Father characteristics in 2008
Control Treated Total Diff and t-test
Education 0.419 0.315 0.388 0.105
beyond High-School (0.495) (0.469) (0.489) (1.32)
Age 40.80 41.96 41.15 -1.165
(4.788) (4.526) (4.728) (-1.52)
High income 0.765 0.563 0.706 0.203***
(0.426) (0.501) (0.457) (2.63)
115 48 163
Income missing 0.0726 0.111 0.0843 -0.0385
(0.260) (0.317) (0.279) (-0.78)
Labour market characteristics
Own business 0.242 0.315 0.264 -0.0729
(0.430) (0.469) (0.442) (-1.01)
Industry 0.250 0.413 0.296 -0.163**
(0.435) (0.498) (0.458) (-2.06)
116 46 162
Construction 0.155 0.370 0.216 -0.214***
(0.364) (0.488) (0.413) (-2.70)
116 46 162
Tenure since 1994.4 1998.6 1995.7 -4.213***
(6.875) (6.769) (7.095) (-3.78)
Permanent contract 0.989 0.714 0.915 0.275***
(0.103) (0.458) (0.280) (3.52)
94 35 129
Private sector 0.915 1 0.939 -0.0847***
(0.280) (0) (0.239) (-3.29)
118 47 165
Full time work 0.974 0.911 0.957 0.0632
(0.159) (0.288) (0.204) (1.39)
117 45 162
Big firm 0.448 0.152 0.364 0.296***
(0.499) (0.363) (0.483) (4.18)
116 46 162
High motivation 0.784 0.696 0.758 0.0881
(0.414) (0.465) (0.430) (1.17)
111 46 157
First line for each variable corresponds to its mean. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels. The 4th column shows the difference in means for treated and control individuals, and in parentheses, the value of the t-stat for the test
of equality of means. A third row with the number of observations is shown in the case that a particular variable has missing values.
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Table A4: Characteristics of treated fathers in the first and second period after job loss. Unrestricted sample
2009-2010 2011-2012 All FJL Diff and t-test
Father educ 0.345 0.200 0.301 0.145
beyond HS (0.479) (0.408) (0.462) (1.32)
58 25 83
Father’s age 41.17 41.88 41.39 -0.708
(4.593) (6.882) (5.351) (-0.47)
58 25 83
Father works in 0.759 0.680 0.735 0.0786
a firm in 2008 (0.432) (0.476) (0.444) (0.74)
58 25 83
Industry (2008) 0.415 0.333 0.390 0.0818
(0.497) (0.482) (0.491) (0.67)
53 24 77
Construction (2008) 0.302 0.458 0.351 -0.156
(0.463) (0.509) (0.480) (-1.33)
53 24 77
Services (2008) 0.283 0.208 0.260 0.0747
(0.455) (0.415) (0.441) (0.69)
53 24 77
First line for each variable corresponds to its mean. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance and the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels. The 4th column shows the difference in means for treated and control, and in parentheses, the value of the t-stat for the test of equality
of means. The third row shows the number of observations. There are 6 missing values in the dummy variables containing information on the
sector of activity.
Table A5: Robustness check: average effect of FJL on average grade and percentile rank (type 2 measure)
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4
FJL -0.104 -0.135* -0.041* -0.055**
(0.064) (0.072) (0.024) (0.027)
Mean 3.647 3.620 0.526 0.519
SD 0.835 0.850 0.292 0.297
N 890 830 890 830
Students (groups) 178 166 178 166
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding
students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.58 and SD of 0.86. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students
in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered
robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education, indicators for
whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey
was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
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Table A6: Average effect of FJL on the average grade and percentile rank. Random Effects
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
FJL -0.102* -0.106* -0.135** -0.136** -0.039* -0.041* -0.052** -0.052**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.067) (0.065) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023)
Female 0.374*** 0.384*** 0.137*** 0.136***
(0.107) (0.113) (0.038) (0.040)
Born Q1 0.551*** 0.539*** 0.213*** 0.206***
(0.166) (0.173) (0.058) (0.061)
Born Q2 0.205 0.169 0.069 0.055
(0.165) (0.174) (0.058) (0.062)
Born Q3 0.340** 0.335** 0.125** 0.126**
(0.155) (0.161) (0.054) (0.056)
Father educ 0.349*** 0.344*** 0.138*** 0.136***
beyond HS (0.109) (0.118) (0.040) (0.044)
Mean 3.706 3.706 3.678 3.678 0.526 0.526 0.519 0.519
SD 0.839 0.839 0.855 0.855 0.291 0.291 0.296 0.296
N 890 890 830 830 890 890 830 830
Students 178 178 166 166 178 178 166 166
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
RE estimates. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding
students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students
in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered
robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education, indicators
for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the
survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
Table A7: Robustness check: Average effect of father’s job loss on the average grade and percentile rank. Different
treatment definitions
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
FJL (1) -0.079* -0.096 -0.032* -0.029
(0.048) (0.061) (0.017) (0.022)
FJL (2) -0.241*** -0.291*** -0.086*** -0.079**
(0.081) (0.100) (0.030) (0.039)
Mean 3.706 3.706 3.678 3.678 0.526 0.526 0.519 0.519
SD 0.839 0.839 0.855 0.855 0.291 0.291 0.296 0.296
N 890 890 830 830 890 890 830 830
Students 178 178 166 166 178 178 166 166
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. FJL (1): dummy equals 1 the year the father loses the job and the years after job loss as long as the father remains unemployed.
FJL(2): dummy equals 1 the year the father loses the job (as long as he does not find a job the same year), and the years after job loss as
long as the father remains unemployed. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of
3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and
SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses.
All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education, indicators for whether the student is re-taking that particular grade,
and whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained
in the text.
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Table A8: Average effect of MJL on the average grade and percentile rank
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4
MJL -0.040 -0.057 -0.017 -0.029
(0.085) (0.092) (0.030) (0.032)
Mean 3.702 3.723 0.528 0.535
SD 0.841 0.826 0.291 0.289
N 835 820 835 820
Students (groups) 167 164 167 164
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. MJL (mother’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the mother loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding
students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students
in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered
robust standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education, indicators for
whether the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey
was distributed. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
Table A9: Robustness check: average effect of FJL on the average grade and percentile rank (3 periods: 2008, 2010, 2012)
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4
FJL -0.171*** -0.185** -0.057** -0.064**
(0.062) (0.073) (0.026) (0.028)
Mean 3.736 3.707 0.527 0.521
SD 0.853 0.869 0.294 0.299
N 534 498 534 498
Students (groups) 178 166 178 166
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding
students in post-compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in
post-compulsory education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust
standard errors at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education, indicators for whether
the student is re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed.
Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
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Table A10: Robustness check: excluding outliers
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
Excl 1st and 99th perc Excl 5th and 95th perc Excl 1st and 99th perc Excl 5th and 95th perc
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
FJL -0.137** -0.164** -0.146*** -0.179*** -0.042* -0.052** -0.044** -0.054**
(0.056) (0.066) (0.050) (0.057) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025)
Mean 3.732 3.705 3.793 3.768 0.531 0.525 0.552 0.545
SD 0.823 0.839 0.796 0.814 0.289 0.294 0.286 0.291
N 870 810 800 740 870 810 800 745
Students (groups) 174 162 160 148 174 162 160 149
Subsample Rest Rest-Excl 2JL Rest Rest-Excl 2JL Rest Rest-Excl 2JL Rest Rest-Excl 2JL
Fixed effects and controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-
compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory
education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors
at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education, indicators for whether the student is
re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions
of subsamples explained in the text.
Table A11: Robustness check: peer effects in the classroom
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4 M.5 M.6 M.7 M.8
FJL -0.105* -0.130* -0.108* -0.128* -0.049** -0.058** -0.050** -0.058**
(0.058) (0.066) (0.059) (0.068) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026)
% FJL in grade-year -0.005 -0.006 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
% FJL in grade-class-year -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean 3.706 3.678 3.706 3.678 0.526 0.519 0.526 0.519
SD 0.839 0.855 0.839 0.855 0.291 0.296 0.291 0.296
N 890 830 890 830 890 830 890 830
Students (groups) 178 166 178 166 178 166 178 166
Subsample Rest Rest-Excl 2JL Rest Rest-Excl 2JL Rest Rest-Excl 2JL Rest Rest-Excl 2JL
Fixed effects and controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FJL (father’s job loss): dummy equal to 1 from the year the father loses the job. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-
compulsory education) has a mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory
education) has a mean of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors
at the student level in parentheses. All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education, indicators for whether the student is
re-taking that particular grade, and whether the average grades belong to classes taken in the school where the survey was distributed. Definitions
of subsamples explained in the text.
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Table A12: Average effect of getting back to work for the offspring of fathers losing the job
Dep variable: Average grade Dep variable: Percentile rank
M.1 M.2 M.3 M.4
Back to work 0.011 -0.060 0.052* 0.030
(0.073) (0.132) (0.029) (0.054)
Mean 3.761 3.658 0.561 0.536
SD 0.667 0.727 0.250 0.269
N 146 105 146 105
Students 42 30 42 30
Subsample Rest Rest Rest Rest
Exclude 2JL Exclude 2JL
FE estimates. Back to work: equals 1 for the periods the father is back to work, and equals 0 the year of job loss, and those years that the
father remains unemployed after job loss. Average grade for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a
mean of 3.69 and SD of 0.89. Average percentile rank for the whole sample (excluding students in post-compulsory education) has a mean
of 0.50 and SD of 0.28. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Clustered robust standard errors at the student level
in parentheses. All models include year dummies, and dummies for stage of education. Definitions of subsamples explained in the text.
Table A13: Probability of finding a job
M.1 M.2 M.3
Spanish 1.800* 1.680* 2.347***
(0.558) (0.514) (0.591)
Educ beyond HS 2.426** 2.341** 3.116***
(1.038) (0.984) (0.931)
Age more than 45 0.551* 0.560* 0.508***
(0.179) (0.181) (0.132)
Industry 0.620
(0.221)
Construction 0.243*** 0.277***
(0.086) (0.093)
Mean 0.543 0.543 0.361
SD 0.499 0.499 0.481
Pseudo-R2 0.106 0.100 0.076
N 311 311 451
Dep var: = 1 if individual has started working in the firm in the last 12 months or has already found a job; and 0 if the individual
is unemployed. Data comes from 1Q 2012 of the Spanish LFS available online (www.ine.es). Sector of activity variables are
defined according to the sector in the current job or sector of last employment and it is only defined if the individual has been
unemployed for less than a year. The table presents odd-ratios and standard errors (in parentheses). Weights used.
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Chapter 3
From Dual Labour Markets to School Out-
comes: Parents’ Contracts and Compulsory
Education Completion in Spain
3.1 Introduction
After the reforms that took place in the 1980’s as a way to introduce flexibility in some Eu-
ropean labour markets, the Spanish economy became an extreme example of the development
of a dual labour market.1 As can be seen in Figure 1, temporary employment rates expanded
dramatically in the 80’s. From around 15% in 1987 (there is no data before that year), the
average rate of temporary contracts for both men and women increased until it reached over
30% of the contracts in the early 90’s, and remained well over 30% until the beginning of the
Great Recession.
Given the negative effects associated to temporary contracts elsewhere in the literature, this
chapter analyses whether the probability of on-time compulsory education completion is affected
by parents’ contractual arrangement in the labour market. Bentolila et al. (2008) and Dolado
et al. (2002) review the empirical literature on the different consequences of temporary contracts
both at the macro and the microeconomic level, and note that several studies have found that
temporary workers receive less investment in on-the-job training and lower wages, after con-
trolling for observed skills, occupation, and firm effects. Moreover, according to their review,
the evidence also indicates that this wage gap between permanent and temporary workers is
associated with employers’ decisions to under-classify temporary workers when assigning them
to occupational categories. There’s also evidence suggesting that temporary contracts increase
work accidents (Guadalupe, 2003) and Booth et al. (2002) show that workers holding temporary
contracts have a lower level of job satisfaction. Besides these effects on temporary workers, ear-
lier evidence has found additional impacts on other family members and family decisions. For
instance, Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) find that households in which the main income earner
has a temporary contract, devote up to a 30% of their annual wages to accumulate a higher level
of wealth (by reducing consumption) than those households in which the main income earner
has a permanent contract. De la Rica and Iza (2005) find that men under temporary contracts
delay marriage decisions and childless women holding fixed-term contracts postpone entry into
1See the next section and the papers by Dolado et al. (2002) and Bentolila et al. (2008) for a description of
employment protection legislation in Spain.
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Figure 1: Temporary employment rates in Spain (%), from Bentolila et al. (2008)
motherhood. Using micro evidence for young people in Italy in the mid-90’s, Becker et al. (2010)
show that the probability of moving out increases in paternal job insecurity and decreases in
children’s job insecurity.
A strand of literature in the social psychology field suggests that the effects of job insecurity
go beyond the insecure employee and affect negatively the school outcomes of their offspring.2
Together with the empirical literature in economics reviewed above, this suggests several mech-
anisms by which the type of contract held by the father could affect the educational outcomes
of children. First, several of the consequences of temporary contracts mentioned earlier in the
text affect variables (i.e. parental income, job satisfaction and health, among others) that are
traditionally seen as inputs of the grade production function or school performance of students.
Second, as the social psychologists point out, parental job insecurity can affect student’s self-
efficacy and work attitudes in a negative way (Lim and Loo, 2003).
This chapter examines the impact of paternal job insecurity on students’ probability of grad-
uating from compulsory education on time, using data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey.
As Pinger (2013), this chapter focus on the paternal impact because the father tends to be
the main breadwinner and because psychological effects of job insecurity tend to be higher for
men than for women (Lim and Sng, 2006). A major concern for identification in this chapter is
that the type of contract held by the father and the probability of on-time compulsory school
2Barling et al. (1999b) find that children who perceive their parents to be insecure about their jobs are
distracted cognitively and Barling et al. (1999a) present evidence that parental job insecurity affects children’s
beliefs in an unjust world and mood, which in turn, the authors show to affect school performance.
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completion might be jointly determined and dependent on unobservables. This concern is ad-
dressed by using an estimation strategy that relies on exogenous variation in regional labour
market policies in Spain to identify the causal effect of interest. From 1997, several regions in
Spain implemented policies that subsidised firms hiring workers using open-ended (permanent)
contracts. Not all regional governments decided to implement them, and among those regional
governments that designed subsidies to foster permanent employment, the amount of the sub-
sidy varied among different demographic groups. Following Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010), I use
this variation across regions, time and age of the father at the time of hiring, to construct an
instrument for the contract type held by the father. Average marginal effects and local average
treatment effects (LATE) are estimated. Results indicate that students whose fathers hold a
permanent contract (as opposed to a temporary, fixed-term contract) the year they should grad-
uate from compulsory education are, on average, 7 percentage points more likely to graduate
on time. LATE estimates are considerably higher, suggesting that those students whose fathers
obtained a permanent contract as a result of the availability of subsidies, reaped bigger benefits
from paternal job stability. These results hold when maternal job insecurity is also accounted
for, and they are concentrated on male students.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first work that tries to identify the causal effect of
paternal contractual form on children school outcomes. Individuals constrained by temporary
employment often suffer unemployment spells. Therefore, the fact that an individual of a cer-
tain age holds a temporary contract the year one of his offspring turns 16, might be reflecting
a rather long term experience of job insecurity.3 As a result, this chapter is certainly linked to
the literature analysing the effect of parental unemployment on the school outcomes of children.
A recent paper in this literature is the one by Pinger (2013), that finds that shifts in paternal
unemployment produced by variations in the cyclical component of regional adult male unem-
ployment decreases the probability of upper secondary schooling choice by around 18 percentage
points.4 Other papers have used plant closures as a way to identify the impact of paternal job
loss on school outcomes (see Rege et al. (2011) or Stevens and Schaller (2011), for instance).
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, as mentioned earlier in the text, this
is the first work that attempts to identify the link between father’s job insecurity (measured
by the type of contract held by fathers) and on-time compulsory school completion (or any
educational outcome in general). Second, it uses an identification strategy that had only been
used previously to identify a rather different effect (wealth holdings of temporary workers), and
3A key control variable in all the estimations in the chapter is a third order polynomial in tenure that, according
to Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) produces similar results to the use of tenure fixed effects.
4See Pinger (2013) for an extensive section reviewing the literature on paternal unemployment and child
outcomes.
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that allows to plausibly identify the causal impact of the variable of interest. Third, following
related literature on the effects of paternal unemployment and job loss, I study a variety of
heterogeneous effects not addressed before for this particular research question.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institutional labour market
framework in Spain. Section 3.3 describes the data and Section 3.4 discusses the estimation
strategy. Section 3.5 presents the results and Section 3.6 offers a discussion of the potential
mechanisms behind the effect of paternal contractual type on on-time compulsory school grad-
uation.
3.2 The Spanish labour market: Institutional framework
The labour reform that took place in Spain in 1984 liberalised the use of temporary contracts
to all type of jobs and established a maximum length of 3 years for this type of contracts. Un-
der that law, the main difference between a temporary and a permanent contract in Spain was
given by the differences in firing costs between temporary and permanent workers. Whereas
permanent workers received an indemnity of 20 or 45 days of wages per year worked for fair
and unfair dismissals, respectively; workers under temporary contracts received a mandatory
severance payment of 12 days of wages per year worked. Moreover, this could not be appealed
in labour courts, and if the worker reached the end of her contract length, she had no right to
perceive any kind of indemnity (i.e., if an employer wanted to fire a temporary worker at no
cost, she just had to wait until the end of the temporary contract).5
After the dramatic increase in temporary contracts that followed the 1984 reform, several
national reforms in the 1990’s and early 2000’s tried to reverse the situation. A description of
these reforms can be found in Mendez (2013) and is summarised here. In 1994, a national reform
restored the principle of causality in the application of temporary contracts. But as Mendez
(2013) notes, the restrictions imposed by this new law on the use of the non-causal temporary
contract led to a greater use of other types of temporary contracts rather than encouraging the
use of permanent ones. Following the failure of the 1994 reform, in 1997 the new conservative
5The unemployment insurance that a worker receives when entering unemployment is not defined on the basis
of the type of contract held. However, there are several requirements that could lead workers under a temporary
contract to receive, on average, a lower and shorter subsidy. Starting with the reform of 1992, a worker in Spain is
entitled to receive unemployment benefits as long as she has worked more than 360 days during the prior 6 years
(not necessarily for the same firm). Moreover, the duration of the unemployment benefits depends on tenure prior
to job loss and the amount received also varies with the wage prior to job loss. In this sense, if workers under
a temporary contract have worked for a shorter period prior to the end of the contract and have received lower
wages, then they will be entitled to a lower amount and shorter subsidy duration (this is as long as they haven’t
reached the maximum number of days worked during the prior 6 years).
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government enacted a reform that introduced a new permanent contract figure whose main dif-
ference with the previous one was that the mandatory severance pay for unfair dismissals was
33 days of wages per year worked. It also introduced payroll tax reductions lasting for 2 years.
In 1999, the government announced that these payroll tax reductions would last one additional
year for contracts signed until May 1999. Finally, in 2001 a new labour market reform extended
similar measures introduced in the 1997 reform to more groups of workers. Several authors
have analysed the impact of these reforms on the creation of new employment under permanent
contracts. Among them, Kugler et al. (2003) analyse the 1997 reform, Mendez (2013) studies
the 1994, 1997 and 1999 reforms and Arellano (2005) investigates the effects of the 2001 labour
market reform.
From 1997, also regional authorities started to implement different policies that offered sub-
sidies to firms that hired workers using permanent contracts. As Pe´rez and Sanz (2009) explain,
there were 2 main forms of subsidies. First, subsidies were granted to firms that converted an
existing fixed term (temporary) contract into a permanent one during the period in which the
subsidy was available. Second, some regions introduced subsidies that were available to those
firms who hired an unemployed worker using a permanent contract. Not all regional governments
decided to implement subsidies to foster permanent employment and among those regional gov-
ernments that decided to give subsidies to conversion, the amount of the subsidy varied among
different demographic groups. Table A.2 in Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) summarises the max-
imum amount of the 2 forms of subsidy available to firms for every region, year, sex and age
group.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data sources and sample construction
The main dataset used in this study is the Spanish Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de Poblacio´n
Activa -EPA-), a representative household survey carried out by the Spanish National Institute
of Statistics (INE). This survey has been conducted since 1964 and interviews around 65000
families every quarter. Respondents are members of participating households that are 16 years
old or more when the survey takes place.6
Graduation from compulsory education in Spain takes place during the year the student
6There are two versions of this survey: the longitudinal version, where households can be tracked during 6
consecutive quarters, but data on the age of individuals is aggregated in 5 year age groups, and the cross-section
version, where households can not be tracked, but there is information on the birth date of individuals. Since
I need the exact age of individuals both to construct the instrument and the dependent variable, I use the
cross-section version of the data.
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turns 16, as long as she graduates on time. Given that members of the household only respond
to the individual questionnaire once they are 16 or more, I use the data from the 4th quarter
for the years 2000 to 2004. This particular period is chosen for two reasons. First, from the aca-
demic year 1999-2000, all the students turning 16 in the Spanish education system are under the
new law (LOGSE) that extended compulsory education from 14 to 16 years of age. Before year
2000 and given different implementation rhythms of the new law across regions and provinces,
it is impossible to distinguish in the EPA data whether a student stating to have completed
compulsory education has done so at age 14 (old system) or at age 16 (new system). Second,
the data on regional subsidies that I am using is only collected until 2004.
In order to build my working sample I use the information on the year of birth to identify
those individuals turning 16 in each cross-section and I pool them together. I match the resulting
observations with the personal and labour market characteristics corresponding to their parents.
There are 10284 individuals turning 16 from 2000 to 2004, but only 9142 are 16 by the time of the
interview. Additionally, I can not observe the educational attainment of 1 of these individuals.
Therefore, the initial available sample consists of 9141 individuals. I use the following sample
selection criteria. First, since the focus of this study is to explore the impact of the father’s
type of contract on compulsory education completion, I only keep those students whose fathers
hold either a permanent or a fixed-term contract during the year of observation. This entails
the biggest reduction in the sample, since only 4907 students have a father holding a temporary
or a permanent contract. The remaining students have a father that either has his own busi-
ness, is unemployed, inactive or retired. Second, I only include students who live in the same
household with both of their parents (4793 observations remaining). Third, individuals living
in the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla are excluded since there is no information avail-
able to construct the instrument (4751 observations remaining). Fourth, I exclude individuals
whose parents are younger than 34 or older than 65 (4737 observations remaining).7 Moreover,
I do not consider students whose fathers voluntarily chose to have a temporary contract (4732
observations remaining).8 Finally, I exclude those observations with missing information in any
of the variables displayed in Table 2. The information on the regional unemployment rate at
the time of hiring is only available since 1976, so I lose those individuals whose fathers started
working at their current firm previous to 1976 (3932 observations remaining). Finally, the vari-
ables containing the sectoral information also display some missing values. The final sample is
a pooled sample of 3893 (turning 16) individuals.
7The reasons are the following. First, those individuals that are younger than 34 became fathers before 18.
Second, those individuals of 65 years of age had reached the legal retirement age in Spain during the period under
analysis.
8These are very few observations: 0.52% of the fathers have a fixed-term contract because of voluntary reasons.
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Data on regional subsidies is taken from Table A.2 in Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010). The
statutory amounts shown in that table are the maximum amount that firms could benefit from
when hiring unemployed workers or converting fixed-term contracts into permanent ones. As in
Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010), there is no information in the Spanish Labour Force Survey that
allows me to identify whether the firm that hired a specific individual claimed these benefits to
the regional authorities. Therefore, these quantities represent existing subsidies that the firm
could potentially use by law. The subsidy that an individual is eligible to is computed by using
data on tenure at the firm, the age of the individual when first entering the firm, the gender
and the region of residence. Following Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) I use the average subsidy
available in the region during the first two years at the firm (given that according to these au-
thors, most contract conversions happen during the first two years at the firm).
Other sources of data have been used to construct regional variables. In particular, regional
unemployment rates by age groups and sex were obtained from INE. Regional deflators of house-
hold gross disposable income have been constructed using the database BDMORES elaborated
by the the Spanish Ministry of Finance.
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics: characteristics of the sample
Information on how the different variables are constructed is given in the Data Appendix. Ta-
ble 1 shows descriptive statistics for the 3893 individuals that form my pooled sample, and
the corresponding numbers for these individuals when divided in two groups: students whose
fathers have a temporary contract the year they turn 16 and should graduate from compulsory
education if on time (871 observations, or the 22.37% of the sample), and students whose fathers
have a permanent contract instead (3022 observations, or the 77.63% of the sample).9
9These results do not use sample weights, but results using them are very similar. See
http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/tools-of-the-trade-when-to-use-those-sample-weights for a debate
on whether to use or not sample weights, and the paper by Solon et al. (2013). Given the concerns, Section 3.5
will present unweighted results, although results using weights can be found in the Appendix. Final weights for
each cross section are multiplied by a factor that is equal to the size of the sample in each cross section divided
by the Spanish population in that year. Weights for the final sample are adjusted so that they add to the number
of people in each cross section.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Father: TEMP contract Father: PERM contract Total Diff and t-test
Student’s characteristics
Graduation at 16 0.410 0.612 0.567 -0.202***
(0.492) (0.487) (0.496) (-10.77)
Female 0.462 0.482 0.478 -0.0209
(0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (-1.09)
Month of birth 5.657 5.885 5.834 -0.228*
(3.139) (3.052) (3.073) (-1.93)
Regional subsidies (age range students) 2.264 2.724 2.621 -0.459***
(2.448) (2.748) (2.690) (-4.74)
Father’s and household’s characteristics
Age 45.12 45.83 45.67 -0.706***
(5.392) (4.876) (5.004) (-3.47)
Max education: Primary 0.541 0.294 0.349 0.247***
(0.499) (0.456) (0.477) (13.10)
Max education: Compulsory 0.362 0.305 0.318 0.0562***
(0.481) (0.461) (0.466) (3.14)
Max education: High School/Vocational 0.0666 0.201 0.171 -0.135***
(0.249) (0.401) (0.377) (-12.06)
Max education: Tertiary 0.0310 0.199 0.162 -0.168***
(0.173) (0.399) (0.368) (-18.00)
Not Spanish 0.0631 0.0288 0.0365 0.0344***
(0.243) (0.167) (0.187) (3.91)
Married 0.984 0.995 0.992 -0.0108**
(0.126) (0.0726) (0.0875) (-2.41)
Household size 4.568 4.383 4.425 0.185***
(1.078) (0.982) (1.007) (4.55)
Mother works 0.413 0.487 0.470 -0.0734***
(0.493) (0.500) (0.499) (-3.83)
Job related characteristics of fathers
Years of tenure 1.991 14.15 11.43 -12.15***
(3.349) (7.721) (8.628) (-67.31)
Firm size (1 to 10 workers) 0.280 0.221 0.234 0.0594***
(0.449) (0.415) (0.423) (3.50)
Firm size (11 to 49 workers) 0.210 0.209 0.209 0.00130
(0.408) (0.407) (0.407) (0.08)
Firm size (more than 50 workers) 0.510 0.570 0.557 -0.0607***
(0.500) (0.495) (0.497) (-3.18)
Part-time contract 0.0138 0.00695 0.00848 0.00683
(0.117) (0.0831) (0.0917) (1.61)
Public sector 0.0873 0.257 0.219 -0.170***
(0.282) (0.437) (0.414) (-13.63)
Has another job 0.0299 0.0334 0.0326 -0.00357
(0.170) (0.180) (0.178) (-0.54)
Regional subs father 1.4857 0.4529 0.6840 1.0327
(year of hiring) (0.0702) (0.0278) (0.0275) (13.67)
Macroeconomic characteristics
Regional unemployment rate students 33.16 32.24 32.45 0.915**
(year of obs) (10.06) (10.15) (10.13) (2.35)
Regional unemployment rate fathers 9.521 14.02 13.02 -4.503***
(year of hiring) (4.524) (9.517) (8.854) (-19.47)
N 871 3022 3893
First line for each variable corresponds to its mean. The 4th column shows the difference in means for both groups (father: permanent contract
vs father: temporary contract), and in parentheses, the value of the t-stat for a test of equality of means. Standard errors in parentheses in
the second line. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Month of birth measured from 1 to 12 (January to December,
respectively). Subsidies teens are regional subsidies available for the age range of students and are expressed in thousands of year 2000 euros.
Results shown do not use weights.
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These descriptive statistics show that students whose fathers have a permanent contract dif-
fer from students whose fathers have a temporary contract in almost all characteristics. The first
remarkable difference is in the main variable of interest: 41% of students whose fathers have a
temporary contract finish compulsory education on time, whereas 61% of students whose fathers
have a permanent contract do so. Fathers in these two groups differ in both personal and job
related characteristics. Fathers that have fixed-term contracts have lower educational attain-
ment, live in bigger households, are less likely to be Spanish citizens and are slightly younger.
In terms of job characteristics, the most remarkable and obvious one refers to tenure. Fathers
under temporary contracts have 12 years less of tenure on average. Moreover, they tend to work
in smaller firms and less in the public sector. There are no differences in terms of the variables
that capture whether fathers have part or full time contracts, or whether they are employed
in other jobs. There are also significant differences in terms of regional unemployment rates or
the amount of regional subsidies available at the time of hiring for fathers, or at the time of
observation for students.
Clearly, these descriptive statistics stress the fact that using contract status alone to explain
on-time compulsory education completion might not be the way to go if one wants to uncover
causal effects. Students whose fathers are observed to hold permanent and fixed-term contracts,
respectively, differ in many observables (and likely they differ in some unobservables too) that
drive both parental contract status and on-time graduation.
3.4 Estimation strategy
The estimation strategy used in this chapter follows closely the strategy used by Barcelo´ and
Villanueva (2010) to estimate the impact of permanent contracts on the financial wealth over
earnings ratio in Spain. It differs from that paper in the sense that given that both my depen-
dent variable (on-time compulsory education completion -G16-) and my endogenous treatment
(whether the father has a permanent contract the year his offspring should graduate from com-
pulsory schooling -P -) are binary, I will first estimate a bivariate probit model instead of the
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates presented by Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010). The
simultaneous equation bivariate probit model is given by:
G16i = 1[β1Pi + γ
′
1Xi + i > 0] (3.1)
Pi = 1[β2RSr,a,t0 + γ
′
2Xi + υi > 0] (3.2)
(i,υi) is distributed as bivariate normal with ρ=Corr(i,υi). Parameters in the model are
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estimated by maximum likelihood, and standard errors are robust and clustered at the level of
definition of the regional subsidies.10 Given normality of the error components, the model is
identified if (i,υi), conditional on covariates, is independent of the regional subsidies instrument
(RSr,a,t0). As described in Section 3.3, RSr,a,t0 varies with the region of residence (r), age of
the worker (a) and time of hiring (t0). In this sense, the instrument (i.e, the average amount of
subsidies available in the region and age group during the first two years at the firm) exploits
region, age and time variation. For this reason, Xi contains region dummies, the age of the
father at the time of hiring and years of tenure at the firm (third order polynomial), as well as
interactions between these variables.11,12
Additionally, to make the exclusion restriction more likely to hold (i.e. RSr,a,t0 appears only
in the second equation), I follow Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) and add other control variables
that might be affecting the introduction of regional subsidies. That is, identification in this
chapter relies on a conditional independence assumption: the instrument is as good as ran-
domly assigned conditional on covariates.13 The main specification in their paper includes two
dummies that capture national wide developments referring to fixed-term contract policies in
the Spanish labour market. First, a dummy variable indicating whether the father entered the
labour market after the 1984 reform that liberalised the use of temporary contracts is included.
Second, the model also includes a dummy for whether the labour contract was signed on or
after 1997, to capture the effect of several policies introducing a new type of permanent contract
with lower indemnities and taking place after 1997. As Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) point out,
by including this post-1997 dummy, β2 captures mainly regional variation in the availability of
subsidies to foster permanent contracts. Dummy variables capturing the maximum education
level reached by the father and his nationality are also included. Finally, to avoid any remaining
regional trends, I also include the regional unemployment rate in the age band of the father
at the time of hiring. These variables all coincide with the variables included in Barcelo´ and
Villanueva (2010), but I include two additional variables in my basic specification (see column
1 in Table 2), and there are some other variables used by Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) that
I include later on.14 The two additional variables that I control for are the following. First, I
10That is, clusters are defined by the region of residence, father’s age at the time of hiring and year of hiring.
11The instrument is a sort of triple difference, but not exactly. First, because following Barcelo´ and Villanueva
(2010) I use the amount of the subsidy and not a variable based on simple eligibility (results using a dummy
eligibility variable are very similar). Second, because each region defined differently the eligible age group and
time where the subsidies where in place.
12As Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) argue, the third order polynomial in tenure is a key covariate that allows to
compare workers who entered the firm in the same year. These authors also tried with tenure fixed effects given
that they had a bigger sample, and found very similar results. Thus, I follow the same strategy and include in
the model a third order polynomial in tenure instead of year of hiring (tenure) fixed effects.
13As Angrist and Pischke (2008) suggest, I check whether there is an association between the instrument and
the outcome in samples where there should be no relationship between Pi and RSr,a,t0 in Section 3.5.1.
14Logarithm of earnings is the only variable that Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) use that I can not include in
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Table 2: Control variables in the different specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic specification
Regional dummies (at the NUTS-2 level) X X X X
Age father (at hiring) X X X X
Father’s third order polynomial in tenure X X X X
Father started contract after 1997 X X X X
Father entered labour market after 1984 X X X X
Regional unemployment rate, age range father (father’s year of hiring) X X X X
Regional unemployment rate, age range student (year of observation) X X X X
Regional subsidies, age range student (year of observation) X X X X
Father’s maximum education reached dummies X X X X
Father’s Nationality (Not Spanish=1) X X X X
Year dummies (year of observation) X X X X
Additional job characteristics
Sectoral dummies X X X
Occupation dummies X X X
Other household variables
Household size dummies X X
Whether mothers works X X
Civil status father X X
Additional student characteristics
Sex X
Quarter of birth dummies X
See the data appendix for the exact definition of variables. Additionally, all specifications include interactions
between region dummies and tenure, region dummies and age father (at hiring), and tenure by age father (at
hiring).
include the amount of regional subsidies available to hire workers in the age range of the students
during the year of observation. The existence of regional subsidies for young people is likely to
be correlated with the existence of subsidies for fathers, and these subsidies for the young might
at the same time affect school related decisions or outcomes. Second, I control for the regional
unemployment rate in the age range of the students. Columns 2 to 4 in Table 2 describe addi-
tional variables added as controls to this basic specification. Moreover, all specifications control
also for year (of observation) dummies.
As long as the model is correctly specified, the bivariate probit model can be used to estimate
average causal effects (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). For each model, I present the results of a
Wald test for the absence of correlation (i.e. under the null hypothesis, ρ=0). If the null can
not be rejected, then  and υ are not correlated and the model collapses to two separate probit
models.15
For comparison, I also present Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates, though these estimates
should be taken with care. As Chiburis et al. (2012) point out, linear IV estimates might be par-
ticularly uninformative for hypothesis testing when treatment probabilities are low. Moreover,
bivariate probit and IV estimates identify different types of causal effects. Whereas bivariate
my model given lack of data on earnings in the Spanish Labour Force Survey.
15The results of two separate probit models are identical to estimating a bivariate probit model imposing ρ=0.
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probit identifies average causal effects, the best you can do without a distributional assumption
is LATE, the average causal effect for compliers (or local average treatment effect). This effect is,
if all assumptions are fulfilled (independence, exclusion restriction, existence of a first stage and
monotonicity) what the IV/2SLS approximates when covariates are used (Angrist and Pischke,
2008).
A major concern regarding the estimation strategy used in this chapter is related to the
timing in which the outcome and the paternal contract status are observed. First, graduating
late can potentially be the result of several years of low educational achievements. Unfortunately,
the EPA data does not allow to identify whether the student is graduating late because she has
repeated a grade earlier in her life, or because she fails to pass a grade during the years in
secondary school, prior to graduation. PISA data for Spain for the year 2003, though, could
offer some insights in this direction.16 According to this data, grade repetition in Spain happens
mainly during compulsory secondary education: 25.02% of 15-year old pupils who have repeated
a grade at least once have done so during compulsory secondary education, whereas 6.34% of
them have repeated a grade at least once during primary education. Accordingly, I would expect
that for students in my sample, grade repetition happens mostly during compulsory secondary
education, a period in which regional subsidies (i.e. the instrument) were already in place.
Second, fathers could hold permanent or temporary jobs for reasons stemming from several
years back in the past. Instrumental variable estimates would take care of this issue, since, as
already mentioned before, the effect that IV identifies is the causal effect for compliers.17 In the
case of this study, these would be the children of fathers who hold a permanent contract in the
year of graduation precisely because they were affected by the regional subsidies instrument.
Therefore, IV estimates would identify the effect only for those students for whom the timing is
the right one.18
3.5 Results
Results that focus on the role of the type of contract held by the father on the probability of
on-time graduation from compulsory education of his offspring are presented in this section.
The role of the type of contract held by the mother is analysed afterwards. Lastly, the last
16I take the data for 2003 because the PISA data on the first year available, year 2000, does not contain
information on repetition of grades. Moreover, 2003 is the only year in the PISA dataset that is within the
observation period of the sample used in this chapter.
17This holds under the assumption of no defiers. That is, there is no individual that would hold a permanent
contract when he is not eligible to regional subsidies, and that would hold a temporary contract when he is eligible
to regional subsidies.
18IV estimates can not identify the impact for those children whose fathers would have held a permanent
contract even in the absence of regional subsidies (always takers); or for those children whose fathers would have
held a temporary contract in any case (never takers).
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Table 3: Bivariate probit: Summary of results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equation 1: On-time graduation
Father has PERM contract 0.0319 0.0883 0.1017 0.1032
(0.1255) (0.0945) (0.0968) (0.0939)
Equation 2: Perm contract
Regional subsidies father 0.0089** 0.0107*** 0.0111*** 0.0109***
(0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Wald test of ρ=0; (p-value) 0.7269 0.8134 0.7123 0.6908
Log pseudolikelihood -3379.100 -3253.129 -3236.913 -3224.003
N 3893 3893 3893 3893
F test of excluded instruments 10.83 14.29 14.58 15.01
Bivariate probit coefficients displayed are average marginal effects for the probabilities P (G16 = 1) and P (P = 1),
respectively. Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clustered at the regional subsidy cell level). Unweighted estimates.
Regional subsidies are the average amount of subsidies available to the firm in the father’s first two years of tenure
at the firm (expressed in thousands of year 2000 euros). Variables included in the different specifications are reported
in Table 2. F test of excluded instruments is the one coming from the linear IV setting, but reproduced here for
convenience.
subsection will address potential heterogeneous impacts of the treatment variable.
3.5.1 Father’s contract type
Table 3 presents the summary results of the bivariate probit model estimations. Note that the
coefficients displayed in the chapter for all bivariate probit or probit estimations are average
marginal effects (see footnotes for each table). The results presented in the main body of the
text are the result of unweighted estimations. Results using weights can be found in Tables A3
and A4.
The results of the bivariate probit first stage (equation 2, Table 3) show that an increase
of 1000 euros in the regional subsidies available to firms increases the chances of observing the
father holding a permanent contract by almost 1 percentage point. The F test of excluded in-
struments coming from the IV setting (reproduced here for explanatory convenience), is above
14 in the last 3 specifications. This indicates that the instrument, at least in the linear setting,
is reasonably strong.19 Additionally, Table A1 follows the suggestion by Angrist and Pischke
(2008) and tests whether there is an association between the regional subsidies instruments and
the probability of graduating on time in samples where there should be no relationship between
Pi and RSr,a,t0 . As Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) argue, most conversions from temporary to
permanent contracts happen during the first two years at the firm, so we should observe very few
happening after 4 or 5 years at the firm. Thus, the variation in current labour status generated
by an inappropriate instrument (the amount of regional subsidies the worker would be eligible
19(Baum et al., 2007) note that when using clustered standard errors, researchers should apply with caution
the critical values compiled by Stock and Yogo (2005) for the i.i.d case or refer to the older rule of thumb of
Staiger and Stock (1997), which says that the F statistic should be at least 10 for weak identification not to be
considered a problem.
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Table 4: Probit: Summary of results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equation: On-time graduation
Father has a PERM contract 0.0736*** 0.0676** 0.0686** 0.0687**
(0.0266) (0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0278)
Log pseudolikelihood -2454.580 -2441.452 -2427.601 -2418.769
N 3893 3893 3893 3893
Probit coefficients displayed are average marginal effects. Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clustered at
the regional subsidy cell level). Unweighted estimates. Variables included in the different specifications are
reported in Table 2.
for after 4 or 5 years at the firm) should have little impact on the probability of his offspring fin-
ishing compulsory education on time. This is what is found in Table A1. The magnitude of the
coefficients is very close to zero in all specifications, and estimates are not significant in any case.
The bivariate probit estimates for the effect of having a father holding a permanent contract
the year the student should graduate from compulsory education on the probability of his off-
spring graduating on time are positive, but not significantly different from zero. However, the
Wald test of ρ equal to 0 can not reject the null in any of the specifications.20 These results
would imply that, conditional on this set of covariates, there is no correlation between the error
terms of both equations (no remaining omitted variable bias) and they should be estimated
separately.
This is what Table 4 shows, but only the results of the equation and variable of interest
(equation 1) are presented. Full results of specification (4) can be found in Table A3, both for
weighted and unweighted regressions. The average marginal effects displayed in Table 4 imply
that students whose fathers hold a permanent contract in the year of graduation (instead of a
fixed-term one) are 7 percentage points more likely to graduate from compulsory education on
time. According to these results, after accounting for the controls specified in Table 2, having a
father with a more stable job would explain around 35% of the initial difference seen in Table 1.21
For comparison, Table 5 presents summary results of OLS, Intention to Treat and IV esti-
mates. Full results of specification (4) in that table can be found in Table A4. Results of OLS
estimates are shown in the first panel and are very similar to the probit average marginal effects
shown in Table 4. The second panel of Table 5 focuses on intention to treat effects. First, if
regional subsidies influence on-time graduation from compulsory education through the contract
status of working parents, one would expect to find an association between regional subsidies
20The results of the Wald test hold even if the instrument is not used in equation 2. See Table A2.
21The initial difference was of 20% percentage points, with students whose fathers have a permanent contract
the year of graduation having a 41% chance of graduating, versus a 61% chance observed for students whose
fathers are seen to hold a permanent contract instead.
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Table 5: OLS, ITT and IV: Summary of results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS. Equation: On-time graduation
Father has a PERM contract 0.0793*** 0.0727** 0.0736** 0.0732**
(0.0280) (0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0294)
Intention to Treat Effects
Reduced form. Equation: On-time graduation
Regional subsidies father 0.0120* 0.0124* 0.0126* 0.0117*
(0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0070)
First stage. Equation: Perm contract
Regional subsidies father 0.0188*** 0.0207*** 0.0208*** 0.0212***
(0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055)
F test of excluded instruments 10.83 14.29 14.58 15.01
IV. Equation: On-time graduation
Father has a PERM contract 0.6422* 0.6000* 0.6047* 0.5540*
(0.3881) (0.3432) (0.3376) (0.3282)
N 3893 3893 3893 3893
Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clustered at the regional subsidy cell level). Unweighted estimates. Regional
subsidies are the average amount of subsidies available to the firm in the father’s first two years of tenure at the
firm (expressed in thousands of year 2000 euros). Variables included in the different specifications are reported
in Table 2.
and on-time graduation. This is what is shown in the reduced form regressions of the middle
panel of the table. An increase of 1000 euros in the regional subsidies available to fathers during
the first two years at the firm increases the chances of on-time graduation of their offspring by
1 percentage point in any of the specifications. The linear first stage shown also in the middle
panel of the table is in line with the results described above for the bivariate probit first stage,
although the magnitude of the impact of regional subsidies on the contract status of the father is
considerably higher, and more similar to the linear first stage results in Barcelo´ and Villanueva
(2010). Compared to the results of these authors, the instrument is strong even after including
regional dummies (their instrument is weak after inclusion of regional dummy variables). This
might be due to several reasons. First, I use a different dataset and a different period. Second,
my first stage doesn’t cover the full sample of working men, but rather, the sample of working
parents of 16 year olds.22
IV estimates of the effect of having a father holding a permanent contract the year the off-
spring should graduate from compulsory education are considerably larger than probit average
marginal effects, with IV estimates showing an estimated impact of around 55 percentage points
(bottom panel of Table 5).23 The same happens in Pinger (2013), that analyses the impact of
22In a paper that evaluates the effectiveness of these regional subsidies to create permanent employment, Pe´rez
and Sanz (2009) find that the outflow into permanent employment of eligible workers improved only minimally
with these subsidies.
23However, if one considers the size of the standard errors in the IV estimations, probit and IV estimates would
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parental unemployment on the probability of upper secondary school choice and obtains a neg-
ative impact of above 50 percentage points. As already discussed in Section 4, the IV estimator
captures the effect of compliers; i.e. in the case of the present study, if all assumptions hold, the
IV estimator offers a weighted local average treatment effect for those students whose fathers
hold a permanent contract due to the availability of regional subsidies at the time of hiring
whereas probit estimates capture average marginal effects instead.
Compliers are, therefore, individuals that got a permanent contract due to the existence of
regional subsidies but otherwise would have been observed holding a temporary contract in the
year their offspring should graduate from compulsory education. Being these individuals males,
they were probably the main breadwinners in the household even before obtaining the permanent
contract. As a result, one could think that, for compliers, those inputs in the grade production
function affected by parental contract status (household income, parental job stability, etc.)
were at a low level prior to the obtention of a permanent contract, and improved considerably
after that.24 Assuming concavity of the grade production function, the increase in the inputs
associated to obtaining a permanent contract for compliers entails a bigger increase in grades
in this subpopulation. Likewise, if parental job stability affects the cost of effort and children
of temporary workers display in general a high level, the reduction in the cost of effort due to
the fathers’ obtention of a permanent contract would be bigger for compliers, given convexity
of the cost function.
not be so different since confidence intervals largely overlap.
24Consider the toy model outlined in Chapter 2 and summarised here for convenience. In that model a student
in general education was faced with the decision to choose how much effort, e, to devote to study. Assume that
student’s utility while she is in school depends directly and positively on the grades she obtains, G. The grade
production function is determined by the level of effort supplied by the student: G = g(e) and is supposed to be
strictly increasing and concave in the level of effort. The effort that students devote to study entails a disutility,
d(e), which is supposed to be strictly increasing and convex. The student chooses the level of effort to maximise
her utility:
max
e
U(G, e) = g(e)− d(e) (3.3)
The first order condition for an interior solution is equal to: g′(e) = d′(e). In order to introduce heterogeneity in
this framework, I follow Card (1999) by assuming that the marginal rate of return to effort, g′(e) = βi(e) = bi−k1e,
and the marginal cost of effort, d′(e) = δi = ri + k2e, are linear functions with person-specific intercepts and
homogeneous slopes (with k1 ≥ 0 and k2 ≥ 0). Variation in bi could be seen as capturing variation in the inputs
affecting the production function for cognitive achievement (see Todd and Wolpin (2003)). Variation in ri instead
can be seen as different tastes for effort. The type of contract held by the father could be affecting, therefore, both
marginal returns and marginal costs of effort since paternal contract status is shown to affect variables typically
seen as inputs in the grade production function and it could also be affecting marginal costs of effort (Barling
et al., 1999a). The optimal level of effort under heterogeneity is then given by:
e∗i =
bi − ri
k1 + k2
(3.4)
Where a necessary condition for the equilibrium to exist with non-negative levels of effort is that bi ≥ ri. Under
the assumption that the student has not repeated any grade until the last year of compulsory schooling, she
completes education on time if her effort is above a certain level, e¯ (that, in turn, leads grades to be above the
passing threshold, g¯): G16 = 1[e∗i ≥ e¯ ≡ Gi ≥ g¯].
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Table 6: Probit: Summary of results - Including mother’s contract status
(1) (2)
Equation: On-time graduation
Father has a PERM contract 0.0688** 0.0680**
(0.0278) (0.0278)
Mother has a PERM contract -0.0028 0.0148
(0.0232) (0.0175)
Log pseudolikelihood -2418.7620 -2419.3950
Controls All Excluding Mother works
N 3893 3893
Probit coefficients displayed are average marginal effects. Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clus-
tered at the regional subsidy cell level). Unweighted estimates. Variables included in the different
specifications are reported in column (4) of Table 2.
Other potential reasons to explain the bigger magnitude of IV estimates are as follows. First,
a fraction of the increase in magnitude could also be explained by the fact that treatment is
very much concentrated and linear IV estimates might be uninformative in these cases. Also,
part of the increase could be related to the bias of IV in small samples (Chiburis et al., 2012).
Moreover, the bigger magnitude of IV estimates could be partly explained by attenuation bias
due to measurement error in paternal contract status.
3.5.2 Mother’s contract type
I use the same sample selection criteria outlined in Section 3.1 but this time taking into account
the characteristics of the mother, in order to obtain the final sample of turning 16 years old
whose mothers are observed as either holding a permanent or a temporary contract. Given the
lower attachment of women to the labour market, the number of observations falls to 2350. In
the sample, 71% of the mothers hold a permanent contract. Table A5 shows the results of using
the same estimation strategy followed in the case of fathers, to analyse the impact of maternal
contractual form on the probability of their offspring’s on-time graduation from compulsory ed-
ucation. The results of the first stage imply that the regional subsidies variable is a very weak
instrument in this setting. Given this, I can not analyse in a rigorous manner the causal impact
of the mother’s contractual form on her children’s probability of on-time graduation. Nonethe-
less, it is noteworthy to point out that, after conditioning on the same set of variables as for
the father, both probit and OLS estimates of the maternal contract type are not significantly
different from zero. Moreover, Table 6 augments the probit model estimated for the father
in Table 4 (specification (4)) with a dummy variable indicating whether the mother holds a
permanent contract. Results related to the father’s contractual form do not change after includ-
ing the mother’s type of contract, with or without additionally controlling for her working status.
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Table 7: Probit: Summary of results - Heterogeneous effects
Equation: On-time graduation (1) (2)
Panel A: Father’s education Low educ High educ
Father has a PERM 0.0653** 0.1180**
(0.0323) (0.0576)
Log pseudolikelihood -1693.0028 -673.3844
Sample Post-comp=0 Post-comp=1
Fathers with PERM contract in the subgroup (%) 69.75 93.44
N 2598 1293
Panel B: Sex of the student Girls Boys
Father has a PERM contract 0.0390 0.0910**
(0.0400) (0.0377)
Log pseudolikelihood -1118.6672 -1252.3831
Fathers with PERM contract in the subgroup (%) 78.39 76.93
N 1860 2033
Panel C: Working status mother Mother doesn’t work Mother works
Father has a PERM contract 0.0422 0.1074***
(0.0372) (0.0405)
Log pseudolikelihood -1281.1293 -1092.5190
Fathers with PERM contract in the subgroup (%) 75.22 80.34
N 2062 1831
Probit coefficients displayed are average marginal effects. Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clustered at the regional
subsidy cell level). Unweighted estimates. Variables included in the different specifications are reported in column (4)
of Table 2. Post-comp is a dummy variable equal to 1 if father’s attained education level is High-School or beyond,
and equal to 0 if father’s attained education is equal to compulsory education or lower.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous effects
This final section briefly explores whether the measured average marginal effects of the type
of contract held by the father differ across different groups of students in the sample. Table 7
summarises the results.
Panel A divides the sample of students in two groups, those whose fathers have a level of
education beyond post-compulsory education and those whose fathers have a maximum attained
level of education that is lower than that. The average marginal effect is lower for those students
whose fathers have a lower attained level of education. However, confidence intervals for the
average marginal effects in both groups largely overlap. In Panel, the sample is split according to
the sex of the student. The estimated average marginal effects for females suggest that females
are not affected by whether the father has a more stable job. The positive effect of more job
stability is concentrated and more beneficial to males. Literature on social psychology has found
that identification with the parents works as a moderator when assessing the impact of parental
job insecurity on children’s work attitudes and beliefs (Barling et al., 1998). According to this
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literature, if males identify themselves more with fathers than females do, male students would
be more distracted cognitively by paternal job insecurity. Finally, Panel C investigates whether
there is an heterogeneous impact between students whose mothers work and students whose
mothers do not work. The results suggest that the benefits of more paternal job stability are
concentrated on those students living in a household where the mother also works.
3.6 Discussion
The findings of this chapter show that parental job stability is beneficial for students. I use
regional variation in subsidies (available to firms to create permanent employment) in order to
identify the effect of the type of contract held by the father on on-time compulsory education
completion. Using the Spanish Labour Force Survey data, I present estimates for both average
marginal effects coming from bivariate probit and probit models and local average treatment
effects (LATE). Results indicate that students whose fathers hold a permanent contract (as
opposed to a temporary, fixed-term contract) the year they should graduate from compulsory
education are, on average, 7 percentage points more likely to graduate on time. LATE estimates
are considerably higher, suggesting that those students whose fathers obtained a permanent con-
tract as a result of the availability of subsidies, reaped bigger benefits from paternal job stability
(although as mentioned in the text, IV estimates need to be taken with care). These results
hold when maternal job insecurity is also accounted for, and they are concentrated on male stu-
dents. These latter results are in line with the findings of several papers on the social psychology
field. For instance, (Barling et al., 1998) found that identification with the parents works as
a moderator when assessing the impact of parental job insecurity on children’s work attitudes
and beliefs. According to this literature, if males identify themselves more with fathers than
females do, male students would then be more distracted cognitively by paternal job insecurity.
Students that at age 16 have not graduated from compulsory education are either delayed in
getting their diploma (i.e. they have repeated at least a grade) or have gone out of the school
system (i.e. dropouts). If we view grade repetition and school dropout as a signal of academic
difficulties, then the effects found in this chapter might be pointing out future or longer-term
negative outcomes in both education and earnings. However, more research is needed in order
to fully understand the magnitude of the effects of parental job stability on their offspring’s
educational outcomes. In particular, this could be done by trying to get access to panel data
that allows to observe the contract status of an individual over time, and at the same time, ob-
serve a more disaggregated educational outcome (like grades) over the same period. This type
of data does not exist, at the time of writing, for the Spanish case, but a first step in this di-
rection could be taken by exploring datasets in other countries with a strong dual labour market.
What are the potential mechanisms by which paternal job insecurity translates into worse ed-
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ucational outcomes for children? Labour earning differences between permanent and temporary
workers might be part of the explanation. Table A6 shows descriptive statistics for fathers and
mothers of children in the same age range than those analysed in this chapter, but using data
from the Spanish section of the European Household Panel.25 Both for mothers and fathers,
individuals under a temporary contract earn less than half of the average of permanent workers.
This average, though, does not account for characteristics of the workers that might explain this
difference. Once controlling for the level of education, sector, occupation, years of tenure, and
the rest of variables used as controls in this study, the difference in income between temporary
and permanent workers might be considerably reduced. Rather than income, something that
the controls in the regressions presented here might not capture and could be considered as a
potential mechanism driving the differential effect found for fathers and mothers, is the level of
satisfaction with different aspects of the job. Table A6 shows that fathers holding a temporary
contract are significantly less satisfied with their earnings, job stability, type of job, hours and
shift worked, their labour conditions and distance to the workplace. Moreover, according to
studies in the field of social psychology, children from as young as 5 years of age, understand
such concepts as pay, labour disputes, unemployment and welfare. Children’s perceptions of
their parent’s job insecurity are then found to indirectly affect their school performance (Bar-
ling et al., 1999a). Similarly, Barling et al. (1998) postulate a model by which children who
watch their parents experiencing layoffs and insecurity, develop negative work beliefs that then
predict their work-related attitudes. Mothers are less satisfied with their jobs too when they
hold a temporary contract but according to some studies, the effects of job insecurity on money
anxiety are only present for men but not for women (Lim and Sng, 2006). Therefore, a lower
degree of satisfaction related to earnings, stability, etc., would be more felt at home if it’s the
father (rather than the mother) suffering from it.
The results in this chapter could have some implications for other papers that study the
link between parental unemployment and educational outcomes. If these studies would focus
on the differences between children of unemployed fathers and children whose fathers have
a permanent contract, they would find even larger differences than the ones reported until
now. In particular, if the estimates come from an economy with a strong dual labour market.
Additionally, the findings in this chapter add to the debate on the need to take seriously the
(unintended) consequences of the development of an extreme dual labour market, like has been
the case in Spain over the last decades.
25The number of variables is richer in the European Household Panel, but the number of observations available
for this study would be considerably lower, as it can be seen by the number of observations displayed in Table A6.
This is the main reason why labour force survey data was chosen instead.
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3.7 Data appendix
Below you can find information on the definition of the variables used in the analysis. The
variables are defined for the father, but the exact same definitions follow when the analysis is
performed with data of the mother.
Dependent variable: Graduation at 16 (G16) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the student
has graduated from compulsory education in the 4th quarter of the year she turns 16 (turning
16 individuals). This corresponds to code 23 in the survey data. I have also classified as having
graduated from compulsory education those individuals that reported a maximum level of edu-
cation reached higher than compulsory education even if this is unlikely given their age.
Main explanatory variable: Father has a PERM contract (PERM) is a dummy that equals
1 if the father is observed as having a permanent contract, and 0 if he has a fixed-term contract.
The instrument - Regional subsidies: Regional subsidies father is the average subsidy
amount available in the region during the first two years of employment at the current firm. Re-
gional subsidies (age range student) is the amount available to hire workers in the age range of
the students in their region of residence and year of observation. Both variables are expressed in
thousands of euros (year 2000). See Table A.2 in Barcelo´ and Villanueva (2010) for the specific
amounts.
National reforms: Father started contract after 1997 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
current contract held by the father was signed on or after 1997. Father entered labour market
after 1984 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the father entered the labour market on or
after 1984. Since the Spanish Labour Force survey does not offer information on the year an
individual first enters the labour market, I construct a proxy in this way: Year individual enters
labour market=Year of observation-Age+Age finished studies.
Father’s job related characteristics: Third order polynomial in tenure: Father’s tenure is
expressed in years and introduced as tenure, tenure squared and tenure cubed. Sectoral dummies
are dummies corresponding to the sector of activity of the firm in which the father works. In
order to reduce the number of dummies, I have grouped the 2 digit sectors into the following:
Agriculture and extractive industries, Manufacture and Energy, Construction, Services I (retail
and hotels), Services II (Transport and Communication, Finance and Renting Activities), Pub-
lic Administration, Education and Health, Other services. The information for the Occupation
dummies is given in CNO-94 (National Classification of Occupations 1994) format at the 2 digit
level for the current job. I create occupation dummies at the 1 digit level.
Father’s personal characteristics: Maximum education reached dummies are four dummies
for whether the father has primary education or less; has completed compulsory education; has
completed high-school or vocational education (for which compulsory education is needed); or
has completed tertiary education. Nationality (Not Spanish=1) is a dummy that equals 1 if the
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father is not a Spanish citizen; Age father (at hiring) is the age of the father the year he was
hired at the current firm. Married is a dummy equal to 1 if the father is married.
Regional characteristics: Regional unemployment rate, age range father is the unemployment
rate in the region of residence, in the age range of the father, the year of hiring by the current
firm. Regional unemployment rate, age range student is the unemployment rate in the region of
residence, for the age range of the student, and in the year of observation. Both unemployment
rates are at the NUTS-2 level and in percent.
Student’s characteristics: Female is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student is a female,
and Quarter of birth dummies -Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4- are dummies equal to 1 if the student is born
in that quarter and 0 otherwise.
Other: Household dummies are dummies for whether the student lives in a 3, 4, 5 or 6 or more
people household. Mother works is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother works (i.e.
has her own business or works for a firm). Year dummies are dummies for years 2000 to 2004
and Regional dummies are dummies at the NUTS-2 level.
3.8 Appendix
Table A1: Robustness check: reduced form placebo - impact future subsidies on P (G16 = 1)
Equation: On-time graduation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Regional subsidies father - 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0015
4 years after hiring (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
N 3155 3155 3155 3155
Regional subsidies father - 0.0002 0.0003 0.0018 0.0021
5 years after hiring (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0078)
N 2890 2890 2890 2890
OLS coefficients. Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clustered at the regional subsidy cell level). Unweighted
estimates. Regional subsidies are the amount of subsidies available to the firm after 4 and 5 years with respect
to the time of hiring, respectively (expressed in thousands of year 2000 euros). Variables included in the different
specifications are reported in Table 2.
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Table A2: Bivariate probit: Summary of results - No instrument used in equation 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equation 1: On-time graduation
Father has PERM contract -0.0082 0.0608 0.0745 0.0794
(0.1303) (0.0998) (0.1031) (0.0992)
Wald test of ρ=0; (p-value) 0.5132 0.9410 0.9509 0.9064
Log pseudolikelihood -3382.509 -3258.785 -3242.887 -3229.795
N 3893 3893 3893 3893
Bivariate probit coefficients displayed only for equation 1 are average marginal effects for the probability P (G16 =
1). Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clustered at the regional subsidy cell level). Unweighted estimates.
Regional subsidies are the average amount of subsidies available to the firm in the father’s first two years of tenure
at the firm (expressed in thousands of year 2000 euros). Variables included in the different specifications are
reported in Table 2.
113
Chapter 3. From Dual Labour Markets to School Outcomes
Table A3: Probit: Full table of results
Equation: On-time graduation Unweighted Weighted
Main variable of interest
Father has a PERM contract 0.0687** 0.0883***
(0.0278) (0.0311)
Father’s related variables
Age (at hiring) 0.0027 0.0036
(0.0037) (0.0040)
Tenure (in years) -0.0082 -0.0103
(0.0156) (0.0183)
Tenure squared 0.0001 0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0010)
Tenure cubed 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Contract started after 1997 -0.0713** -0.0403
(0.0339) (0.0396)
Entered labour market after 1984 -0.0159 0.0116
(0.0376) (0.0421)
Regional unemp rate 0.0007 0.0001
(year of hiring) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Max education: Compulsory 0.0695*** 0.0770***
(0.0198) (0.0225)
Max education: High School 0.1372*** 0.1238***
(0.0261) (0.0304)
Max education: Tertiary 0.2170*** 0.2205***
(0.0434) (0.0520)
Not Spanish -0.1043** -0.1058**
(0.0424) (0.0492)
Married 0.1242 0.1136
(0.0892) (0.0923)
Household variables
Mother works 0.0222 0.0235
(0.0159) (0.0183)
Household size (4 people) -0.0020 0.0011
(0.0256) (0.0292)
Household size (5 people) -0.0553* -0.0592*
(0.0285) (0.0326)
Household size (6 or more) -0.1063*** -0.0896**
(0.0328) (0.0365)
Student’s related characteristics
Female 0.0915*** 0.0914***
(0.0266) (0.0316)
Quarter birth 1 0.0381 0.0403
(0.0241) (0.0281)
Quarter birth 2 0.0132 0.0056
(0.0243) (0.0278)
Quarter birth 3 0.0489** 0.0325
(0.0242) (0.0280)
Regional subsidies -0.0057 0.0019
(age range students) (0.0055) (0.0064)
Regional unemp rate students 0.0002 0.0002
(year of observation) (0.0016) (0.0019)
Log pseudolikelihood -2418.7692 -2411.3640
N 3893 3893
Probit coefficients displayed are average marginal effects for the probability P (G16 = 1). Clustered robust
SE in parentheses (clustered at the regional subsidy cell level). Variables included are reported in Table 2,
column (4).
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Table A4: OLS, First stage and IV: Full table of results
Unweighted results Weighted results
OLS First Stage IV OLS First Stage IV
Dependent variable: G16=1 PERM=1 G16=1 G16=1 PERM=1 G16=1
Main variables of interest
Father has a PERM contract 0.0732** 0.5540* 0.0928*** 0.8245**
(0.0294) (0.3282) (0.0331) (0.4044)
Regional subsidies father 0.0212*** 0.0208***
(0.0055) (0.0056)
Father’s related variables
Age (at hiring) 0.0028 -0.0013 0.0030 0.0036 -0.0017 0.0042
(0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0044)
Tenure (in years) -0.0075 0.1569*** -0.0842 -0.0096 0.1597*** -0.1274*
(0.0159) (0.0091) (0.0545) (0.0186) (0.0102) (0.0683)
Tenure squared 0.0001 -0.0104*** 0.0051 0.0007 -0.0107*** 0.0085*
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0045)
Tenure cubed 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0002*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Contract started after 1997 -0.0761** -0.0724** -0.0562 -0.0442 -0.0434 -0.0392
(0.0356) (0.0285) (0.0389) (0.0420) (0.0302) (0.0441)
Entered labour market after 1984 -0.0116 -0.0419* 0.0079 0.0174 -0.0670** 0.0642
(0.0368) (0.0234) (0.0415) (0.0410) (0.0308) (0.0537)
Regional unemp rate 0.0007 0.0016*** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0021*** -0.0016
(year of hiring) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0018)
Max education: Compulsory 0.0740*** -0.0126 0.0806*** 0.0816*** -0.0078 0.0881***
(0.0212) (0.0128) (0.0222) (0.0242) (0.0145) (0.0259)
Max education: High School 0.1436*** 0.0305** 0.1288*** 0.1307*** 0.0383** 0.1027***
(0.0272) (0.0152) (0.0296) (0.0319) (0.0179) (0.0389)
Max education: Tertiary 0.2147*** 0.0344 0.1986*** 0.2155*** 0.0562** 0.1766***
(0.0418) (0.0223) (0.0436) (0.0496) (0.0239) (0.0581)
Not Spanish -0.1052** 0.0026 -0.1070** -0.1077** -0.0182 -0.0980*
(0.0427) (0.0300) (0.0457) (0.0494) (0.0377) (0.0584)
Married 0.1343 0.0658 0.1029 0.1210 0.0724 0.0670
(0.0932) (0.0656) (0.1044) (0.0962) (0.0766) (0.1152)
Household variables
Mother works 0.0219 0.0062 0.0196 0.0238 0.0123 0.0160
(0.0162) (0.0092) (0.0166) (0.0188) (0.0104) (0.0207)
Household size (4 people) -0.0036 0.0035 -0.0047 -0.0005 -0.0106 0.0086
(0.0263) (0.0147) (0.0269) (0.0300) (0.0173) (0.0313)
Household size (5 people) -0.0584** -0.0012 -0.0574* -0.0617* -0.0153 -0.0488
(0.0295) (0.0166) (0.0302) (0.0337) (0.0198) (0.0362)
Household size (6 or more) -0.1100*** 0.0228 -0.1201*** -0.0937** 0.0120 -0.0995**
(0.0340) (0.0196) (0.0356) (0.0375) (0.0225) (0.0396)
Student’s related characteristics
Female 0.0903*** -0.0211 0.0990*** 0.0894*** -0.0251 0.1042***
(0.0267) (0.0148) (0.0281) (0.0319) (0.0164) (0.0343)
Quarter birth 1 0.0376 0.0039 0.0357 0.0394 -0.0031 0.0427
(0.0247) (0.0136) (0.0252) (0.0287) (0.0156) (0.0306)
Quarter birth 2 0.0131 0.0009 0.0138 0.0048 -0.0027 0.0103
(0.0250) (0.0134) (0.0254) (0.0286) (0.0155) (0.0309)
Quarter birth 3 0.0482* 0.0269** 0.0360 0.0310 0.0331** 0.0101
(0.0248) (0.0132) (0.0267) (0.0287) (0.0148) (0.0336)
Regional subsidies -0.0055 0.0026 -0.0078 0.0022 0.0029 -0.0021
(age range students) (0.0056) (0.0033) (0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0035) (0.0068)
Regional unemp rate students 0.0002 0.0018* -0.0005 0.0002 0.0016 -0.0005
(year of observation) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0021)
F test of excluded instruments 15.01 13.54
N 3893 3893 3893 3893 3893 3893
Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clustered at the regional subsidy cell level). Regional subsidies are the average amount of subsidies
available to the firm in the father’s first two years of tenure at the firm (expressed in thousands of year 2000 euros). Additional variables
included are reported in Table 2, column (4).
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Table A5: Summary of results - Mother
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit. Equation: On-time graduation
Mother has a PERM contract -0.0014 -0.0059 -0.0069 -0.0048
(0.0277) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0281)
OLS. Equation: On-time graduation
Mother has a PERM contract -0.0012 -0.0065 -0.0075 -0.0057
(0.0297) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302)
Intention to Treat Effects
Reduced form. Equation: On-time graduation
Regional subsidies mother -0.0062 -0.0053 -0.0050 -0.0045
(0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0089)
First stage. Equation: Perm contract
Regional subsidies mother 0.0125* 0.0117* 0.0117* 0.0117*
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
F test of excluded instruments 3.24 2.89 2.91 2.88
N 2350 2350 2350 2350
Probit coefficients displayed are average marginal effects. Clustered robust SE in parentheses (clustered
at the regional subsidy cell level). Regional subsidies are the average amount of subsidies available to
the firm in the mother’s first two years of tenure at the firm (expressed in thousands of year 2000 euros).
Variables included in the different specifications are the same ones as the reported in Table 2 for fathers.
Unweighted estimates.
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Table A6: Other characteristics of Perms vs Temps: European Household Panel
Fathers Mothers
Temps Perms Diff Temps Perms Diff
Degree of satisfaction with several aspects of the job (1: not satisfied to 6: completely satisfied-)
Earnings satisfaction 2.824 3.428 -0.604*** 2.864 3.399 -0.535***
(1.249) (1.320) (-4.83) (1.366) (1.271) (-3.43)
Job stability 2.954 4.866 -1.912*** 2.852 4.942 -2.090***
(1.380) (1.214) (-14.80) (1.630) (1.217) (-11.18)
Type of job 4.160 4.536 -0.375*** 3.897 4.553 -0.657***
(1.408) (1.200) (-2.86) (1.585) (1.301) (-3.54)
Hours worked 3.893 4.127 -0.234* 3.886 4.347 -0.461***
(1.366) (1.348) (-1.82) (1.401) (1.221) (-3.02)
Shift worked 4.092 4.402 -0.311** 4.207 4.570 -0.363**
(1.344) (1.313) (-2.47) (1.390) (1.284) (-2.28)
Labour conditions 3.746 4.399 -0.652*** 4.443 4.394 0.0496
(1.427) (1.282) (-5.22) (1.267) (1.344) (0.31)
Distance to workplace 3.588 4.406 -0.818*** 4.102 4.341 -0.239
(1.529) (1.440) (-5.90) (1.501) (1.528) (-1.30)
Average job satisfaction 3.602 4.312 -0.710*** 3.736 4.368 -0.632***
(0.885) (0.847) (-8.69) (0.928) (0.841) (-6.02)
Health related characteristics
Subjective health status 2.030 2.052 -0.0220 2.068 2.080 -0.0119
(0.778) (0.660) (-0.31) (0.785) (0.719) (-0.13)
Suffers chronic disease 0.150 0.0955 0.0549* 0.114 0.131 -0.0178
(0.359) (0.294) (1.66) (0.319) (0.338) (-0.44)
Stay hospital last 12 months 0.0677 0.0434 0.0243 0.0455 0.0673 -0.0219
(0.252) (0.204) (1.05) (0.209) (0.251) (-0.83)
Number visits doctor 2.361 2.382 -0.0212 2.773 2.913 -0.141
(1.361) (1.232) (-0.18) (1.345) (1.266) (-0.91)
Other variables
Annual labour earnings 1227870.9 2770000.2 -1542129.3*** 826226.3 1988890.5 -1162664.2***
(772725.7) (1909696.2) (-15.78) (787777.3) (1018455.5) (-11.41)
Never moved from current region 0.626 0.602 0.0239 0.670 0.644 0.0262
(0.486) (0.490) (0.53) (0.473) (0.480) (0.45)
Been unemployed in last 5 years 0.698 0.117 0.581*** 0.591 0.173 0.418***
(0.461) (0.322) (14.18) (0.494) (0.379) (7.34)
Vandalism in neighborhood 0.223 0.167 0.0556 (0.418) (0.374) (1.46)
N 139 694 88 312
Own calculations using data from the Spanish section of the European Household Panel. Data belongs to fathers and mothers that have
a permanent or a temporary contract, and are parents of individuals turning 17 in the panel (1995-2001) that live with at least one of
the parents. The 3rd and 6th column shows the difference in means for both groups (permanent contract vs temporary contract), and in
parentheses, the value of the t-stat for a test of equality of means. Standard errors in parentheses in the second line. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Weights not used but results using weights are very similar. Annual labour earnings in pesetas.
Subjective health status is measured in a 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad) scale.
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